

HERAKLEITOS

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Herakleitos

If any apology is needed for the discussion at the present moment* of such an academic subject as

A Philosopher of War.

the philosophy of Herakleitos, it seems to the present writer to consist in the

fact that Herakleitos is pre-eminently a philosopher of war. Like Hobbes at a later date, Herakleitos found, wherever he looked, the reign of war and strife. War, said Herakleitos, is the Father of all, and King of all: πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς. He who wished to do away with the reign of strife in this world knew not what he said. Herakleitos thus blamed Homer for praying that strife might perish from among gods and men; he said that Homer did not see that he was thus praying for the destruction of the universe, for, if his prayer was granted, it would happen that all things would pass away. The cessation of strife, in short, thus means the end of the world; for, the world, said Herakleitos, is supported by strife. War, therefore, is the condition of nature, and as such we may identify strife and justice, said Herakleitos: εἰδέναι δίκην ἔριν. Lastly, not only is war, said Herakleitos, natural and just, but we may also say that it is the very spring of all things, and that all things come into being through strife: γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν.

Such in a nutshell is the war-philosophy of that dark Ephesian philosopher, Herakleitos, who is

Personality and style.

said to have flourished in Asia Minor in the sixty-ninth Olympiad. The more

exact dates of his life and death have been fixed in modern times to be 535 B. C. and 475 B. C. From the great perplexity of his writings, Herakleitos came to be surnamed the Obscure (ὁ σκοτεινός). Even the great Aristotle complained about the grammatical difficulties in Herakleitos' work. This work is said to have borne the customary title περὶ φύσεως. Even though we have not the whole work of Herakleitos before us, we have sufficient fragments extant from that work to enable us to reconstruct Herakleitos' philosophy tolerably satisfactorily. Herakleitos wrote in aphorisms, which is the real reason of

* This essay was first published in February, 1916,

his occasional obscurity. To take one illustration out of many, it is impossible to make out what Herakleitos meant when he called gods mortals, and men immortals: θεοὶ θνητοί, ἄνθρωποι ἄθάνατοι. Very often, however, Herakleitos' meaning is plain when we once understand the secret of his philosophy; but we must remember that his style is often antithetical: the name of the bow (βίος), he says, is life (βίος), but its work is death—τοῦ βιοῦ οὖνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.

Herakleitos has been called a weeping philosopher, as contrasted with Demokritos, who is called a laughing philosopher. The charge against Herakleitos is due to some traces of pessimism found in his writings. Man, says Herakleitos, is kindled and put out like a light in the night-time: ἄνθρωπος, ὅπως ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φῶς, ἄπτεται ἀποσβέννυται. Time, he says elsewhere, is like a child playing draughts; it "amuses itself with counters, and builds castles on the sea-shore for the sake of throwing them down again: construction and destruction, destruction and construction"—this is how the supreme principle acts (Gomperz: Greek Thinkers I. 64). Even though, therefore, we have some justification for calling Herakleitos a weeping philosopher, we have still more justification for calling him a philosopher who made other people weep. We know how he inveighed against all his predecessors, Homer, and Hesiod, and Pythagoras, and Xenophanes, and the rest. About Homer, he said that he deserved to be turned out of the lists and whipped with lashes: τὸν Ὅμηρον ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι. Pythagoras, he said, made a wisdom of his own—much learning and bad art: Πυθαγόρης ἐποίησε ἑωυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. About Hesiod, and Pythagoras, and Xenophanes, as a whole, he says that their much learning had not yet taught them understanding: "much learning teacheth not understanding, else it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes": πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἄν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτίς τε Ξενοφάνεα. It is worth while remembering that Herakleitos inveighs against Pythagoras in this strain, even though he was indebted to him for the idea of the lyre of which he made an important use in his system, as we shall see later on, and that he criticised Xenophanes in spite of Xenophanes' similar attitude towards Homer and Hesiod, who, in his opinion, "ascribed to the

Gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace even among mortals—stealings and adulteries, and deceivings of one another". In the light of such severe criticisms it would be better to call Herakleitos a philosopher who did not himself weep, but made other people weep; an ὄχλολοῖδος who railed at the people, a veritable fire-breathing philosopher like his later compeer—Nietzsche.

Herr Pfeiderer wishes us to look upon Herakleitos in the light of the idea of the mysteries: "im lichte der Mysterien-idee". The opinion is entirely groundless. Herr Pfeiderer does not seem to have noticed the severe attack that Herakleitos made against all people who took part in mysteries. He calls them night-walkers, wizards, bacchanals, revellers, mystery-mongers—*νυκτιπόλοι, μάγοι, βάκχοι, λήναι, μύσται*—a worse terminology of abuse could scarcely be invented; for what are called mysteries among men they celebrate in an unholy way: *τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μνεῦνται*. In the light of such utterances of Herakleitos, it would be sheer madness to consider Herakleitos in any sense a mystic. Among the two traditions discussed by Mr. Cornford in his book "From Religion to Philosophy," we may safely refer Herakleitos to the scientific tradition, and not to the mystical tradition. The only claim of Herakleitos to a niche in the mystic shrine is his aphoristic, epigrammatic, and cryptic style. But mere aphorism is not mysticism, and we may safely regard Herakleitos as even an anti-mystic, remembering what importance Herakleitos attached to the dry light of reason: the dry soul, said Herakleitos, is wisest and best: *αὕη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*.

We are now prepared to discuss the relation of Herakleitos to Parmenides. We have already seen above that Herakleitos refers to Xenophanes, while we can undoubtedly say that Parmenides refers to Herakleitos, so that Herakleitos may be safely put down as having flourished *between* Xenophanes and Parmenides. Zeller, however, flatly denies that Parmenides was acquainted with the doctrine of Herakleitos (Vol. II pp. 111-12). Zeller does not take into account the important reference in Parmenides, which unmistakably points to Herakleitos: "Undiscerning crowds", says Parmenides, "in whose eyes it is and is not, the

Relation to Parmenides.

same and not the same, and who suppose *that all things follow a back-turning course*': πάντων δὲ παλίντροπος ἐστὶ κέλευθος. Here we may notice that Parmenides is using the very word, which, as we shall see later on, Herakleitos had used before him—παλίντροπος—which makes it unmistakably clear that Herakleitos preceded Parmenides, and that, in spite of Zeller, Herakleitos' doctrine was definitely known to Parmenides. And if it is clear that Herakleitos preceded Parmenides, it is also clear that the doctrine of becoming *preceded* the doctrine of being, and Hegel's contention that the logical category of becoming must *follow* that of being is not historically justified. And this becomes an aspersion on one of Hegel's favourite ideas that the logical order of development corresponds to the historical, and that the categories of the Understanding are at the same time the categories of the Cosmos.

One of the central points in the philosophy of Herakleitos is his idea of perpetual change, of a continuous flux. This was expressed by Plato and Aristotle in the celebrated expression πάντα ῥεῖ—all things flow. Herakleitos himself never used these words; but the expression summed up, according to Plato and Aristotle, the essential teaching of Herakleitos. Herakleitos however says himself that the Sun that rises up every morning is new every day; νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἥλιος. Herakleitos also expressed his favourite idea of incessant change in that oft-quoted sentence of his: you cannot step twice into the same waters, for "other and yet other waters are ever flowing on": ἕτερα γὰρ καὶ ἕτερα ἐπιρρέει ὕδατα. This doctrine of the Master that it is impossible for us to step into the same rivers *twice* had its nemesis in the teaching of one of his disciples who held that it is impossible for us to step into the water *even once*, for as soon as we are placing our foot in it, the water has already run off. Then, again, Epicharmos made fun of Herakleitos' doctrine by putting the doctrine of perpetual flux in the mouth of a debtor. Why should the debtor pay his debts at all, seeing that the man who borrowed is not the same as the man who was going to pay? Anyhow, irrespective of such extravagances to which the doctrine was carried, we may say that Herakleitos broached for the first time an important scientific truth that nothing in this world is absolutely stationary, but that all things are perpetually changing, and that it is not the static aspect of things but the dynamic aspect that matters for science.

Herakleitos had now to find out a substance which would serve as basis for this process of incessant change. As Anaximenes had chosen Air as his *φύσις* because it had a greater capacity of change than the Water of Thales, so Herakleitos chose Fire as his *φύσις* because it was more changeable than the Air of Anaximenes. Volatility or the capacity to change seems to be the reason which led these philosophers to fix upon their primal substance. Fire, said Herakleitos, was the type of change ; for look at fire, he said, the fuel is turning into smoke, from behind smoke are emerging cinders, and the cinders are turning into ashes. The whole process is symbolic of change. Herakleitos expressed this darkly when he said in a cryptic style that the Thunderbolt steers the course of all things : τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός ; that it was Fire, whether celestial or terrestrial did not matter, that directed the course of the Universe. He said, moreover, that the world had been made neither by gods nor by men ; that it always was, and is, and would be a Fire Everlasting : κόσμον...οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ζεῖζων.

What Herakleitos exactly meant by fire (πῦρ) has been a bone of contention among historians of philosophy. This is, as we shall see presently, one of the crucial points of "interpretation" in Early Greek Philosophy. Lassalle would argue in Hegelian fashion, and say that "fire" is just the idea of becoming, which includes under it the notions of being and not-being. Teichmüller would argue that by "fire" Herakleitos meant the actual fire that burns and crackles on the hearth. Zeller would say that Herakleitos might have meant by "fire" warm matter in general (Vol. II. p. 24). Anyhow, it does not seem possible that Herakleitos might have meant by fire the "element" of its name, which was the sense in which Empedokles and Aristotle later understood it (Zeller, Vol. II p. 53). Herakleitos understood by Fire a kind of world-forming force, the λόγος, and he identified it in succession with Zeus and with Eternity. It was the supreme principle of the world, from which various forms of matter went forth, and to which they returned. Herakleitos has given us a very pregnant aphorism, which tells us that the Way Up and the Way Down are one and the same : ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ αὐτή ; that from fire proceed air, and water, and earth in that order,

which is the Way Down, and to fire they return in the reverse order, which is the Way Up.

Herakleitos is therefore a kind of monist, and Zeller goes to the length of calling his philosophy "the most outspoken Pantheism" (*The Problem of the One and the Many*, Vol. II. p. 46). And yet it must be remembered that Herakleitos does not deny true reality to the Many as his predecessor Anaximander had done : he reconciles the opposite claims of the One and the Many in the only way possible for him. He tells us how it is wise to accept that all things are One : *ὁμολογέειν σοφὸν ἐστὶ, ἐν παντὶ εἶναι* ; but the Many and the One are interdependent, and from all things arises the One and from the One all things : *ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα*. We must also remember that famous reference in Plato's "Sophist" to the reconciliation of the Many and the One by Herakleitos, and by Empedokles. Plato tells us : "Certain Ionian, and at a later date, certain Sicilian Muses remarked that reality is both many and one ; for, say the more severe Muses, in its division it is *always* being brought together, while the softer Muses relax the requirement that it should be so, and say that the All is *alternately* one and many". By the severe Ionian Muses, Plato means Herakleitos, and by the soft Sicilian muses, he means Empedokles. And we incidentally gather Plato's opinion that Herakleitos held that Reality was One and Many simultaneously, and that Empedokles held that it was so only alternately. We shall see very soon what use we can make of this statement.

But now if the One is Many, and the Many One to Herakleitos, what is the actual process by which this becomes so ? Anaximander had said that contraries came out of his *ἄπειρον* by the process of "separation"; Anaximenes had said that it was by the processes of "rarefaction and condensation" that from air proceeded all things ; Herakleitos now comes forward, and gives us the process by which the one becomes many, and the many one, in his important idea of Exchange (*ἁμοιβή*), which is a clever anticipation of the modern idea of Conservation of Energy. All things, says Herakleitos, are exchanged for fire, and fire for all things, even as wares are exchanged for gold, and gold for wares : *πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα, καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ χρυσοῦ χρομάττα, καὶ χρομάτων χρυσοῦς*. Thus it comes about that fire is

exchanged for air and water and earth, and air and water and earth are exchanged for fire, for we see that fire gives out smoke but receives fuel instead. Anyhow, there is no destruction of matter. Exchanges are always going on in the world, energy is conserved, "measures" are fixed. The Sun, says Herakleitos, will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, the handmaids of justice, will find him out: ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα. εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑρινύες μιν δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσι. The process, then, by which the One passes into Many, and the Many into One, as well as that by which anything can pass into another, may be termed, says Herakleitos, *ἁμολογία*; this will secure the fixity of measures, for the soul of it is justice. If we understand, thus, the two catchwords in the philosophy of Herakleitos, change and exchange, we may understand the whole of Herakleitos' philosophy.

The one great problem that presents itself before any philosophy of change is how to account for the static appearance of the world. We have seen above that the law of the conservation of measures may be theoretically supposed to secure the appearance of stability. But even this is insufficient to explain the actual mode of working which produces the static appearance of the world. With a view, then, to explain the actual mode by which this result could be secured, Herakleitos gives us another very significant notion: the law of opposite tension. Philo tells us that Herakleitos boasted of a great discovery when he said that harmony was secured by opposite tension. At any given moment, said Herakleitos, even though they are constantly changing, each of the three forms of matter, Fire, Water, and Earth is made up of two equal portions; these equal portions are always being drawn in opposite directions; and it is this opposite tension which secures harmony. In short, what Herakleitos' doctrine about the static appearance of the world comes to is this, that there appears to be a stability in the world for the simple reason that, in the terminology of modern science, action and reaction are equal and opposite. The war which Herakleitos saw between things, he also saw inside things: out of strife everywhere proceeded the fairest harmony. Harmony, he said, lies in bending back, as, for example, of the bow and the lyre: *παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη, ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης*. "As the arrow is leaving the string, the harmony of the bow is secured."

by the opposite tension of the hands ; and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and re-tension. Such is also the secret of the universe" (Campbell). Does not a painter, asks Herakleitos, produce his harmonious effects by the contrast of colours, and the musician by that of high and low notes ? And if the law of opposition governs the sphere of art, why should we not suppose that it has supreme power everywhere ?

The idea of opposite tension also led Herakleitos to formulate for the first time the famous Law of Relativism, which later on influenced Sophistic teaching. Gomperz has said (Vol. I. p. 71) that Herakleitos in his Law of Relativism anticipates the modern conception of polarity. The Law of Relativism does away with differences of kind among things, and substitutes instead differences of degree. There is no absolute distinction between night and day, said Herakleitos, between life and death, between good and bad. Hesiod was wrong in saying in his "Theogony" that Day was the child of Night : he did not know that Night and Day are one : 'Ησίοδος...ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκε. ἔστι γὰρ ἓν. Then again, Herakleitos said that Life and Death, Youth and Old age, are the same : τὰντ' εἶναι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός, καὶ νέον καὶ γηράϊον. Then, again, Herakleitos boldly preached that Good and Bad are one : ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν τὰντόν : this is veritably the supermoralism of his later analogue Nietzsche, who wishes us to go beyond Good and Evil. Herakleitos illustrates his Law of Relativism by taking other illustrations. The sea, he says, is both purest and foulest water : θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μισρώτατον. It is purest for fish, but foulest for men, thus pointing to the conclusion that there is no absolute nature of sea-water. Herakleitos also says that extremes meet, as we find that the beginning and the end of the circle is the same : ξυνὸν ἀρχὴ καὶ πέραις. Then he says that we step and do not step into the same rivers (this was how he was obliged to modify his original theory of perpetual change in the light of the law of Relativism) ; we are and we are not : ποταμοῖσι τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι ἐμβάινομεν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβάινομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμέν. It was such an antinomianism of Herakleitos which might have led Plato to give us the interesting puzzle in his Republic : "A man and no man, seeing and not seeing a bird and no bird, sitting upon wood

and no wood, struck and did not strike it with a stone and no stone".

If we ask Herakleitos whether his law of Relativism holds good in the case of God, he gives two different answers at two different places. Once he says that the law of Relativism holds good even about God: the First Principle, he says, is willing to be called Zeus, and unwilling to be called Zeus: λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς οὐνομα. But he says elsewhere that the law of Relativism stops at God, even though it holds good about men: to God, he says, all things are fair and good and just, but men hold some things unjust and some just: τῷ μὲν θεῷ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἄγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἅ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν, ἅ δὲ δίκαια. The conclusion at which Herakleitos arrives is that "God is both day and night, war and peace, surfeit and hunger; but He takes various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each". In short, says Herakleitos, every one gives Him the name he pleases: ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐκάστου.

There is one important point which emerges from Herakleitos' doctrine of Relativism. If the law of Relativism is right, it is equivalent to a flat denial of the law of Contradiction; and it was Aristotle who first noticed this, and who therefore ranked Herakleitos along with Anaxagoras and Protagoras among the chief violaters of the Law of Contradiction. If the Law of Relativism is right, Reality is both many and one, good and bad: this entirely violates the Law of Contradiction which tells us that A cannot be B and not-B at the same time. Zeller, however, argues against the authority of Aristotle (Vol. II. pp. 36-37), and asserts that Herakleitos did not deny the law of Contradiction. "Though Herakleitos asserts", says Zeller, "that opposite qualities can belong to the same subject, he does not say that they belong to it in the same respect: to assert, in other words, that opposites are found in the same subject is not to assert their identity. The former view alone can be deduced from the examples which Herakleitos brings forward, and he had no occasion to go farther, since his concern was not with speculative Logic but with Physics." To the mind of the present writer, Zeller is entirely ignoring the fact that Herakleitos supposed that Reality was

Many and One simultaneously, that is, at the same time. Otherwise, the whole point of the distinction between the Ionian Muses and the Sicilian Muses which Plato drew in his "Sophist" would be entirely lost. Plato says, that, to Herakleitos, Reality was many and one simultaneously, and to Empedokles, alternately. If, then, Plato is right in maintaining this distinction between Herakleitos and Empedokles, it follows that Herakleitos did hold that Reality was Many and One at the same time, thus breaking the Law of Contradiction. It was no more than this simple fact which Aristotle wished to draw our attention to, when he said that Herakleitos violated the Law of Contradiction. We see thus how Zeller's defence of Herakleitos falls to the ground.

If there is any one point more than another which has caused the greatest amount of divergence in the interpretation of Herakleitos, it is the question as to whether Herakleitos did or did not hold the theory of periodic conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσις*). The controversy between Zeller and Burnet on this point is very keen, Zeller asserting that Herakleitos did hold a theory of conflagration, Burnet saying that we have no evidence to ascribe the theory to Herakleitos. Zeller's arguments are, in short, these : (1) that Anaximander and Anaximenes had held a theory of conflagration even before Herakleitos ; (2) that we have Aristotle's testimony that Herakleitos did believe in such a Conflagration ; (3) that even those Stoics who were opposed to the doctrine of Conflagration say that Herakleitos held it ; (4) that we have an utterance of Herakleitos himself to the effect that fire in its advance will judge and convict all things—*πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινέει καὶ καταληφεται*—thus proving that he believed in a universal Conflagration by fire ; (5) and that even though the idea of Conflagration is inconsistent with another central idea of Herakleitos' system, namely, perpetual Change, Herakleitos unfortunately did not see this inconsistency, and allowed it to remain in his system.

Burnet, on the other hand, argues against ascribing the theory of Conflagration to Herakleitos. His arguments are in short : (1) that the idea of Conflagration which reconciles all opposites, and that of Change which retains all opposites in a state of war, are mutually contradictory ; (2) that Plato intends to say about Herak-

leitos in his "Sophist" that he maintained that the One was always Many, and the Many always One, which would give the lie direct to the theory of Conflagration; (3) that the only clear statements about the fact that Herakleitos taught the doctrine of a general Conflagration are posterior to the rise of Stoicism; (4) that the theory of measures, the metaphor of exchange, and the criticism of Homer's prayer that strife should cease, all go against it; (5) that lastly, Herakleitos positively asserts that the world has been created neither by gods nor by men, but that it always was, and is, and shall be a fire ever-living, a passage which we have already quoted : κόσμον...ἣν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεζώνον.

The present writer thinks however that both Zeller and Burnet have gratuitously assumed that Conflagration and Change are mutually contradictory, and that if we once admit

Conflagration and Change not contradictory.

Conflagration we thereby deny the possibility of future Change. Now, Conflagration and Change are so far from being contradictory, that they are both of them equally essential for a right understanding of Herakleitos' position. Herakleitos did not suppose that when the world was overtaken by a Conflagration, there was for ever an end of it; on the other hand, he seems to have held that at the time of the Conflagration, the world, as it takes the Way Up, so far from being reduced to nothing, is reduced to a Ball of Fire, because the measures must always be conserved; and that when a future periodic generation of the world takes place, it is by this Ball of Fire taking the Way Down that we get to the world once more. In fact, the Way Up and the Way Down themselves are an indication of the belief of Herakleitos in a periodic Conflagration, a point which neither Zeller nor Burnet has noticed; and thus Conflagration, so far from being contradictory of Change, as both of them have gratuitously assumed, becomes the necessary condition of Change. And so, as we see, both Zeller and Burnet are and are not right, and are and are not wrong, if we may be allowed to speak in the strain of Herakleitos himself. At the time of the Conflagration, the world is reduced to a Ball of Fire, which contains in it the potentiality of change, and at the time of the Creation, the Ball of Fire emerges as the world once more. This is how, as Herakleitos said, Time is playing draughts like a child, building castles on the sea-shore for the purpose of throwing them down again. We may compare with this the

whole of the poem of Sir Rabindranath Tagore "On the sea-shore"—where he speaks of "Children gathering pebbles to scatter them over again" (Gitanjali p. 55.)

We must now pass to another important point about

Herakleitos—his great practical wisdom.

Practical Wisdom : Psychology and Ethics.

Even the fragment of his work that is left to us teems with wise sayings which all of us might usefully fix in memory. Speaking about scientific effort, he says that Nature loves to hide—*φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ*; and if he had lived in Bacon's days, he would certainly have added that even though the greatness of Nature lies in concealing things, the greatness of Man consists in bringing them out. Speaking about the soul, he says, how the soul is unlimited, how one cannot discover the limits of the soul : *ψυχῆς πείρατα οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο*. He is again the first philosopher we know who asserts the fact of self-consciousness; true to the teaching of the Delphic Oracle, he tells us how he sought himself : *ἐδιζήσάμην ἐμεωυτόν*. Herakleitos again is the first definite champion of Rationalism : Reason is "common", he says, and yet most people live as though they had each an individual understanding : *τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζῶουσι οἱ πολλοὶ ὥς ἰδίην ἔχοντες φρόνησιν*. The sleeping, he says, drift each to his separate world; but "those that are awake have one common world" : *τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι*. This is as much as to say that universal judgments become possible only from the standpoint of Reason, but Sense gives us each a separate judgment. In Ethics, he points out how it is delight to souls to become moist : *ψυχῇσι τέρψις ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι*. He inveighs against the practice of wine-drinking : Hades and Dionysos, he says, are the same : *ὧν τ' ὁ δὲ Ἄϊδης καὶ Δίονυσος*. We must, hence, not allow our souls to worship Dionysos, in other words, to become moist; it is the dry soul which is the wisest and best : *αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. He insists on the power of Justice in this world; he tells us how Justice shall overtake forgers of lies, and the witnesses to them : *δίκη κατὰλήψεται ψευδέων τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας*. He expatiates on the great value of character; our character, he tells us, is our guarding angel : *ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων*—a text which must have supplied Fletcher with a fruitful idea when he said :—

"Our acts our angels are, or good or ill,
Our fatal shadows that walk by us still."

The social views of Herakleitos are not less remarkable:

Views about Society.

he was a hard aristocrat who clamoured against the many-headed monster—the people. “Fools,” he says, “they are like the deaf: they are absent when present.” The many, he adds, are bad, and the few are good: πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί. One man would be ten thousand to him, he says, if he be best: εἰς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ᾖ. Even though he attacked democracy in this severe style, he did not forget the divine element in all human laws. Far from arguing like the later Sophists, that the human law, because it is a conventional law, deserves to be abandoned in favour of the law of nature, Herakleitos argued that the human law partakes of the natural law, which is at the same time a divine law: “Fed are all human laws,” he says, “by one which is divine”: τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου. And yet he takes to pieces some of the Greek social institutions like sacrifice and image-worship, two chief pillars of the Greek Religion. About sacrifice, he says, that in it “people vainly try for purification by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into mud were to try to wash his feet clean with mud”; in other words, he says that there is no power for purification in a blood-defiled sacrifice. Lastly, he vociferously clamours against idol-worship, saying that “he who prays to an image is chattering to a stone-wall.”

Having thus seen the various sides of Herakleitos' philosophy, we are now prepared to estimate

Influence on Ancient Philosophers.

the influence that he exercised on the succeeding philosophers. (1) The most direct influence that Herakleitos exercised, and the earliest in point of time, was that on Protagoras. We have seen how Herakleitos preached a kind of Relativism which directly paved the way for the *Homo Mensura* of Protagoras. We have Plato's authority for saying that the doctrine of Protagoras must be referred back to Herakleitos, as we may see from Plato's “Theaetetus”. (2) Then again, by Aristotle's consent, we cannot understand Plato's philosophy, unless we suppose it to be a synthesis of Herakleiticism and Socratism, unless, in other words, we suppose that Plato adopted Herakleitos' flux for his phenomenal world, and the Socratic permanence for his Ideal world. Thus, it is clear how Plato himself was influenced

by Herakleitos. (3) Thirdly, the influence which Herakleitos wielded on the Stoics is very remarkable. If the relativistic side of Herakleitos' philosophy connects him with the Sophists, the rationalistic side of his philosophy connects him with the Stoics. The implacable determinism of Herakleitos which he expressed when he said ἔστι γὰρ εἰμαρμένον πάντως...found its way in the Stoic system, along with another pregnant idea of Herakleitos, his insistence on Reason or Word which he called λόγος for the first time in the History of Philosophy. Men seem to know it not, he says, "even though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word" : γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον. This combination of the ideas of Necessity and Reason, which at the same time is a kind of Justice, is the very bountiful legacy which Herakleitos left to the Stoics. But as soon as we have said that it was Herakleitos who first used the Word λόγος in a philosophical sense, we know what a large vista opens before us of the mighty influence of Herakleitos. We have said that the Stoics directly borrowed the λόγος doctrine from Herakleitos in the sense of the immanent Reason of the world. The only modification that the Stoics introduced in the conception was to suppose a kind of an original λόγος σπερματικός, which in its turn was to produce a number of λόγοι σπερματικοί, the immanent Reason in the world to produce a number of lesser immanent Reasons in men. Philo, the Jew, later adopted the term λόγος from his predecessors Herakleitos and the Stoics, but he understood by it much more than the immanent principle of Reason. He understood it in the sense of "the divine dynamic, the energy and the self-revelation of God" (*Vide* Article "Logos" in En. Br. XIth Edition). Lastly, when St. John borrowed it from Philo and made use of it in his Fourth Gospel, he introduced a still more important modification in it by making it fully personal, by saying how the Word became Flesh, and by subordinating the aspect of λόγος as Reason to that of λόγος as Word, which hitherto had run into one another. Just as the word we speak is an expression of our spirit, so Christ was the Divine Word sent out by the Father as an expression of His spirit. This, in short, is the history of the word λόγος, which Herakleitos had the credit of having first invented, and philosophically used. (4) There is another aspect of the influence which Herakleitos wielded on Christianity, and this is a point, which, so far as the present writer is aware, has not yet been noticed by anybody. The very

remarkable expression which Herakleitos uses παιδὸς ἡ βασιλείη, "the kingdom belongs to the child," became later on one of the central teachings of Christianity, namely, in the doctrine of humility: "Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (St. Matthew XVIII. 3).

Coming to modern times, we find that Herakleitos' influence is no less remarkable. (1) Hegel was very largely influenced by the theories of Herakleitos. Hegel expressly says how Becoming is the first chief category to reckon with in Logic, as Herakleitos is the first chief philosopher to reckon with in Philosophy. Hegel avails himself of the central idea of Change in Herakleitos, which he transmutes into a theory of Development; he again avails himself of the idea of the harmony of opposite tension in Herakleitos, which he transmutes into his favourite logical device of thesis and antithesis to be subsumed under a higher synthesis. In short, the very keystone of his methodology Hegel owes to Herakleitos, and it consists, we may say, just in the idea of *development by contradiction*. (2) Then again, we know how Herakleitos influenced some modern reactionaries like Proudhon and Nietzsche. The revolutionary Proudhon, says Gomperz, (Vol I. P. 77) was the exactest counterpart of the Ephesian: in their mental habits and their love of paradox, they were as like each other as two peas. While Nietzsche borrowed not merely Herakleitos' habit of retiring to mountain-fastnesses, but he borrowed his whole philosophy of war, and crowned these with the doctrine of Supermoralism—"Beyond Good and Evil"—of which he made an originally perverse use. (3) While Herakleitos' Philosophy of Change has been echoed in modern times from the halls of the Collège de France, and Herakleitos' teaching seems at last to have fallen on very fruitful soil. To Bergson, as to Herakleitos, immobility is purely an appearance. Reality is ever in a flux, and we could hardly think of Becoming unless we set going a kind of cinematograph inside us, unless, "if we are not abusing this kind of illustration, the cinematographical character of our knowledge of things is due to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation to them" (*Creative Evolution* p. 323). We see therefore that Bergson is largely indebted to Herakleitos in his idea of perpetual flux, but with this difference, that while to Herakleitos the flux is physical, to Bergson, the flux is psychical.

Influence on Modern Philosophers.

If we were now to survey Herakleitos' philosophy as a whole,
 we might be astonished to see how many
General Survey. novel ideas Herakleitos contributed to
 Philosophy. In Science, a man who first

noticed the absolutely dynamic aspect of the universe, who not merely asserted the reign of absolute Law, but who also imagined that the soul of Necessity was Justice, and who first anticipated as through a glass darkly two significant notions of modern science, namely, Conservation and Polarity; in Psychology, who first asserted the fact of Self-consciousness; in Epistemology, who first dared to proclaim a definite Rationalism by his stress on what he called the "Common"; in Morals, a scoffer at Dionysos and wine, and, in brief, the moisture of soul; in Politics, a railer at the people, in spite of the fact that he believed that all human laws rested on a divine foundation: Herakleitos stands out, like an ancient Carlyle, "a bold, paradoxical, and solitary figure," the head and fount of two opposing streams of thought, Relativism and Rationalism, which between them have divided the whole philosophic world down to this day. "If we may echo his own cry", says Gomperz, "Herakleitos was and was not the bulwark of conservatism, he was and was not the champion of revolt." Herakleitos shines on the horizon of Greek Philosophy like a solitary star of the first magnitude, suffering no peer near his throne, forming no school of thought, and yet, in his self-isolation exercising a potent influence on the whole course of Ancient and Modern Philosophy.

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