

STUDIES IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Prof. R. D. Ranade



Editor : B. R. Kulkarni




MAHARASHTRA STATE BOARD FOR LITERATURE AND CULTURE
BOMBAY

Calendar of events in
Prof. R. D. Ranade's life

1886	Birth.
1901	Initiation into spiritual life by Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj. Umadi
1914	Awarded Chancellor's Gold Medal
1915	Lectures at Bangalore on the philosophy of the Upanishads. The lectures were later published under the title 'A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy'
1924	Started Academy of Philosophy and Religion Launched upon the scheme of an Encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy
1927	Invited to the chair of Philosophy, Allahabad University.
1928	Delivered Basu Mallik Lectures under the auspices of Calcutta University which were later published under the title Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought.
1928	Delivered Rao Bahadur Kinkhede Lectures under the auspices of Nagpur University which were later published under the title The Bhagvad-gītā as a Philosophy of God- realisation.
1933	Publication of Mysticism in Maharashtra.
1947	Awarded D. Litt. degree honoris Causa by Allahabad University
1954	Delivered lectures at Karnatak University, Dharwar which were later published under the title: Pathway to God in Kannada Literature
1957	Niryana

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R. D. RANADE
(1886-1957)

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Studies in Indian Philosophy

Prof. R. D. Ranade



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FOREWORD

It has always been my earnest desire to preserve every word of Shri Gurudev and to offer it to the world of scholarship. I am exceedingly happy that the present work is being published under the auspices of the Sahitya Samskriti Mandal, Maharashtra State. My thanks are due to them.

The work, though partly in the form of Notes, will be found highly useful by students of philosophy and research scholars.

It is with great satisfaction that I place this scholarly treatise in the hands of all those interested in Philosophy and Religion.

Bombay:

(Mrs.) VIJAYA V. APTE

20th March 1986

PREFACE

It is our great privilege to publish 'Studies In Indian Philosophy', by late Prof. R. D. Ranade, a doyen of Indian Philosophy.

The history of philosophy is its own critique. The historical process involves development, evaluation, attempt at cancellation and rehabilitation of doctrines. Different Darsanas of Indian philosophy have their own basic assumptions which they sometime share with others. Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sāmkhya, Yoga or Dvaita Vedanta all share the doctrine of the reality of the world. Similarly, Buddhism and Jainism, though very different in approach from Advaita Vedanta, share with the latter several epistemological doctrines. The Advaita system itself, to which Shri Ranade belongs, has developed on account of the intellectual warfare with other philosophical systems and the conflicts arising within the system itself. Comparisons and criticisms have always helped development of philosophical thought. This is borne out by the present work also, though briefly. We wish we had a fuller exposition of such comparison from this great master.

We are happy that we are able to publish this yet unpublished work during Professor Ranade's Birth Centenary Year. The Board deems it an honour that Shri Gurudev R. D. Ranade Samādhi Trust, Nimbai (R.S.), has asked the Board to undertake the publication of this Volume. What more befitting tribute can be paid to late Professor R. D. Ranade, than bringing to light his hitherto unpublished works?

Bombay:
Gudi Padava
Chaitra Shuddha Pratipada
Shake 1908
10th April 1986

S. S. BARLINGAY
Chairman,
Maharashtra State Board for
Literature and Culture, Bombay.

EDITORIAL NOTE

The preservation of the thought of the Master throws on the disciples a special responsibility of propagating his philosophy in all its pristine purity. What a disciple or an Editor can do is to add a foot-note here or a foot-note there.

The Notes left by Gurudev R. D. Ranade are valuable and constitute a rich heritage. They contain original suggestions and judgments and thus make a contribution to world-scholarship in general and to Indian Philosophy in particular. They are highly critical in value; though succinct, they are very lucid couched that they are in a simple style. The logical and developmental manner of arrangement of topics reflects his method of study and presentation. It is our confidence that many a research scholar would be benefited by a study of these Notes as they give a new vision to look at Indian Philosophy. Particular mention may be made of two Sections of Mimāṃsā System, namely the Doctrine of Śabda and the Doctrine of Sphoṭa. The topic "Contribution to the Science of Interpretation", will be very valuable for those who are interested in the study of Linguistics, and by those who want to specialise in the interpretation of the Hindu Law. In fact, the science of interpretation is a basic discipline. These days there are very few who study and appreciate the value of Mimāṃsā Philosophy. Unfortunately, it is dubbed as meaningless ritualism. The two sections treated in the present brochure are an epitome of the fundamental Mimāṃsā teachings. In our opinion, students of Linguistics cannot afford to disregard Mimāṃsā doctrines.

The Notes are unbiased and do not advocate any particular 'ism' of philosophy. Both the orthodox and heterodox schools are subjected to a severe criticism whenever their theory is not in conformity with logical reasoning. Neither the thrill of poetry nor an emotional out-burst is allowed to have an edge over cool philosophical reasoning.

Under Six Systems, Gurudev has included: (i) Sāṃkhya, (ii) Yoga, (iii) Buddhism, (iv) Jainism, (v) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and (vi) Pūrva-Mimāṃsā. This classification is different from the traditional school of Six Systems (Śaḍ -darśanas) which (a) does not include Buddhism and Jainism, (b) treats Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as separate systems and (c) includes Vedānta or Uttara-Mimāṃsā. His new classification seems to be oriented towards grouping non-Vedantic Schools together and treating them as Pūrva-pakṣas, and as such Vedānta constituting Uttara-pakṣa is taken out of the traditional fold. By the by the stand-point of the Uttara-pakṣa, namely Vedānta, has already been elucidated in his volume: Vedānta the

Culmination of Indian Thought published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay in 1970. A few of the Notes with some exposition appear in the above-mentioned volume.

Gurudev Ranade's interpretation of any doctrine is most natural. While scholars—both eastern and western—have laboured hard to understand correctly the import of the Buddhist doctrine of Pratitya-Samutpāda, Gurudev takes the term in its most natural sense. He splits the word into two parts—Pratiti + Asamutpāda and elucidates that what the doctrine implies is that in Pratiti or intuition, there is Asamutpāda i.e. non-creation of the world (P. 22). Only a God-realiser can give such an interpretation.

It is really wonderful how he would translate a technical term from Indian Philosophy into a technical term from Western Philosophy instead of just explaining its meaning. Thus the technical term Nayābhāsa (opposing standpoints) to be found in Jaina epistemology is rendered into the Kantian term—Antinomy.

His mathematical brain would always incline towards graphic presentation of the data wherever possible. Thus he would divide a page into two sections to present side by side the views of Prabhākara and Kumārila on all topics so that the similarities and differences between the two philosophical heavy weights (Pp. 71 ff) become at once obvious. The symbolic representation of systems expressing varying views on validity of knowledge (P. 55) makes the whole discussion precise and clear.

The salient features of his writings—systematisation, comparative approach, clarity of thought and lucidity of exposition, chaste language, employment of apt, western terminology and doctrines to display ancient Indian thought in the modern out-fit which make it more appealing—are all present in these Notes many of which are just jottings.

Mostly Gurudev Ranade has not—barring one or two places (P. 49)—specifically mentioned his own judgments regarding a topic dealt with. But the brief outline of a topic is interspersed with his own comments which can be easily noted by a discerning reader. At times there are brief summaries of standard works on a particular philosopher or a topic kept ready for critical exposition.

Sometimes two drafts of a section are given—one rough and one fair. If there is a specific instruction to omit the rough draft, it is omitted. If, however, there is no such specific instruction, the rough draft too is retained. In the latter case a comparative study of both the

drafts shows how the topics were rearranged, the rearrangement showing that Prof. Ranade was always thinking of the subject in order to put it in a still more systematic way. In this connection, we may refer to two drafts of the subject-headings of his Vedanta and Western Thought one of which was prepared as early as 1927.

Sometimes the sub-sections are indicated at 1, 2, 3.....; sometimes as i, ii, iii.....; or A, B, C,.....; or even a, b, c.....; bracketed or unbracketed. As every system was prepared independently and as these are but Notes, his usual rigour of maintaining uniformity is not found here. Again we do not know whether he wanted to develop each system into a separate book or prepare one single volume comprising all the Six Systems.

Notes on one section viz. 'Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla' place for which is indicated in Chapter III as well as Chapter V, are not available. It is mentioned that this section is typed separately but nowhere could it be found. So too "Analysis" of the Yoga Sūtras referred to on Pp. 14 and 18 could not be traced.

We have also included here his plan of the Pathway to God bearing the sub-title: A Study in the Philosophy of Beatificism. He wanted to write a volume on the Pathway to God (see P. 114) for which his works on the Upa- niṣads, the Bhagavad-gītā, Vedanta or the Three Pathways (Pathway to God in Marathi Literature, Pathway to God in Hindi Literature and Pathway to God in Kannada Literature) would constitute the basis.

Some of these Notes were taught by Shri Gurudev to his M.A. students.

Gurudev's Bibliography given at the end of each of the six systems would be found useful by those who want to undertake an intensive study of a system. The bibliography is not just a list of books; but it gives an analysis of the important contents of a book. There are also thought-provoking comments which would help a student to think independently and form his own judgment. In a couple of places, Gurudev's Bibliography refers to the Call Number of a book of the Allahabad University Library.

I must express my gratitude to Mrs. Vijayatai V. Apte (daughter of Shri Gurudev) for having made available the material for publication. It is very kind of her to have written a Foreword to this volume.

My heartfelt thanks are due to Dr. S. S. Barlingay, Chairman; Shri S. D. Deshmukh, Secretary of Sahitya Sanskriti Mandal, Maharashtra State, as well as Members of the

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Mandal for the keen interest they took in the publication of this work. But for their kind gesture the work would not have seen the light of day. The indefatigable efforts which Shri Vidyadhar Gokhale made in the furtherance of this sacred cause are beyond all praise. Shri R. B. Alva, Director; Shri G. D. Dhond, Dy. Director; Shri P. S. More, Manager and Shri A. C. Sayyed, Dy. Manager and the concerned staff of Government Central Press, Bombay have laid us under great obligation by their valuable help in the printing of the volume.

The Mss. was very old and in some places difficult to decipher. It goes to the credit of Shri S. D. Shintre who took the trouble of making a clean typed copy ready for the Press. Shri V. G. Nitsure typed the Bibliography appended to the Six Systems. Shri Vyankatesh Apte and Dr. P. M. Upadhye rendered whatever help was sought from them. To all these earnest devotees who have done the job in a spirit of sacrifice our gratitude is due.

Bombay

Tukarambij

Falgun Vadya Dvitiya, Sake 1907

27th, March 1986

B. R. KULKARNI

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CHAPTER ONE

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SAMKHYA

[The points I to X cover the entire Samkhya thought—mostly evaluative. Professor Ranade had re-grouped the ten points under three heads:

- (1)Cosmology (Categories and Causality).
- (2)Psychology (Buddhi, Linga and Guṇas).
- (3)Ontology (Prakṛti and Puruṣa).

Perhaps the ten points would have appeared as re-arranged under these three major heads in the final exposition. Points I (Introduction), II (Criticism of Sāmkhya Categories) and IV (Sāmkhya Doctrine of Causality) would have gone under Cosmology. Points V (the Schematic Function of Buddhi), VI (Doctrine of Linga Sarira) and VII (Relation of the Gunas to Prakṛti) would have been covered by Psychology. Finally, Ontology would include Points III (Evaluation of Arguments for the Existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa), VIII (Criticism of the Nature of Prakṛti), IX (Criticism of the Nature of Puruṣa) and X (The Samkhya Ideal).]


I. Introduction

1. *A Scientific World-view.* Sāmkhya is very old, going back to the days of the Upaniṣads. and tries to give a scientific explanation of Reality ; Cf. Homer and Thales. Evolutionism. Realistic, atheistic, spiritualism.

2. *The Criteria of Truth.* -Recognition of Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda. As scientists, the Sāmkhya Philosophers attach great value to Pratyakṣa. As Rationalists, they credit Anumāna with the power of proving even the super-sensuous (अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् Kārikā 6). Āpta-vākya recognised (Kārikās 4 and 5), but misinterpreted. This means that the Sāmkhya Philosophers want to interpret the Upaniṣads as supporting Sāmkhya Philosophy only, that is to say, a pluralistic, spiritualistic atheism. They take Upanisadic passages and foist a philosophy of their own thereon (प्रधानमल्लनिर्बहण).

3. *Heterodox System.* -Sāmkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mimāṃsā should all be excluded from the 'orthodox' systems; Sāmkhya, because Nirīśvara: Vaiśeṣika because no Āptavākya; and Mimāṃsā, because no necessity of God. It is curious that in the three doublets Sāmkhya-Yoga, Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya, Mimāṃsā-Vedanta, the first is heterodox, and the second orthodox: probably a movement of thought.

II. Criticism of Sāmkhya Categories:



1. Four logical combinations, because two co-present and co-eternal entities; Prakṛti, Prakṛti-Vikṛti, Vikṛti, na-Prakṛti na-Vikṛti; Cf. Aristotle: Moved, Mover, Neither, Both; also Cf. Yoga : Śukla, Kṛṣṇa: Śukla -Kṛṣṇa and AśuklāKṛṣṇa.

2. Mahat, the cosmic principle, cannot be identified with Buddhi, the psychic principle
(a) Implicit parallelism in the equation of Mahat and Buddhi, the cosmic and the psychic as in the attributes of Spinoza. (b) Not even the parallelism but an *indentiat* philosophy in the huddling up of mind and matter.

3. Violation of the law of Satkāryavāda, the vaunted Sāmkhya doctrine of Causality. There must not be more in the effect than in the cause. It is wonderful how from the unintelligent Prakṛti, the intelligent Buddhi could spring. This means that non-intelligence is superior to intelligence.

4. (a) Ahamkāra, a superfluous category ; sometimes dropped even by the Sāmkhya philosophers in the concept of Linga- Śarira (सप्तदशैकं लिंगम्— 17 or 18) : 17+1,

महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्, dropping Ahamkāra, it is 17, (b) The ego, according to the scheme, becomes a product of nature. Contrast, however, the Puruṣa.

5. Tanmātras and Mahābhūtas : (a) The priority of functions to structures, (b) Also qualities, (Śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha) as (c) essences of substances or elements (ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, aap, pṛthvi) (Kārikā 38). The Tanmātras are the first to exist, but the last to be known—Aristotle. Idealism vs. Naturalism.

6. The unsatisfactory position assigned to Manas (a) Doctrine of Inner Sense: (2, 3, 4, 5). The triple internal organ, not treated accurately from the psychological point of view. If Manas is an internal organ like Buddhi and Ahamkāra, it must be on a par with them, and cannot be their offspring. While Buddhi and Ahamkāra are products as well as productive, the Manas is only a product, (b) Moreover, Manas partakes both of intelligence and activity, from the Jnanendriyas and Karmendriyas respectively. Hence, in a way, it is superior both to Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Intelligence and activity made compatible in Manas.

III. Evaluation of arguments for the existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa

1. *Arguments for the existence of Prakṛti*.—Three main proofs for the existence of Prakṛti (Kārikā 15):

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् कार्यतः प्रवृत्तेश्च।
कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य॥

From Finite to Infinite: from *Peras* to *Apeiron* ; from Effect to Cause (if there is *identity* of cause and effect in Sāmkhya, why should it argue *from* effect to cause?) and from Plurality to Unity (avibhāga, or indivisibility of cosmic substance). Prakṛti or the Avyakta, which according to Sāmkhya is supersensuous, is in the system proved not by Intuition but by Anumāna, Kārikā 6 अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात्. Such a great importance the Sāmkhya philosophers attribute to the method of Inference. Inference from the Vyaktas must lead not to Avyakta, as in the system, but to Jñā or Spirit. Interposition of Avyakta between Vyakta and Jñā, gratuitous. There must, again, be a "saceta" cause for Prakṛti, as Śamkara contends. The arguments for Prakṛti only prove the Spirit.

2. *Arguments for the existence of Puruṣa*, Three main proofs for the existence of Puruṣa. No proofs for *Puruṣa* should have been given; only for *Puruṣas*:

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादि विपर्ययादधिष्ठानात्।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ (Kārikā 17)

Proofs from Immanent Teleology [or *Vinculum Substantiate*—there must be a *vinculum* (bond) for all complexes], Contraries, and Substrata.

3. *Plurality of Puruṣas*: (a) Differentiation of organs, (b) Unsimultaneity of actions (c) Variety of enjoyments:

जननमरणकरणाणां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥

Pluralism (Mc Taggart). The Vedāntin आनंदबोध in his न्यायमकरंद criticizes these Sāmkhya arguments for the plurality of selves. See Das Gupta, Vol. II.

4. Evaluation. Intimations of the great philosophical proofs of Reality. Recognition of the cosmological or *causal* argument, of the *teleological* or design argument, of the *logical* argument from contraries, and of the *ontological* argument from the substratum, substance, or background.

IV. Sāmkhya Doctrinc of Causality

1. The Sāmkhya Philosopher speaks not merely about Pariṇāma, but even about *Sarga* (Kārikā 21), and *Prasava* (Kārikā 11), which is Creation. The mere presence of Puruṣa (Puruṣasannidhi) is the cause of creation. Pariṇāma vs. Sarga. Transformism vs. Creationism. Loose terminology. "Puruṣasannidhi" reminds one of the World's desire for God in Aristotle. God, a magnet.

2. Causation is referred to the sphere of nature and has no application to Puruṣa; Cf. Kant.

3. Two different conceptions of Causality in Sāmkhya : Separateness of Cause and Effect (Kārikā 15) and Identity (Cf. Bradley and Vedānta) of cause and effect (Karyam at Kāraṇabhāvat, Kārikā 9, or Avibhagat Vaisvarupyasya). Tadatmya or Ananyatva, on a lower level than Gauḍapāda's Ajāti. Cf. Śamkara- Bhāṣya, II.1.18. Probably, the Sāmkhya philosophers borrowed the Identity doctrine from the Vedānta.

4. (a) Śamkara sides with the Sāmkhya doctrine of Satkārya-vāda, as against the Naiyāyika doctrine of Asatkārya-vāda, or Arambha-vāda; only by Sat he means Brahman, while the Sāmkhyas mean Prakṛti.

(b) Satkārya-vāda or Pariṇāmavāda, Evolutionism or Transformism. Satkārya-vāda in Sāmkhya (preformation or equilibration), and Asatkārya-vāda in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (epigenesis or new formation), both inaccurate expressions: they stand only for *Satkāraṇa-vāda*. Why not equate Kāraṇa with God? In Sāmkhya, Kāraṇa is Prakṛti; in Vaiśeṣika, atoms; in Vedānta, God. All these schools join hands in Satkāraṇa-vāda. Asatkāryavāda in Vaiśeṣika, generation from अणुऽ. Asatkāryavāda in Nyāya, generation of पट from तंतुऽ which are already destroyed (?) Asatkāryavāda is a contradiction in terms. Kārya must exist previously in some shape. The Naiyāyikas are also called अर्धवैनाशिकऽ. The Vaiśeṣikas are पीलुपाकवादिनऽ (generation in 7, 9, 10, 11 moments). The Naiyāyikas are पीठरपाकवादिनऽ not cumulative transformation but total transformation.

5. Violation of the law of सत्कार्यवाद in the evolution of the intelligent Prakṛti from the non-intelligent Pradhāna. The generation of the conscious Buddhi from the unconscious Prakṛti is a violation of Sāmkhya Satkāryavāda.

V. The Schematic Function of Buddhi

Three points in Sāmkhya Psychology: (a) The Nature of Buddhi, (b) Doctrine of Linga-Śarira, and (e) the Nature of Qualities*. See Foot note on P. 1.

1. *Nature of Buddhi*.—Buddhi is the unifier, the mediator, the Janus-faced interpreter (Kārikās 36, 37). Time in Kant. A new schematism required for any pair of schematiser and schematised.

2. Infinite regress involved in all schematism.

3. Fictitious function. Why, then take exception to Semblance '? Through Buddhi, Prakṛti becomes intelligent or sentient as it were, as Puruṣa becomes active as it were. But only, 'as it were', and not really (Kārikā 20):

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम्।
गुणकर्तृत्वेच तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः॥

VI. Doctrine of Linga-sarira

I. The Linga-Śarira, a good hypothesis, but incapable of proof (Kārikās 40, 41 and 42):

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यंतम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिंगम् ॥४०॥

चित्रं यथाऽश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो यथा विना छाया ।
तद्वद्विनाऽविशेषैः न तिष्ठति विनाश्रयं लिंगम् ॥४१॥

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसंगेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिंगम् ॥४२॥

(Cf. Upward, downward, absolution and bondage Kārikās 44 and 54).

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बंधः ॥

The Bhagvad-gītā (XV. 10) says we can see it, उत्क्रामन्तम् etc.

2. The only concept in the whole History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, for the *modus operandi* of Transmigration. (The horrible interpretation of Anguṣṭa-mātra by Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious Pp. 130- 32).

3. A new concept of Bhāva (traces or disposition), additional to the concept of Linga. Also reciprocal causation of Bhāva and Linga (Kārikā 52):

नविना भावलिंगं न विना लिंगेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
लिंगारव्यो भावारव्यस्तस्माद्विधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः॥

As of seed and sprout. Which is the root, and which is to fruit? Bhāvas or traces are deposited in Linga: Cf. धमस्तमनुगच्छति.

4. The Linga must retire (*Vinivṛtti*, Kārikā 55) or break before liberation can be attained.

5. The Linga must have a body (Kārikā 42). A mere encasement (Mahadādi Sukṣma-paryantam) cannot transmigrate; this would either make the Linga a substance, or in the alternative, destroy the Udāsinatva of Puruṣa; and even then Transmigration would be inconsistent with the eternity of Puruṣa.

6. Psychoplasm and *Anlage*.

VII. Relation of the Guṇas to Prakṛti

Examination of the doctrine of qualities.

1. Is Prakṛti an aggregate or a whole? Are Guṇas components or only subsidiary? Members or Parts? (strands of a rope). Are they dependent or independent, adjectival or substantival? If adjectival, they are super-fluous; if substantival, they are super-numerary. The Guṇas have no substantival existence. Which of the two viz. Guṇas or Prakṛti is prior, is left unsaid (Jha).

2. The condition of the Guṇas during the state of Pralaya: are they in equilibrium, or are they yet dynamic?

3. The mutual relation of the Guṇas, their reciprocal generation, conquest and concert (Kārikā 12):

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः॥

निस्त्रैगुण्य also : Puruṣa is beyond the reign of qualities.

4. Only three in earlier Sāṃkhya, an infinite number in later; this latter does away with the triplicity of the Guṇas. Cf. the Attributes of Spinoza (Cf. सत्त्वादित्रयमपिव्यक्तिभेदादनंतम् Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya on I. 127 Sutra).

5. The Guṇas co-operate towards one purpose viz., the satisfaction of Puruṣa (Kārikā 31 पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः). They are destroyed (nistraiguṇya), as the liberation is attained. Lamp in action; wick, oil, and flame: Sattva Rajas and Tamas (Pradipavaccarthatovrttiḥ, Kārikā 13). In a different sense Cf. प्रदीपवदावेशः तथापि दर्शयति (ब्र.सू. IV. 4.15). This has two meanings:

either that the Atman remaining in himself illumines all existence or that the Atman enters into an infinite number of Jivas.

6. Analogy with the doctrine of Humours in Medieval Physiology, or Tridoṣas in Indian Medicine. Compare also the three types of modern psychology; intellectual type, feeling type and conative type; also the eidetic types in Jaensch or the types of men in Spranger or Carlyle.

VIII. Criticism of the Nature of Prakṛti

1. *Personality*. The personality of Prakṛti is seen from the Andha-pangu-Nyāya (Kārikā 21). Buddhi lifts up the Pangu over the shoulders of the Andha. (Andha-pangu-Nyāya applied also to Karma and Jñāna). The milk and the calf, no doubt (Kārikā 57); but the cow is neglected!

2. The Actress or dancing girl or नर्तकी (नव्वद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिंगम्) Cf. U.P. and Bengal, where dancing is regarded as an art. Sexual imagery. She is also very tender. सुकुमारतर. She is rainbow-coloured. (Kārikā 63):

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकं रूपेण ॥

The colours are the prakṛtīvikṛtayaḥ sapta. सप्तहस्तासोज्ज्वल. White light = seven prismatic colours.

3. Benefactress (Kārikā 58):

औत्सुक्यं निवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥

Prakṛti is generous (Guṇavati) while Puruṣa ungrateful (Aguṇa). Guṇa = Virtue or Quality or also strand. Kārikā 60:

नानाविधैरूपायैरूपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थक्यं चरति ॥

4. Modest (Kārikā 61) :

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टाऽस्मीति पुनः न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥

And therefore evanescent. सुकुमारतर; dalliance with a mental creation? Two co-present and co-eternal entities, one of which is likely to be evanescent, passes beyond philosophic comprehension. Retiring of the dancing girl (Kārikā 59). Mutual retirement; "I am seen", "I am the seer", (Kārikā 66) :

दृष्टामयेत्येको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥

5. Relativism. The Prakṛti retires for the relieved soul, but continues to exercise her function for the others. This makes Prakṛti subjective. She is, and is not. Why not Prakṛti a semblance or an Avarana? Why not equate with Māyā? Subjective and illusory. The vaunted Sāṃkhya Realism does not hold much water. Why not have a multiplicity of Prakṛtis for a multiplicity of Puruṣas? (Kārikā 18).

6. It is not the Puruṣa who is bound or emancipated, or transmigrates (Kārikā 62)

तस्मान्न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः॥

but it is the Prakṛti, which is emancipated (Kaivālyārtham Pradhānasya, Kārikā 21).

IX. Criticism of the Nature of Puruṣa

1. The Puruṣa not entirely Udāṣina (Kārikā 65) or Upekṣaka (Kārikā 66). No doubt, he is described as looking at Prakṛti unconcerned. He has a purpose (Puruṣārtha), which is the motive to action. The Indriyas, the Guṇas, the Linga, and the Prakṛti, are all described as contributing to this Puruṣārtha: Cf.—

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकृत हेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥
(प्रतिपद्यन्ते Contrast करणानि)

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्यबुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥
(एते, गुणविशेषाः Contrast गुणाः)

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिक प्रसंगेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात् नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिंगम् ॥ ४२ ॥

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विभोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥
(लिंगम्, सैव च Contrast प्रकृतिः)

2. The Puruṣa is described as Sākṣi, Kevala, Draṣṭā etc., (Kārikā 19):

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥

But he cannot be a Sākṣi or Cetā, because this implies intelligence, and intelligence is Jaḍa (Prākṛtika); Cf. Bergson. Puruṣa is said to be neither Prakṛti nor Vikṛti nor Prakṛti-Vikṛti; and Buddhi is Prākṛtika. Sākṣitva might involve intuition, and not intelligence.

3. Moral Responsibility entirely shelved. The vicarious suffering of Puruṣa. Wife purchases articles and husband has to pay for. The Prakṛiti sows, and the Puruṣa reaps. Cf. the vicarious suffering of both the Puruṣa and Paramātmā in Bhagavad-gītā कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिः....पुरुषः भोक्तृत्वे हेतुर्च्यते XIII. 20. भर्ता भोक्ता महेश्वरः परमात्मा XIII. 22.

Double fault in the Bhagavad-gītā.

4. Puruṣa in the singular in Kārikā 1. Unconscious Monism. The psychoanalytic background of Íśvara-kṛṣṇa's mind.

X. The Sāmkhya Ideal

1. Poetic and not philosophic presentation. The dancing girl retires. The Linga-śarira breaks. The Guṇas commit suicide: their true intent is all for the delight or satisfaction of Puruṣa. Aristotle on Plato. A poetical fancy.

2. The Sāmkhya ideal, negative. Removal of suffering. No beatification, no joy. Cf. Painlessness in Nyāya. दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् ... तदवघातके हेतौ Elimination of sorrow.

3. Intellectualism: Isolation, an intellectual state. The driest soul, the wisest and the best. No place for emotion or feeling. A vast array of sad personalities. Flight of the Alone to the Alone. Contrast Kaivalya with the Mukti of Vedanta, and the Nirvāṇa of Buddhism.

4. Separation of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, to be attained by a contemplation on their separateness, which is a circle. भृंगीकीटन्याय Hypnotic hoax. Cf. Rashdall's Criticism of Bradley's Self-Realisation : the self is real already.

5. Knowledge of not-ness: Nāsmi, Na me, Nāham:
(Not-ness: no predicate ; nāsmi: no subject).

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासात् नास्मि नमे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्ये ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

नास्मि, नाहम् :Buddhistic element in Sāṃkhya ; influence of Buddhism). What then becomes of the eternity of Puruṣa? Two interpretations. Buddhistic and Vedantic.

6. The Vedānticised Sāṃkhya : Tho conceptions of Jivatkaivalya (Aikāntika, pertaining to an end) (Kārikā 67, potter's wheel) and Videhakaivalya (Ātyantika, beyond all end) (Kārikā 68) :

सम्यग् ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारण प्राप्ती
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात् चक्रभ्रमवद् धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

ऐकान्तिक might mean also catastrophic liberation. Prototypes of Jivanmukti and Videhamukti. Implicit Vedāntism in Íśvarakṛṣṇa. He goes to the length of positing both Jivanmukti and Videhamukti. Running with hare and hunting with hound.

7. The ultimate aim, emancipation of every Puruṣa (Kārikā 56) :

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतौ महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरंभ ॥ २ ॥

Cf. tho Vedāntic doctrine of Sarvamukti. Doctrine of universal salvation.

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<i>V. V. Sowani (Raipur)</i>	Critical study of Sāmkhya System Poona. Contains सांख्यसूत्र Pp. 1-28. Our own Critical Estimate of Sāmkhya Philosophy.

CHAPTER TWO

YOGA

I. Introductory

1. Two Patanjalis; Patanjali, the Grammarian, and Patanjali, the Yogin:

योगेन चित्तस्य पदेन वाचाम्
मलं शरीरस्य तु वैद्यकेन ।
योऽपाकरोत्तं प्रवरं मुनीनाम्
पतंजलिं प्रांजलिरानतोऽस्मि ॥

Keith on wrong grammar. We should read Prātibhādvā sarvam, (III. 33) instead of Prātibhādvā sarvam.

आर्षप्रयोग or हस्तदोष Ahiśah:

पातंजलमहाभाष्यचरकप्रति संस्कृतै ।
मनोवाक्कायदोषाणां हन्त्रेऽहिपतये नमः ॥
(पतन् अंजलौ इति पतंजलीः)

Yoga defined as stemming the tide of consciousness so as to make it stable and placid. योग derived from युज् to concentrate (समाधौ), not from युज् to join, 7th conjugation (उभयपद) (Contrast Yoke), see Woods. Svarupa (I. 3) and Sārupya (I. 4).

II. Metaphysics

2. The conflict of Self and God in Yoga : which of them is the primary reality? Draṣṭuḥ svarupe avasthānam (I. 3). Īśvarapraṇidhānādvā (I. 23). God from the back-door. Could be resolved only in Vedantic fashion by identifying Self and God. Yoga, a half-way house between Sāmkhya and Vedānta.

3. Transcendence of God; Cf. the deistic God of Aristotle. God as a mere Epiphenomenon. *Deus Ex Machina*. Concession to Bhakti. Pancaśikha, the Sāmkhya philosopher, said by Hopkins to have introduced the 26th Principle, namely God, under Bhāgavata influence (?) Kleśa-Karma-vipākaśayaiḥ. (I. 24). पुरुषविशेष = *Primus inter pares*. Two meanings to "Self of Selves". Is Yogic God theistic or deistic? No God-realisation in Yoga, but self-realisation, but the self-realisation of a kind, namely, ideological. Remover of obstacles (I. 29). Teacher and without time (I. 26). Omniscience (I. 25). Eka-tattva, the only Reality (I. 32).

4. Avidyā, root cause of the world experience. Approach to Vedanta Definition of Avidyā, taking Anitya for Nitya: Anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmāsu Nitya-śuci-sukhātmakhyātiravidyā (II. 5). Breeding ground of all other Kleśas (II. 4).

5. (i) Definition of Viparyaya as : मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम्।(I. 8). Again, approach to Vedanta. वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपोऽज्ञानम् Cf. Vedantic Adhyāsa. (also Atadvati tatprakāraṇam jñānam). (ii) This inconsistent with Sattva- Puruṣānyatākhyāti, (anyatā—separateness), which is so often mentioned in the Yoga Sūtras. The first is unrealistic while the second is realistic. (iii) A third description yet under Sāṃkhya influence: Unreal for the knower, real for the ignorant; कृतार्थप्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् (II. 22), (Tat = Pradhāna).

6. Also attack on the Vedantic conception of Asmitā (Unity of Self and Mind. Dṛgdarśana-śaktyorekātmataivāsmi (II. 6). Aham Brahmāsmi) Cf. अहं हक्. Contrast the Yogic unification of gr̥hiṭṛ, grahaṇa and grāhya. Ānanda which constitutes samādhi (I. 17.) Asmitā is a Kleśa (II. 3) and also constitutes Samprajñāta Samādhi (I. 17). Two meanings of Asmitā : one while going out of the door and one while returning through the door. (मूळ अस्मितेचे सूक्ष्म शुद्ध स्फुरण म्हणजे समाधी.)

III. Epistemology

7. The Epistemological Argument for Self and God (4th Adhyāya). Cf. Berkeley. The Proof of (a) mind (b) minds (c) Mind of minds.

(i) The mind is not self-illuminative (Svābhāsa IV. 19) nor can one mind be cognised by another (IV. 21) hence a self exists as the knower of mind: negative aspect. (Difference between Self and Mind).

(ii) The states of a mind are known to its Lord who never changes (IV. 18): positive aspect.

(iii) The objective world exists for a Self (II. 21). The being of the spectacle is for the Seer. *Esse est percipi*.

(iv) A thing uncognised by one mind still exists for another (IV 16); hence other Selves and God exist. Thus there is no solipsism. This kills two birds with one stone. Cf. also Berkeley's proof of God.

(v) One Mind the Director of many (IV. 5). Hence corresponding to a supreme Mind, there must be a supreme Self. Conception of *primus inter pares*, namely God. Compare on the whole Yoga-vāsiṣṭa and its Idealistic Philosophy.

IV. Ethics

8. (a) Parallelism of the ten virtues included under Yama and Niyama with the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, Exodus and Deuteronomy, the latter of which gives an older scheme and the former a newer one, which is the one now usually adopted. (1) Thou shalt have no other gods beside me. (2) Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images. (3) Thou shalt not take the name of thy God for a vain end. (4) Thou shalt work during the week, and rest on the sabbath. (5) Honour thy father and thy mother. (6) Thou shalt not kill. (7) Thou shalt not commit adultery. (8) Thou shalt not steal. (9) Thou shalt not bear false witness. (10) Thou shalt not covet.

Yama and Niyama, a high moral code. *Negative* and *positive* aspects. (Self-regarding and other-regarding virtues). This distinction not ultimately valid.

Virtues included under Yama (II.30) : (1) Non-Killing (*Ahimsā*), (2) Truth (not bearing false witness) (*Satya*), (3) Non-stealing (*Asteyam*), (4) Celibacy (no adultery) (*Brahmacarya*), (5) Non-possession (*Aparigraha*).

Virtues included under Niyama (II. 32) : (1) Purity (*Śauca*). (2) Contentment (*Santosa*). (3) Austerities (work and rest) (*Tapas*). (4) Uttering the name of God, Praṇava (*Svādhyāya*). (5) Worship of God (*Īśvara-praṇidhāna*, offering of actions at the feet of God, a kind of Karma-yoga : Sarvakriyāṇām parama- gurvārpaṇām (II. I), *Īśvara-praṇidhāna* = ईश्वरामध्ये क्रियांचे प्रणिधान करणे म्हणजे ईश्वरास क्रिया अर्पण करणे- कोल्हटकर. प्रणिधान = ध्यान? तज्जपः तदर्थभावनम् । (I. 28) This is superior to Vedānta.

Eight of the Ten are almost identical (Hocking). Cf. also Virtues in the Bhagavad gītā.

(b) Other Virtues, Maitri, Karuṇā Muditā (contrast Ānanda), Upekṣā (I. 33). We must feel happy when we see other people happy. Cf. also Virtues in Buddhism.

(c) Mystical virtues : Tivrasamvega (I. 21): Dirghakāla, Nairantarya and Satkāra (I. 14), or Ādara. Brown's laws of association.

Control of Citta in its intellectual and emotional aspects by Abhyāsa and Vairāgya (enoughness of heard and seen, I. 15). Abhyāsa and Vairāgya intellectual and moral bridles (I.12); Cf. Bhagavad gitā (VI-35). Vairāgya, not different from Upekṣā.

(d) Four kinds of Karmas, Śukla, Kṛṣṇa, Śukla-Kṛṣṇa, Aśuklākṛṣṇa. अशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनः। त्रिविधमितरेषाम् (IV. 7). This last for the Yogins. "Anticipation" of Vedantic Prārabdha, Sancita and Kriyamāṇa. Sāmkhya influence also traceable—लोहितशक्लकृष्णाम्। सोपक्रमं निरूपक्रमं च कर्म (III. 22). We have to suffer संचित and प्रारब्ध but we can control the क्रियमाण i.e. the future:

भोग प्रारब्धाच्चा हरिकृपेनें नाश । - एकनाथ.
प्रारब्ध क्रियमाण भक्ता संचित नाहीं जाण । - तुकाराम.

(a) Knowledge of Puruṣa alone leads beyond Guṇas, Puruṣa-khyāterguṇa-vaitṛṣṇyam (I.16). (b) Thinking of the opposite, Pratipakṣabhāvanam. Schiller, Aristotle's wand. Measure, (c) Virtues of universal application, (Sārva-bhauma), जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौमा महाव्रतम् । (II. 31); Birth, place, time, circumstances must not matter. Cf. Kant. For Vratas of two kinds, Mahāvratā and Anuvratā Cf. Jainism. (see Hiriyanna, p. 167). Virtue is virtue irrespective of clime or time. One must not kill under any circumstances.

V. Occultism

10. The different powers : Estatic impediments, Post-estatic realities (III. 36.), Powers, an impediment for Samādhi. Compare :

अणिमा लघिमा प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यं महिमा तथा ।
ईशित्वं च वशित्वं च तथा कामावसायिता ॥
महिमा लघिमाणुत्वं प्राकाम्यं वशितेशिता ।
प्राप्तिः कामावसायित्वं शंभोरैश्वर्यमष्टधा ॥

Dispassion for Powers may bring Kaivalya. From subtlest to the highest (I. 40). Physical, Psychical, Moral (desirelessness may bring on Isolation), and Mystical (Sages and Self). Asteya- pratiṣṭhāyām sarva-ratnopasthānam (II. 37). Cf. अस्तेय (यो भुङ्क्ते स्तेन एव सः।) Bhagavad-gitā (III. 12). As knowledge becomes infinite, the knowable becomes infinitesimal (IV. 31). ज्ञानस्य आनंत्यात् ज्ञेयमल्पम्। For details see "Analysis".

VI. Psychology of Mysticism

11. Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna, Samādhi, stages of one continuous process, (a) Dhāraṇā, local (nose, heart, navel, brain or external object, III. 1), Dhyāna, ideological, (b) तदेव (ध्यानं) अर्थमात्रनिर्भासं। स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधीः III 3. Dhyāna, nisus to continuity of experience; Samādhi, attainment of continuity. Dhyāna is defined as Pratyayaikatānatā (III 2); but in this way it could hardly be distinguished from Samādhi. Hence it is better to understand Dhyāna as effort to attain to continuity without reaching it, which is Samādhi. (C) Traya- mekatra Samyamaḥ (III. 4). as opposed to Yama and Niyama. Samyama, a search-light (Prajñāloka, III. 5). (d) Samādhi of two kinds. Samprajñāta (Conscious), objectful; Asamprajñāta, Super-conscious, objectless. Moral, Physilgoical, Psychophysical and Psychical.

12. (i) Helps towards mental steadiness. Parts of the Body. Dream Ideas (I.38). (ii) I am. (iii) Personalities (Virtues), (iv) Hypnogogic and Hypnopompic forms, imagery preceding deep sleep and following deep sleep respectively, (v) Super-sensuous objects. The sorrowless Luminosity विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती (I. 36), (i.e. of the sun, moon, planets, and gems), (vi) Iśvara-praṇidhāna (I. 23). Can an Atheist be a Yogin? (vii) Meditation on Praṇava and its meaning (I. 28). (viii) Breath-control. A mixture of correct and incorrect helps.

13. The 'dichotomy' between Samprajñāta and Asamprajñāta, unjustifiable. Four kinds of Samprajñāta Samādhi (Vitarkavicārānandāsmitā, I. 17). If there is Vicāra, how can there be Samādhi?

Two kinds of Asamprajñāta, Bhavapratyaya and Upāyapratyaya : Bhava- pratyaya for the bodiless, Upāyapratyaya for the aspirant who pr actises Śraddhā, Virya, Smṛti, Samādhi and Prajñā (I.20). विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम्। Five kinds of nomenclature : (1) Savilarka (I. 42). Nirvitarka (I. 43, Artha- mātra-nirbhāsā). (2) Sabija, seeded (I. 46), Nirbija, seedless (I. 51; III. 8). (3) Nirvicāra (I. 47), Savicāra (I. 44). (4) Savikalpa, Nirvikalpa. (5) Samprajñāta, Asamprajñāta.

Is there anything like Asamprajñāta? Difference of Degree, and not of kind. Otherwise, Asamprajñāta would be catalepsy. No Ārūdhā (as contrasted with Arurukṣu and yunjāna). Infinite progress, as in Croce and Gentile. There has never been a man who has reached the end. Approximationism.

14. The conflict between the Intellectual and the Mystical in Yoga : Kaivalya or Samādhi? Isolation or Svarupāvasthāna? Why two independent chapters on Samādhi and Kaivalya?

15. The Yogic Ideal: (1) Affective: Painlessness (All indeed is pain, Duḥkhamēva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ, II. 15). and Desirelessness; Cf. Ataraxia and Apathia. Beatification absent from Yoga. Ānanda is regarded as inferior, constituting only Samprajñāta Samādhi. Is there anything higher than Ānanda? (2) Epistemological: Unity of Grhīṭṛ, Grahaṇa, and Grāhya like a jewel (I. 41) not like a mirror; this stultifies the Yogic attack on Vedantic Asmitā. (3) Intellectual: Rāmbharā, prajñā intellect big with truth, or truth-bearing consciousness (I. 48). ऋत superior to Satya सत्यं त्वर्तेन परिषिचयामी. Also Viveka-khyāti, discernment of the self from not-self (See Seven stages below). (4) Mystical: Svarupāvasthāna, also Pratyayānupaśyaḥ (II. 20). (5) Moral: Dharmameghaḥ Samādhiḥ, showers blessings like a cloud. The cloud of Virtue comes to him who has no interest left in intellection. प्रसंख्यानोऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेः धर्ममेघः समाधिः (IV,29) कुसीद = सिद्धिं च सावकारी (व्यापार) करणारा (6) Ontological: Kaivalya or Isolation, Sattva-puruṣhānyatā-khyāti. सत्त्व = चित्ताचें उपादान कारण. अन्यता = Separateness. (7) Psychological : Svarupā pratiṣṭhā vā, citiśaktiḥ (IV. 34). The power of Consciousness abiding in itself.

16. The seven stages of Viveka-khyāti: (Four objective, and three subjective). Too Buddhist in character. (1) The nature of pain has been known. (2) The causes of pain have been removed. (3) This removal has become a fact of direct experience in Samādhi. (4) Discriminative knowledge (विवेकख्यातिः), which is the *means* to it (Hānopāyaḥ, the cause of the removal of pain, II. 26) has been attained, which implies that Viveka-khyāti is a stepping-stone to Isolation. On the other hand, Viveka-khyāti is also described as the *end*. Cf. Tadā vivekanimnam kaivalya-prāgbhavam cittam (IV. 26); "The mind, weighed down by the thought of Isolation, bends *towards* Discrimination". Description of Jivanmukta. His mind being laden with Kaivalya descends to practical life with discrimination; also Cf. योगानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिसविवेकख्यातेः His illumination goes on extending until he realises the separateness of the body and the self. Inconsistency. Does Kaivalya proceed from Viveka-khyāti, or does Viveka-khyāti proceed from the thought of Kaivalya? (5) The Buddhi has achieved its purpose; Cf. Sāmkhya. (6) The qualities, (here also, Cf. Sāmkhya) now finding no support, have been destroyed as stones rolling from a mountain top; Cf. also, ततः कृतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिर्गुणानाम् (IV. 32). (7) The Puruṣa has thus attained to the state of complete isolation. A mere *intellectual* ascent to isolation. Self-hypnotism.

17. Effacement of the distinction between Samādhī and Vyutthāna. Value of the Samskāra of Samādhī. It destroys all other Samskāras: Tajjaḥ samskāro'- nya-samskāra-pratibandhḥ (l. 50).

VII. Doctrine of Sphoṭa

18. Transfer to Mimāṃsā under heading—Relation of Śabda to Sphoṭa.

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Author	Book
	Patanjali's Yoga Sūtras in "The Sacred Books of the Hindus Series" Allahabad, with a "Text and Translation" of the commentary of Vyāsa and the "translation" only of Vācaspati's gloss. In the translation of the Sūtras the author tries to give the meaning of every word. The Introduction by S. C. Vasu is good.
<i>Ganga Nath Jha</i> ..	The Yoga Darśana (Tukaram Tattya 1907) contains no text but the translation of Sūtras and the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa. The author also subjoins to the translation of the Bhāṣya notes on the commentaries of Vācaspati Misra, Vijñānabhikṣu and Bhoja. The Preface is good but introduces some Vedantic arrangement.
<i>Woods</i> ..	The Yoga System of Patanjali (Harward Oriental Series). Read the Introduction Pp. XIII to XXIII) which is historical in nature concerning the date of Patanjali. The Yoga Sūtras, the Yoga Bhāṣya and Vacāspati Misra: Analysis of the contents of the Sūtras in serial order of the Sūtras as well as Wood's Adhikaraṇas thereof might be read but the language is quaint. The Bibliography at the end might be referred to; Index of quotations in the commentaries might also be referred to. Index of Words in the Sūtras is valuable which would enable us to fix the meanings of the words by collation.
<i>S. N. Das Gupta</i> ..	Yoga Philosophy (In relation to other systems of Indian thought. Calcutta 1930). Doctorate Thesis. Yoga Cosmology, Yoga Psychology, Yoga Physics, Yoga Ethics etc. valuable.
<i>Das Gupta</i> ..	Yoga as Philosophy and Religion (Kegan Paul) should be read. Especially Chaps. VII from Book I and Book II generally The Appendix on "Sphoṭavāda" is valuable. Das Gupta relies too much on commentaries and does not exercise independent interpretation or philosophic judgement
<i>Das Gupta</i>	"Study of Patanjali" (Calcutta University) might be read.
<i>Rajentira Lall Mitra</i> ..	"Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali" (Asiatic Society of Bengal, Bibliothica Indica). Text and Translation both of Yoga

Sūtras and Bhoja's "Rāja- Mārtaṇḍa". Mitra's reflections are subjoined in square brackets to the translation of the commentary. The Index is valuable. But besides reference to Sanskrit words in the text and the commentary, it contains references to English words also in his own reflections and no reference to words in the Preface. The Preface is valuable philosophically and contains good English but it is somewhat long.

Our own Analysis of the Sūtras *seriatim* and reflections thereon according to subject-matter such as Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, Occultism and Mysticism.

CHAPTER THREE

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BUDDHISM

I. The Problem of the Historical Buddha

(a) The doctrines of the Buddha recently separated from the doctrines of Canonical Buddhism. Mrs. Rhys Davids (1934) entirely changes her old opinions as expressed in her *Buddhism*, Home University Library, 1912: *peccavi*. The first Edition of Mrs. Rhys Davids was written from the stand-point of materialistic pluralism. "Mrs. Rhys Davids' method sound": see Article on Pre-Canonical Buddhism by Keith in the Indian Historical Quarterly, March 1936. The problem of the historical Buddha thus exactly resembles the problem of the historical Socrates Cf. Burnet and Taylor. To add to the analogy, Buddha like Socrates, is regarded as a mystic. Religion requires uncommon insight, must go not to the Less but to the More, and thence to the Most (Mrs. Rhys Davidas). No foundation or propagation of Religion without mystic insight.

(b) Very different from the doctrines of the Buddha are the doctrines of Canonical Buddhism. Buddha, according to the new theory, must be regarded as merely the mouth-piece of the Canonists. What are the reasons for this disparity between the teachings of the Buddha and the teachings of Canonical Buddhism? They are probably these: (i) The Canonists misunderstood the teachings of the Buddha (lapse of three centuries, want of writing, necessity of system, dogma, and so forth); (ii) The Canonists misrepresented the doctrines of the Buddha in the interest of their monkdom. "Monkish hostility". The negative side of the Buddha's teaching thus emphasised by the monks at the cost of the positive. They retained Buddha's Ethics, dropped his Mysticism and stressed the negative side of his Metaphysics *viz.*, Change and Causality.

II. The Teachings of the Historical Buddha

Mrs. Rhys Davids cites Fragments to prove that the Buddha believed in the Self; the reality of the Moral Law, and so on (Cf. expressions like *Ātmadipa*, 'Live as they who have the Self for a lamp, the Self for a refuge: Dharma for a lamp, Dharma for a refuge and none other;' (P. 73) in Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Buddhism*, Home University Library; Cf. Butler's *Candle of the Lord within us*. Buddha likewise believed in what in Western terminology may be called God (P. 148 in Mrs. Rhys Davids' Ch. VII entitled 'The Message of the Fragments').

Also see Mrs. Rhys David's criticism of Max Muller's five marks of religion. The only difference between the doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the doctrine of the Buddha is that while the Upaniṣads preach *Tattvam Asi*, the Buddha preaches *Tattvam Bhavasi* (Bhava=Becoming or growth). See review of Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Manual of Buddhism* I. B. Horner, Pp. 307 -312, Journal of Theological Studies, 1933. The doctrine of Anatta only means that the body, the senses, and the rest are not the Self. Cf. the important reference in Keith to the reality of the *Self*, in the Alagaddupama-sutta in his "Buddhist Philosophy", Pp. 64-65. Buddha harks back to the Upaniṣads: Cf. Chapter V, 'A Mis-reading of Buddha' in E. Holmes' Creed of Buddha; the author severely criticises the no-soul doctrine read by Mr. Rhys Davids, and Mr. Paul Carus, in the teachings of the Buddha. The author says (Chap. VIII): 'Western Thought is bankrupt'. The whole is very valuable as being a positive interpretation of the doctrine of Buddhism. Cf. also Radhakrishnan. E Holmes probably supplied an inspiration to Radhakrishnan and Mrs. Rhys Davids. Buddha taught a doctrine of *Two Truths*, the exoteric and esoteric, one for the layman and the other for the philosopher (?). This is probably an anachronism going later to the times of Nāgārjuna. Buddha had no philosophical insight, says Poussin, to understand the inconsistency of the two doctrines; his silence on metaphysical questions interpreted as incapacity for rational thought. Did not care for Metaphysics. Buddha refuses to answer questions concerning the soul, because they do not conduce to enlightenment and Nirvāṇa (Digha- Nikāya 9).

Postscript.—The so-called Anattā-lakkhana-sutta proves that Buddha believed in Self by denying the reality of body mind and senses - Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 78, The dying Buddha said 'Heed ultimately not what men say. Heed the inner monitor, the still small voice', Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 86. Paṭicca Samuppāda means setting afoot of beneficent causes which should on no account be stopped, P. 92: Progress to Nirvāṇa instead of suffering. Buddha's doctrine of Bhava or growth: A Deva appears in a vision to the Buddha and says, "Teach religion, sir! Teach religion, welfarer! Learners of religion will become" (P. 102). Cf. also 'Bhava' in the expression Bhava-suddhi, in Asoka's edicts; also compare 'Now shall I turn back no more, but I shall become a further farer in the life divine (P. 122). ' Just as a man who has climbed up a crag can see more, lovely gardens, lovely wood, lovely landscape, while the crag blocks the view of the other, similarly Jhana adds to one's vision (Pp. 138-139). कतिं: पृष्ठं गिरेरिवा । Also देव पाहो देव पाहो उंच ठायीं उभे राहो. Lofty ethics of moral tele-volition (P. 144): abundance of benevolence towards others through Telepathy.

III. Canonical Buddhism

(i) Samghāta and Santāna, contradictory conceptions. Samghāta and Santāna, cardinal points also in Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika school, that of Materialistic Pluralism. See Śāṅkara's criticism below. Incessant Change (Cf. P. Carus, Gospel of Buddha, Identity and non-identity, Pp. 131, 140) without a permanent substratum, is an impossible concept; Cf. Kant. No substance, Self, Cause, and God. Buddha's catechism to Rāhula on Impermanence: Many gods come to listen (Cf. Cula-Rāhulovada-sutta 147 of Majjhima-Nikāya). Does the Doctrine of Becoming involve merely the 'impermanence' of phenomenal existence? This line of interpretation adopted by certain modern interpreters of the doctrine of Māyā. Evanescence, instead of illusion. Herakleitos, though he recognises incessant change, yet recognises a God. Bergson, in spite of his doctrine of change, has made a place for mystical reality in his '*Two Sources of Morality and Religion*'

(ii) The Self. The Milinda-praśna primarily responsible for the defective analogy of the Self with the chariot (probably Greek influence) see E. J. Thomas, *Buddhist Scriptures*, Pp. 123-124 Questions of King Milinda, P. 46 Cf. Buddha: Self; Canonists: No Self. The Image of the Chariot better utilized by the Upaniṣads and Plato. In Buddhism, Chariot an assemblage of parts; in Upaniṣads and Plato, the Chariot a vehicle drawn by the white and dark, the ruly and the unruly, horses. No 'Charioteer' in Buddhism. Hume: entire disparity of ideas; billiard balls. Buddhism: Projection of energy or efficacy. James: an ever-enveloping unity. The Buddhist view, in between the views of Hume and James. The Canonical doctrine of the annihilation of personality symbolized by the absence of the representations of Buddha in early Buddhist sculpture and painting, his place being taken by his foot-prints, or by the royal umbrella. Cf. The hand on the horse, or Kaaba in Mohamedanism. (Eidola) Carlyle. The nemesis of the denial of God in Buddhism is the apotheosis of its Founder. The very nails, and bones, hair and teeth of the Buddha worshipped and made immortal. Distribution of Buddha's 'relics' in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. Buddha's three bodies (trikāya), closely akin to the Christian conception. Nobody ever went to break God, but God ultimately broke him. Evasion of Moral responsibility in the Canon (Cf. E. J. Thomas, *Buddhist Scriptures*, Pp. 123-124. Questions of King Milinda, P. 46 ff.). Explanation of Milinda-prasna that a new Mind and a new Body are created, which is really no explanation at all. Morality requires that he who sows must reap. Moral responsibility comes to be entirely shelved. No Ethics without a Metaphysical foundation.

(iii) A critical examination of the doctrine of Paṭicca-samuppāda, a very defective theory of Causation. It has been argued that the concatenation of the 12 links in the chain of Causation merely symbolises the fatuity or the non-existence of the self, and the reion of mechanical law, vide Keith, Ch V, Section 4, Buddhist Philosophy, for various interpretations of the Law. (Pp. 105-106).

According to Keith, the first link in the Chain of Causation, namely "Avidyā" has no 'Vedantic' significance: Jacobi says it has only a Sāmkhya significance. Kern interprets the Chain of Causation as based on a Cosmic myth and says it only implies the creation and destruction of the world; Frank says on the other hand that the Chain has only an ideal significance. Burnouf tells us that the Chain implies the emergence of a concrete entity from non-existence; while Kirste says that it tries to bring about a relation between independent temporary existences, which are not changes as in an organism. Oltramare similarly tells us that the Chain does not try to explain the origin of life, but only points out to the emergence of misery; while Mrs. Rhys Davids says that the Chain may imply progress to Nirvāṇa (P. 92), and not necessarily the emergence of misery. It need not be a pessimistic doctrine but may be a melioristic one. The Buddhists did not make sufficient use of their doctrine of Saṃtāna to explain Causation, otherwise Causation to them would have meant no more than mere continuity. Das Gupta tells us that the Pratītyasamutpāda means dependent emergence which is only another name for collocative production, assemblant origination or contingent necessity; while to us it seems to imply the doctrine of 'asamutpāda' or non-creation as experienced in 'Pratīti' or intuition (Pratīti + asamutpāda). The Asamutpāda doctrine of the Buddhists thus comes quite near to the Ajāti doctrine of Vedānta.

(iv) Probably the chiefest defect of Canonical Buddhism : the doctrine of Re-incarnation running riot. Buddha remembers on his death-bed that in his previous life he was King Sudassan (Dīgha-Nikāya 17). Mahāgovinda also (Dīgha-Nikāya 19). Also Makhadeva (Majjhima-Nikāya 83). 547 "Jātaka" tales (Khuddaka-Nikāya 10). Previous lives of monks and nuns also (Khuddaka-Nikāya, 13, (Apadāna).

(v) *Occultism*.—Meditation on emptiness (Majjhima-Nikāya, 121). Practising internal emptiness (Majjhima-Nikāya 122). Belief of Buddha: A spell (in verse) given by the four great kings to Buddha to serve as protection against evil spirits which he repeats to the monks (Dīgha-Nikāya 32). A poem on the Three jewels, the Triratna viz., the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order, forming a charm to win the good will of spirits (Khuddaka-Nikāya I Khuddakapatha). Also Spiritual Exercises in Coomarswami. Read Section 'Ecstasy' in Rhys Davids'

Early Buddhism. Pp. 86-89. Read also 'skilful practice of Trances' in Poussin's way to *Nirvāṇa*, Pp. 159-66. Cf. also the occult process of Jhāna or Tele-volition in Mrs. Phys Davids. Tele-volition good in a moral sense, but its objective validity questionable. See Buddhist Ethics below. Mahāyānists' Dhyāna : Meditation called Tathatāmbana (Das Gupta, P. 150).

Postscript.—Stories of celestial mansions. Beings who have been reborn in one of the heavens explain the acts of merit that led to their reward (Khuddaka-Nikāya 6, Viman-vatthu Stories of Petas, Beings condemned for their former misdeeds to a wretched existence as ghosts (Khuddaka-Nikāya 7, Petavatthu). No purgatorio in Buddhism.

IV. Buddhistic Ethics

The sublimity of empirical or descriptive ethics in Buddhism. Its strongest point, the message of peace and contentment. Sanctity of Life. India, the true representative of Buddhism, says Mahatma Gandhi; neither Burma nor Ceylon, neither China nor Japan. As Logic sprang full-grown from the head of Aristotle, so Ethics sprang full-blown from the head of the Buddha. Hinayanists and Mahayanists could only add a point here or a point there.

The Elephant (Bodhisattva) gives over his *physical* tusks in order to gain spiritual tusks (knowledge). Cf. Coomarswamy, Pp. 290-93, *Shāḍḍanta Jātaka*: "the tusks of omniscience are a thousand times dearer to me than these; and may this worthy gift be the cause of my attaining Omniscience". Buddha on taking meat. Buddha tells us that a monk should eat meat only if he has not seen, heard or suspected that it was specially prepared for him (Majjhima-Nikāya 55). Contrast Tachibana, *The Ethics of Buddhism*, "As to Buddhism, it is perfectly clean from this sort of bloodshed. As we say repeatedly, it has no gods to appease or to control by means of sacrifice; and killing any animal, to say nothing of a human being, is interdicted as an abominable sin in Buddhism" (P. 41). Peacocks may be killed (Cf. *The Ideal of Kingship*, [An article by Professor R. D. Ranade reprinted in his book *Philosophical and other Essays Part I*, Published by Shri Gurudev Ranade Satkar Samiti, Jamkhandi, 1956—Editor.] or D. R. Bhandarkar's *Asoka*). Let the monk wander alone like a rhinoceros; Cf. *Khaggaviṣāṇa* sutta in Khuddaka-Nikāya 5 (Sutta-nipāṭa). Even though a monk were to be sawn limb from limb he should not lose equanimity, Majjhima-Nikāya, 21 (*Kakacupama-sutta*). The gain that a man obtains by leading a religious life, (See the entire Sutta on the 'Fruits of the Life of a Wanderer', Coomarswamy. Pp. 266 -68). *Vammika-sutta*: the anthill smokes by night and blazes by day. A monk is commanded by a Brahmin to dig into it. The ant-hill is the human

body and the Brahmin is Buddha himself (Majjhima- Nikāya 23). Buddha leaves instruction behind. Buddha asks the monks not to perform a miracle except the miracle of instruction (Digha- Nikāya 11). Buddha set up no monk after him to take his place, but he left only his Doctrine after him (Majjhima-Nikāya 108). Many of the Buddha's disciples left him because he did not work a miracle, or expound the beginning of things (Digha-Nikāya 24).

Post-Script.—Devadatta leaves Buddha's Order (Majjhima-Nikāya 29). Jaina Nataputta sends Abhaya to Buddha to ask him about the severe condemnation which he passed on Devadatta (Majjhima-Nikāya 58). Buddha's discourse to the Brahmins of Kosambi who were quarrelling violently (Kosambiya-sutta, Majjhima-Nikāya 48). Buddha is offended at a band of noisy monks at Chātumā, but is appeased (Majjhima-Nikāya 67).

Why did India lose her greatness? On account of Atheism + pessimism + passivism. Maitri, Karuṇā, Muditā common to Yoga and Buddhism. The Buddhists condemn suicide, the Jains uphold it. Four Āryasatyas; not four, but one, viz, Suffering. Insistence on suffering. Buddhist Ethics, universal appeal; hence the Christian sympathy

Post script.—Buddhism effected expansion in the nature of the moral life, in the parental, the filial and the conjugal relations. Buddha built up an interworld or intermondial ethics (Mrs. Rhys Davids). Paṭicca-samuppāda in its moral aspect, a double-edged sword. It works up and it works down; down to suffering and up to Nirvāna.

On the various ways of meditating on impassibility (incapacity for passion) (Majjhima-Nikāya 106). On the middle path between two extremes (Majjhima-Nikāya 139). Cf. The Aristotelian mean. Metta-sutta: On friendliness, Khuddaka-Nikāya 1 (khuddaka-pāṭha). Social Ethics. Classification of offences that involve exclusion from the Order (Vinaya-Piṭaka 1). 'Description of Individuals', especially according to their stages along the Path (Abhidhamma- Piṭaka 4 (Puggala-pannatti). Is this a spiritual gradation?

Ethics in Mahāyāna : The conception of Pāramitas from Subhuti's Aṣṭa- sāhasrikā-prajñā - pāramitā, such as Dāna-pāramitā, Kṣānti-pāramitā, Dhyāna-pāramitā, Śīla-pāramitā, Virya-pāramitā and so on.

V. Scholastic Buddhism

A. General.

B. (a) Four Buddhist Schools.

(b) Mahāyana Buddhism.

A. *General.*—(a) According to some, the Sarvāstivādins were the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sauntrāntikas. Das Gupta says they were the Vaibhāṣikas (P. 167). The Theravādins are the Cannonists. The materialistic pluralism of Sarvāsti-vādins (Cf. Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*). Contradiction in the conceptions of Samghāta and Samtāna; also incompatibility of Samghāta and Samtāna. This point has already been mentioned. Curious explanation of Perception as due to the conglomeration of a sense-atom, a mind-atom, and an object-atom. Mere contiguity. Cf. Greek Philosophy. The Dharmas no better than Vaiśeṣika अणुs.

(b) The history of Buddhism. Four important schools: Vaibhāṣikas, Saun- trāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika. The first two Realists (Hinayāna), and the other two Idealists (Mahāyāna). The doctrine of Sva-laksana (Cf. Radhakrishnan). Sva-lakṣaṇa-unnecessary between Universal and Particular— as debated between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. (Cf. "The Indeterminate" of Plato, which however, is mathematical in character). Vijñānvāda, ideas or reality of consciousness; Śūnyavāda, reality of nothing whatsoever. The general parallelism of these four schools to Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Application of this principle to their teachings about Nirvāṇa. Samsara and Nirvāṇa: real, and unreal; permutation and combination (*See* Stcherbatsky "Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa "), (i) Vaibhāṣikas : Samsāra real; Nirvāṇa real, (ii) Sauntrāntika : Samsāra real; Nirvāṇa unreal. If Nirvāṇa is unreal, how can the Sautrantika be a Buddhist ? (iii) Vijñānvadin : Samsāra unreal; Nirvāṇa real, (iv) Śūnyavādin : Samsāra unreal; Nirvāṇa unreal (*See* Stcherbatsky, P. 27).

(c) Yogācāra : The concept of Ālaya-vijñāna for the Yogācāras (vide Suzuki) takes the place of God. Āsvaghoṣa's Bhūta-tathatā implies the ineffable character of being, Cf. The This-ness of Bradley. The Dharma-kāya is the moral equivalent of God. Buddha's Three Bodies.

(d) Mādhyamika : The Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna consisting in its Self-Relativism and Scepticism. The Mādhyamika: middle path. Four classical truths not real; Buddha unreal; Nirvāṇa unreal.

B. (a) *Four Buddhist Schools*. (I)) Vaibhāṣika (optionalists). Dinnāga: Descartes. Hinayāna.

(i) Descartes : Direct perception. Presentative perception. Nothing interposing between object and mind. Stimulus and direct perception.

(2) Sautrāntika. Kumāralabdha : Locke.

(ii) Locke : Indirect perception. Representative perception. Ideas interposing between matter and mind. Impression between stimulus and perception.

(3) Yogācāra or Vijñānavādins : Vasubandhu : Berkeley. Both recognised ideas but Berkeley, also mind. Mahāyāna. Mahāyāna expelled believers in soul who went to China (Mrs. Rhys Davids P. 26).

(iii) Berkeley : only Ideas are real.

(4) Mādhyamika : Śūnyavādins : Nāgārjuna : Hume.

(iv) Hume: If matter goes, mind also goes. Buddha does not exist. Nothing exists. Doctrine of the Void.

The first two are Realists Realists so far as knowledge is concerned; objects must be beyond knowledge. The other two are Idealists—Idealists so far as knowledge is concerned. Objects must be inside knowledge.

Vaibhāṣika : Conception of Svalakṣaṇa, i.e. that which characterises itself. It is equivalent to attribute, qualities, characteristics, etc. e.g. Blueness. Vaibhāṣikas say that only Sva-lakṣaṇas exist and they are objective. Cf. Dharma. They say that the Svalakṣaṇas are directly perceived.

Sautrāntika : Relying upon Suttas. The Sautrāntikas say that Svalakṣaṇas are perceived not directly but indirectly. Psychological analogy: Between stimulus and perception there is impression. Vaibhāṣikas do not recognise impression.

Yogācāra: Relying upon Yoga. The Yogācāravādins or Vijñānavādins use Vijñāna i.e. *Idea* for Svalakṣaṇa or Dharma (Stcherbatsky) only. They are floating ideas. Cf. Bradley. They advance the following arguments for their Idealism:

(i) The Svalakṣaṇa is objective, Vijñāna is subjective.

(ii) Analogy of the dream.

(iii) Triplet of knowledge, knower and known. The latter two go away and the jñāna (knowledge) alone remains. Disproof of inference or Vyāpti. All inferences and judgements are wrong, because both of them deal with matters of fact which do not exist. Hence inference cannot exist.

(iv) Relativism. Cf. Protagoras. Thorns are good for the camel and bad for man. So they are both good and bad. So no judgement is possible. Cf. Antinomianism in Plato or Relativism. Hence objectivity is impossible. So only ideas are real.

Mādhyamika. Relying upon eight-fold middle path. Ālayavijñāna Bhūta-atathatā. They say that even ideas do not exist. Nāgārjuna says nothing exists. Cf. Zeno. This is only his sceptical side. Positive side: He believes in mystical intuition. Cf. Stcherbatsky. Thus there comes to be a world of two Realities: Samvṛti-satya and Pariniṣpanna-satya : Cf. Vyāvahārika-satya and Pāramārthi- Ka-satya: Also Phenomenal and Noumenal Reality; Opinion and Knowledge; Appearance and Reality; and not-Being and Being. This-ness or That-ness, ineffable character of Reality. Dharmakāya from the moral point of view. Gauḍāpāda and Śamkara exactly believed in these two conceptions. Hence the two are called. 'crypto-Buddhists'. They are also called Pracchanna-Bauddhas, and Ardhavainasikas. Naiyāyikas also are called Ardhavaināsikas. Nāgārjuna says: nothing comes into existence Nothing goes out of existence. Creation is impossible. Annihilation is impossible Cause is an illusion, Effect is an illusion. No unity exists, and no plurality exists:

अनिरोधं अनुत्पादं अनुच्छेदं अशाश्वतम् ।
अनेकार्थं अनानार्थं अनागमं अनिर्गमम् ॥- नागार्जुनकारिका.

In the original Notes, the space remained blank. The word तथता has been inserted by the Editor. 'Tathatā may imply that continuity exists. Dharma (Yogācāra) ten stages of Bodhisattavahood. Last being consecration or Abhiṣeka.

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean analogous to Nāgārjuna's Doctrine of the माध्यम. The mean must steer clear of Seylla and Charybdis.

(b) *Mahāyāna Buddhism*.—Three chief conceptions in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Vijñānavādins	(i) The Tathatā or That-ness.
	(ii) Vijñāna or Idea.
Śūnyavadins	(iii) Śūnya or Void.

Sec Das Gupta

The first is stressed by Āśvaghoṣa, the second by the Lankāvatārasūtra, and the third by Nāgārjuna. All the three really are inter-related.

Āśvaghoṣa stresses Tathatā, but refers incidentally to Vijñāna and Śūnya. Lankāvatāra stresses Vijñāna, but refers to Tathatā and Śūnya. Nāgārjuna stresses Śūnya, but also refers to Tathatā and Vijñāna. The difference between the three conceptions is the difference of stress.

Tathatā is the *plus ultra* of Buddhist Philosophy. It is their absolute or God. It transcends all pairs. It is ineffable. Tathagata is one who has realized this Thatness. And Tathāgatā-garbha is the womb of such.

Considered in such a way, the Tathatā Philosophy of Āśvaghoṣa comes dangerously near to Vedantism. The Buddha says that all things forever abide in Nirvāṇa. The Tathatā of Āśvaghoṣa comes nearer to the Vedantic Absolute. Āśvaghoṣa's approach to the Vedantic Absolute in his philosophy of Tathatā may be explained by his early Brahmanical nurture.

Vijñānavada : Vijñānavada is a philosophy of Ideas. Consciousness creeps in only surreptitiously. In Berkeley consciousness is the very foundation. ĀlayaVijñāna which is another name for mind is merely the habitat of Ideas.

The Vijñānas are to the Ālayavijñāna as the waves are to the ocean. In the Ālayavijñāna are produced the ripples of sense-experience or ideas. They are what we may call the modes. The relation between Vijñāna and Vijñānalaya is both that of identity and difference. The ocean is both identical with and different from waves. What causes these waves? The Vijñāna philosophy tells us that Avidyā causes it, just as the wind is responsible for the waves in the ocean. This principle of Avajjā in Vijñānavada comes again perilously near to the Vedantic doctrine of Māyā. What exists essentially is merely the idea. In the all-conserving mind, ignorance manifests itself in the shape of the perceiver and the perceived. Various grades of individuation due to ignorance more than the number of the sands on the Ganges. Buddha's answer to Rāvaṇa in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra. Buddha does not teach the Nairātmya or Nihsvabhāva doctrine, lest his followers should be scared away. The external world is merely an expression of these ideas. Hence there is no objective world as such. Cf. Berkeley and Johnson's criticism. A fight takes place between Tathatā and Avidyā. If Avidyā conquers, sorrow and the world appearance are produced; and if Tathatā conquers, Nirvāṇa is the result. The fight between Tathatā and Avidya may be compared to the fight between the ego and the Id in Freud, or the reality-principle and the ego-principle, or death instinct and the life instinct in Jung.

Śūnyavāda has seven modes of voidness: (i) inter-dependence of things, (ii) essencelessness of things, (iii) unknowability, (iv) phenomenal causality, (v) ineffability, (vi) pollution by desire, (vii) temporal and spatial limitation. On its sceptical side from Gorgias downwards: disbelief in Space, Time, Cause, Mind, Substance and the World. On the other hand, there is a mystical side to Nāgārjuna's philosophy. The seeing of the Buddha and the Tathāgatas. Mahākaruṇā. Buddha is an illusion, Nirvāṇa is an illusion and Pratitya-samutpada is itself an illusion, and also four Ārya-satya are an illusion. Yamakami's interpretation of the Śūnya. It does not mean the void, he says : No process or Change अशाश्वतमनुच्छेदम् । अनागममनिर्गमम् । Middle path. Grace derived from them. Dhyāna or the mode of meditation preached as that of Tathatalambana, which corresponds to Aham Brahmasmi. Stages of Bodhisattvahood. Two grades of Reality : Samvṛti-satya and Parinirvāṇa-satya, Cf. Parmenides, Plato, Kant, Bradley and Śāṅkarācārya. The statement of untruth is itself untrue. To this Candrakīrti replies that truth consists in silence.

VI. Bādarāyaṇa's Criticism of Buddhism

Bādarāyaṇa's criticisms of Buddhism fall into two Adhikaraṇas. The first is supposed to be devoted to the Realists, including the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, the second to

either the Vijñānavādins (Belvalkar) or to the Śūnyavādins (Jacobi). Jacobi does not seem to be wrong; on the other hand, he seems to be right on account of the reference in the Sūtras to Abhāva. In any case, it is a criticism of the doctrine of the Void by whomsoever it may have been preached, and at any rate, the Śūnyavādins preached it more than the Vijñānavādins.

Points in Śankara's criticism : (i) Samudāya (= Samghāta, Cf. Steherbatsky), an impossible concept : conglomeration impossible, (ii) Samtāna (Cf. Steherbatsky), or continuity, an impossible concept; because when a later existence is produced, the previous is destroyed (*Purva-nirodha*). (iii) The simultaneity of cause and effect (*Yaugapadya*), an impossible concept. The horns of a bull are not causally related, says Gauḍapāda. (iv) The Buddhists speak of *Nirodha* or destruction, see (ii) above, but neither caused destruction as of a pitcher (*prati-samkhyā*), nor uncaused destruction as of the world into the elements (*apratiSamkhyā*), can be explained on the hypothesis of incessant becoming. *Nirodha*, in other words inconsistent with Samtāna. See Yamakami's criticism of Śankarācārya. (v) 'Anusmṛti' or recollection becomes impossible. Subjective sphere. These are the arguments against the Realists, (vi) As against the maintenance of a Void, Bādarāyaṇa says that the Void does not exist, because Reality is actually experienced, Cf. *Nābhāva upalabdheḥ*, Cf. also *Na bhāvaḥ anupalabdheḥ*. Śankara fights Realism with the weapons of Idealism and Idealism with the weapons of Realism. The world is phenomenally real, but noumenally unreal. Empirical reality and transcendental ideality as in Kant. Sunya is not equal to Void : Yamakami Sogen.

VII. Dialectical Buddhism

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

VIII. An Exfoliation of the Different Conceptions of Nirvāṇa

1. Psychological :—
 - (i) Rooting out of Desire.
 - (ii) Cessation of Suffering (especially Ādhyātmika).
2. Epistemological :—
 - (i) Discovery of the Law of Causality.

(ii) Destruction of Avidyā or Ignorance. Snapping of the first link in the chain of the Twelve Nidānas (by knowledge).

3. Ontological :—

(i) Annihilation of Being, and perpetuation of Being. Realization of essencelessness, negative; Realization of Tathatā, positive.

(ii) Going beyond Being and not-Being. Transcending duality.

4. Ethical :—

(i) Equanimity, Cooling away or Peace. The ocean becomes still. Cf. *Apathy* and *Ataraxy*.

(ii) Sanctification. Cf. The Mahayana conception of Consecration.

5. Mystical :—

(i) Realization of Supreme Bliss. The different conceptions of Nirvāṇa are summarised very beautifully by Mr. Rhys Davids in his *Early Buddhism*, with a wealth of epithets such as, "the harbour of refuge, the cool cave, the island amidst the floods, the place of bliss, emancipation, liberation, safety, the supreme, the transcendental, the uncreated, the tranquil, the home of ease, the calm, the end of suffering, the medicine for all evil, the unshaken, the ambrosia, the immaterial, the imperishable, the abiding, the further shore, the unending, the bliss of effort, the supreme joy, the ineffable, the detachment, the holy city" (P. 72).

(ii) Living in Dharmakāya here and now. Dharmakāya is a logico- metaphysical, as well as an ethico-religious conception. This last conception of Nirvāṇa may be compared to the Vedantic Jivanmukti, the Pari-Nirvāṇa being comparable to the Vedantic Videhamukti. The MahāpariNirvāṇa of the Buddha may be something higher.

IX. The Mystical Element in Buddhism

No great religious genius without an uncommon insight. A vein of mysticism throughout the history of Buddhism.

Buddhist Mysticism. Two occasions of light, (Cf. Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, Sacred Books of the East. Vol. XI, Buddhist Suttas, P. 81). Also Gṛhakāraka in Buddha's post-illuminational soliloquy. This is in Majjhima.

Advice to Rāhula on contemplation by breathing in and out (Majjhima- Nikāya 62). Practising meditation by in and out breathing (Majjhima Nikāya 118). The practice of breathing in and out (Khuddaka-Nikāya 12).

Buddha's Enlightenment (see Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Pp. 71-83). Spiritual Experience under the Bo-tree.

The light that is seen round about the Buddha (Nimbus), see Monier-Williams Lecture X, *Mystical Buddhism*, Pp. 232-38 for a fine description of the stages of Buddha's Enlightenment. Buddha's criticism of Mystical experience in the Story of the two Brahmanas (see P. Carus, Pp. 117-122; probably Canonical influence). Immeasurable light of moral comprehension (see P. Cams, P. 98). Knowledge of the chain of the twelve Nidānas constitutes Enlightenment (see Monier Williams and Warren). In the last watch of the night, Buddha discovered the Law of Dependent Origination under the Bo-tree, H. C. Warren (P. 82). Also he discovered the Builder of the House (P. 83). A great halo of light was seen round about the Buddha by one who went to see him.

Ten stages of Bodhisattvahood, the last stage is that of Consecration (Abhiseka, see Suzuki; also E. J. Thomas, the Chapter on Bodhisattava's career Pp. 202-203. (1) दुरारोहा (2) बद्धमाना (Bound) (3) पुष्पमंडिता (4) रुचिरा (5) चित्रविस्तरा (6) रूपवती (7) दुर्जया (8) जन्मनिदेश discussion of Buddha's 7 births in which he gradually attains consummation. (9) यौवराज्य (10) अभिषेक. Different degrees of Bodhisattvahood, all reaching towards Buddhahood. As a consequence, there ought to be only one Buddha and not many. But Buddha himself says that there have been many Buddhas before his time.

History of the Buddhas. Buddha tells the history of the twenty-four previous Buddhas, concluding with an account of himself, (Khuddaka-Nikāya 14, Buddhavamśa). Also see Majjhima-Nikāya 116, Isigili-sutta. Buddha cites the names of the Pacceka-Buddhas who formerly dwelt on the Isigili hill. Also Digha-Nikāya 14; an account by Buddha of the six previous Buddhas.

One has a vision of the Tathāgatas and Buddhas (in Mahāyānism) and receives instructions from them. Grace or Mahākaraṇa of the Buddha. Mahāyāna Mysticism. Cf. Mystic intuition in Nāgārjuna (Steinbock). God in us and we in God (Cf. Sogen, P. 301). Buddha present in all things, in stars, flowers etc. (Cf. Yamakami Sogen). Buddha must be heard, seen etc. at all times (Rockhill 'Life of Buddha', P. 198): the Buddha must be the

cynosure of all our senses. Cf. also Nāgārjuna's mystical intuition as in Stcherbatsky. Suzuki, a Neo-Buddhist; Sogen, Suzuki, Steherbatsky, all Neo-Buddhists.

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CHAPTER FOUR

JAINISM

I. Pan-psychism (a better word than Monadism)

1. More consistent Atomism than that of the Vaiśeṣikas. All atoms qualitatively alike. Transmutation of metals into gold, therefore, not chimerical. The Jainas did not make sufficient use of Dharma or motion (Anaxagoras) in their cosmology. Contrast Democritus: "Give me matter and motion". Interlinking of atoms explained on account of wetness or humidity (Kunda- kunda).

2. Every material atom ensouled by Jiva. Hylozoism (Jacobi) or Pan-psychism. According to Śāṅkara there is Caitanya in Pāṣāṇa and Mṛttikā; only it is not Āvirbhūta. The Jaina conception of substance. Substances cannot exist without qualities (see Upadhye). Contrast Naiyāyika's view निर्गुणं द्रव्यं प्रथमे क्षणे उत्पद्यते. According to Jainas, Dravyas or Substances are divided into Jivas and A-Jivas the former of which are of five grades or degrees and the latter are of five classes or kinds. Their Pan-psychism goes against the division of existence into Jivas and A-Jivas. These latter are: (i) Kāla, (ii) Dik, (iii) Dharma= motion (R̥gveda; (iv) A-dharma, and (v) Pudgala (Atoms). Time is Nāstikāya, while the four others are Astikāyas. Substance must be One, and not many as the Jainas suppose: Cf. Plural number of substances in McTaggart.

(Atomism in Jainism and Democritus: (a) Pudgalas are atoms. They are qualitatively alike while Democritus says they are qualitatively different. As the atoms are alike, "Alchemy" is possible in Jainism. (b) Both recognise motion. Dharma is the principle of motion in Jainism. (c) The combination of the atoms is explained in Jainism by humidity; in Democritus, it is explained by hooks. In contemporary science, it is explained by electric attraction. In Nyāya God is responsible for making द्रव्यगुण, others follow themselves. (d) While Democritus recognised secondary qualities, the Jainas did not. (e) Democritus did not deny God while the Jainas did).

3. Gradation of Jivas according to development of sensation (Is this biologically sound?) One sense: minerals; Touch. Two senses: Worms; Touch+Taste. Three senses: Ants (Do not the ants see?); Touch+Taste+smell. Four senses: Bees;

Touch+Taste+Smell+Sight. Five senses: Men; Touch+Taste+Smell+Sight+Hearing. Hearing seems to be the highest sense according to Jainus.

4. Also mirroring of all experience in the perfect soul; ordinary souls do not mirror. Cf. the nature of Omniscience or Kevala-jñāna discussed later. (In Leibnitz, there is a *monas monadum*. In Jainism, there is not, except it be the Tirthankara). In Jainism difference between Matter and Spirit. In Leibnitz matter, a lower grade of spirit.

5. Hylozoism+Gradation+Representation= a theory of *Monadism*. No God required in either. Cf. Jaina Tirthankara. (The Tirthankaras in Jainism have not the power of incarnation but are otherwise like the liberated souls of Badarayana, who also have not the power of creation which God alone possesses. Panpsychism, a better word for the Jaina theory than either hylozoism or monadism though with either it has got analogies.

II. Probabilistic Epistemology

(i) The discussion of the Nayas is a necessary ancillary to the Syādvāda. The Syādvādamanjari, which is a standard epitome of Jaina Doctrine, discusses both the Nayas as well as the Syādvāda (which is itself called Saptabhangi- naya). For the discussion of Nayas vide also Viśeṣāśāsyaka Bhāṣya on the Nirukti of Bhadrabāhu. (a) There are infinite Nayas (philosophical standpoints or doctrines) possible. Anekāntavāda. But the Jainas consider only four Nayas as prominent. The Samgraha-naya (synoptic) of Vedanta, all-inclusiveness. The Vyavahāra-naya of Sāmkhya, the practical (pragmatism) or scientific stand-point. The Naigama-naya of Nyāya. This refers to the Nigamana of Naiyāyikas. And the Rju-Sutra-naya of Buddhism (See Das Gupta). The Jainas approve of the straightness of the Buddhists (Radhakrishnan, however, says that Samgraha-naya belongs to Sāmkhya and Vyavahāra-naya belongs to Vedanta (Vol. I. P. 301. Is this right?) Just because all these Nayas look at Reality each from its special point of view, they cannot apprehend Reality at all. Hence arise *Nayābhāsas* or Antinomies. Four Antinomies as in Kant, (b) Or, as in Radhakrishnan, the Sāmkhyas believe in Satkārya-vāda, effect in cause; the Vaiśeṣikas believe in A-Satkārya-vāda, effect not in cause: the Jainas would say that these views are only probable. (c) Or again, the Upaniṣads say that the Self exists and the Buddhists say that it does not exist (See Das Gupta): both views again are only probable. It follows, therefore, that not absolute knowledge but Relativity alone is the truth. Cf. Sophists. What we call knowledge is only probable knowledge. Hence,

(ii) The seven-fold formulation of Syādvāda or as it is also called the Saptabhangi doctrine : (The seven dicta of Probabilism or Antinomianism): (1) Probably it is. (2) Probably it is not. (3) Probably it is both is and is not. (4) Probably it is ineffable. (5) Probably it is, and is ineffable. (6) Probably, it is not, and is ineffable, and (7) Probably it is, is not, and is ineffable. Cf मराठी मोडणी:—

1

2

3

—

4

—

5

6

7

$$\begin{array}{l} 5 = 1 + 4 \\ 6 = 2 + 3 \\ 7 = 3 + 4 \end{array} \quad \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} 5 = 1 + 4 \\ 6 = 2 + 3 \\ 7 = 3 + 4 \end{array}} \right\}$$

(iii) Criticism of Syādvāda: (1) The first implies the second, hence the second becomes tautologous. (2) The third combines two imcompatibles, Asti and Nāsti. It breaks the Law of Contradiction (Śankara and Rāmānuja). Herakleitos: Sea-water is good for fish, bad for men. Grapes have seeds and have not seeds. The tree is moving and yet is not moving. Black teeth are beautiful, black teeth are ugly. Slender waist is a mark of beauty; slender waist is a mark of ugliness. Thorns are good for the camel, but bad for man. Antinomianism. (3) Probability may itself be probable, just as the Relativity of Nāgārjuna itself is relative. (4) Probability not applicable to the Moral Law, to Mokṣa, to Tirthankara, (just as Herakleitos's Relativism stops at God)." As the subject, the object, and the subject-object relation all become indefinite, how can the Tirthankara teach with authority", asks Śankara, "and how can his followers act on his precepts?" Ethics thus which is the pivot of Jainism would come to an end. May it not be, however, that, as recently in the case of Buddhism, so in the case of Jainism, the founder and the dogma might be sharply distinguished? Yes. पूज्यपाद'ऽ समाधिश्चतक which is perfectly spiritual. It is only in Bhadrabāhu, the author of Niryukti, 1st Century B. C., that we probably definitely hear of Syādvāda. There would be also great justification for this as the Canon is separated in Jainism from the

Founder by a longer period than in Buddhism (800 years instead of 400 years). (5) Coming to Ineffability, combination of Asti with Avaktavya is impossible. It is Vadatovyaghata. (Avaktavya=Anirvacaniya?) (6) The ineffability would be justifiable (Ward criticises Spencer by saying that he *knows* his unknowable) if spiritual experience is to be stressed (e.g. in तदेजति तन्नैजति etc. in Isavasya Upanisad), instead of intellectual conviction. (7) Why should we stop at the seventh stage, and not go on further? *Progressus ad infinitum*. Why not add *Syat na avaktavyah* as the eighth? And then go on with further formulations, later adding *Syadavak- tavyasca na vaktavyah*, and permuting and combining these with Asti and Nāsti, go on *ad infinitum*? (Na avaktavyah is different from vaktavyah). Relativism, ultimately, inconceivable without an Absolute (Radhakrishnan). Relativism is relative to Absolute. Change implies permanence Relativism implies the Absolute. (8) Logically speaking, Probability may have a categorical basis, as negation itself has. Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive; Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic. Is there greater reality from categorical to hypothetical, and from hypothetical to disjunctive?" Yes, if the hypothetical is the expression of the Causal Law, or the disjunctive exhausts reality", would say Bosanquet. But if this is not so, then Bosanquet is not right in giving greater and greater reality from categorical to hypothetical, and from hypothetical to disjunctive. Ultimately, there must be a categorical basis for the hypothetical and the disjunctive. *Tattavamasī* is a categorical proposition. Bosanquet puts a premium upon the knowledge of conditions or upon doubt, which the Vedantin does not allow. (9) Spinoza said Determination was Negation; the Jainas say Indeter- mination is Reality.

A is B
 ∴ Not-A is Not-B does not follow.

If Spinoza is right, Jainas are wrong. (10) Relativism good only as a tentative stage. Relativism as a necessary ancillary to Mysticism is what Gauḍapāda himself would teach; Cf. Bradley: Blend of scepticism and mysticism. But to dissect relativism and mysticism is not desirable.

III. Doctrine of Two Truths

Two degrees of Truth: Vyavahara and Nīścaya, cf. two degrees of reality in Nāgārjuna: Samvṛtisatya and Pariniṣpanna-satya, also two degrees in Śāṅkara. The ĀtmapravādaPurva, which is certainly earlier than the Angas and therefore may express the opinion of Mahāvira himself, states two different points of view, namely, those of Vyavahara

and Niścaya, Commonsense and Philosophy, which correspond to the Phenomenal and the Noumenal. (1) From the commonsense point of view, the Self does good or bad actions (Kartā); from the philosophical point of view, it remains absolutely in its own nature. (2) In commonsense, it enjoys the fruits of its actions (Bhoktā); in reality it enjoys nothing. (3) In commonsense, it absorbs the material Karmas and is material or corporeal: in reality, it is not matter and is incorporeal. (4) In commonsense, it fills the whole body; in reality it fills the whole world and is therefore called Viṣṇu (see Jaini).

IV. Arguments for the Non-existence of God

Jaina criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of God. All these are included in हेमचंद्र's द्वात्रिंशिकास्तवन with its commentary called स्याद्वादमंजरी cf. कारिकावलि and मुक्तावलि (1) Has God intelligence ? (2) Does He perceive or infer? If so, has He any organs such as eyes and so forth? (3) Is God omniscient? (4) Has God a body? then, He must have a very big brain in order that He may create this world. Du Bois Raymond. (5) Nobody creates the shoots of corn they spring of themselves (Nature or Svabhāva). Hence the Naiyāyika's syllogistic argument is wrong. Creation according to Jainism is without beginning or end. (6) Has God a will and a purpose? (7) Does God move in order that He may create the world? (8) Is the world an effect of God's caprice or whim ? (9) Is God dependent upon the action of men? (10) Why should we not regard Karma or the Order as creator of the world instead of God? (11) Is God dependent on Adrṣṭa? (12) Is the world merely His play? (13) Is not God partial; Has God not hatred? (14) Has He any instruments for the world creation? (15) Is God subject to change? (16) Supposing there are many gods would they not quarrel with one another? If so, the ants and the bees would be superior to these gods because they do not quarrel (see Guṇaratna's Tarkarahasya-dīpikā; as well as Haribhadra Sūri's Śaḍdarśana samuccaya. (which is earlier than Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasangraha;), Pp. 115-24, Edited by L. Suati, Bologna 1905; also, Das Gupta Volume I, Pp. 203-6. On the whole, we cannot understand Creation. The world has been real from eternity and will continue so to eternity. Anādyananta and real. Jainism: the world always exists and is not created. Vedānta: the world does not exist and is not created, Ajātivāda.

V. The Ethical Code of Jainism

(i) Five chief virtues: Ahimsā, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacharya and Aparigraha. Close analogy with the virtues of the Bhagavad-gītā. The story of live grains of rice given by a father-in-law to his four daughters-in-law. The first throws them away, the second neglects

them, the third preserves them, and the fourth sows them and propagates them (see Winternitz, Vol. II, P. 446). Preservation and propagation of the Faith.

(ii) Other virtues : (1) Gandhi and the diseased calf. Unity of life. "Thou art thyself the animal thou wishest to kill" (see Winternitz Vol. II P. 436). (2) Humanitarianism. Walking veiled for fear of inhaling organisms. Straining water and not partaking of honey and curds. The Go-rakṣaka Viceroy. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. (3) Nudity or nakedness, the dividing point between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. Nudity in respect of the Tirthankara and his raiment, whether the Tirthankar was naked or clad and consequently whether his image should be naked or clad. This refers to all the Tirthankaras but *par-excellence* to Mahavira. A contemporary of Akbar, Yaśovijaya Sūri, tries to reconcile the two. Mendicancy. (4) Hatred of women. Internal stench. The story of Malli and the six princes (see Winternitz, Vol. II, P. 447). (5) Imperturbability. (6) Suicide increaseth life. Greater period of Eternal life. Contrast Buddhism (Also Hamlet). Starvation to death highly recommended. We may kill ourselves but not others. Sadism inflicting pain upon others, masochism inflicting pain upon oneself, from two proper names Sad and Maso. Kant's universalisation. One's virtue and others' happiness. Kant's celibacy. (7) Philanthropy. Charity and Beneficence. (8) Excessive Self- mortification. Mahavira meditating in cool places during cold weather, and under the mid-day sun during summer (see Winternitz, Vol. II). Contrast Buddhism.

VI. Liberation vs. Omniscience

(i) Process of Liberation: How Karma attacks the soul. Empedocles: Love and Strife. Holes in the ship of Soul (see Winternitz, Vol. II). Karma the material, fluid. Inflow, catalepsy (soldering), obscuration, decadence, and release. Āsrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa. (Bandha and Samvara seem to be identical in meaning); Cf. Stages of the eclipse of the sun. The second, the third, and the fourth may be compared to the penumbra, the umbra, and once more the penumbra.

(ii) (a) Doctrine of the Superman : The nemesis of the denial of God is the apotheosis of the founder. Hopkins: "Deny God, worship man, nourish vermin". The spiritual Super-man. The Tirthankara in Jaina philosophy takes the place of God. Qualifications of a Tirthankara : Infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, infinite power. Infinite knowledge: 'Kevalajñāna' or omniscience:

जिनेन्द्रो देवता तत्र रागद्वेषविवर्जितः ।
हतमोहमहामल्लः केवलज्ञानदर्शनः ॥

Distinction between Arhat (Jivanmukta) and Siddha (Videhamukta). A Jivan- mukta might also be a Videhamukta; Cf. Janaka called Videha; also distinction between Siddha and Tirthankara (we Jaini, Pp. 1-2). To deserve, to accomplish and to sanctify. The Tirthankaras are those Siddhas who propound the Truth during their lifetime, which is a higher thing. The Tirthankaras are Asāmānya- Siddhas; the others are Sāmānya-Siddhas. The Tirthankaras, however, like a society of gods (McTaggart). They sit on the Siddha-śilātala. It is possible for every man to reach the highest state or divinity. The Tirthankara is the only lone being in a world of non-possibles.

(b) The nature of Omniscience: Omniscience, not serial (क्रमरहित); Omniscience = Omnipresence. Omniscience = Omnipotence. Omniscience = Bliss, cf. the co-presence of light and heat (see Kundakunda by Upadhye). अनन्तचतुष्टय Vedantic synthesis of Cit and Ānanda. No past, present and future. Beyond time and space. Kevala-Jñāna, Mirroring. Super-sensuous. Self-consciousness possible (see Kundakunda's Pravacana-Sara).

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<i>Jacobi</i> ..	Article "Jainism" in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Vol. VII.
<i>Stevenson</i> ..	The Heart of Jainism. Chapter II Historical Suammry. Chapter IV Mahavira's predecessors. Chapters VI and VII Jaina Philosophy. Chapters X and XI The Jaina Layman and Ascetic. Also Chapter XII. Chapter XV Jaina Architecture and Literature. (Read particularly Chapter II, Historical Development of Jainism and Chapter XV Jaina Architecture and Literature. She gives reasons why Jainism lingered in India while Buddhism vanished).
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- Champatrai Jain* .. The Practical Path. Contains practical discipline such as an account of Āsrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa. "May the happy reunion", says C. R. Jain, between mother and daughter, Hinduism and Jainism bring happiness to all, P. 233. This spirit is bristling through the work.
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CHAPTER FIVE

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF NYAYA-VAISESIKA

I. Reduction of all Categories (Vaisesika) to one. Hegel's Categories

1. (i) History of the doctrine of the Categories. Kanāda recognises only six, and does not recognise Abhāva. Abhāva comes to be added later on.

(ii) There are four kinds of Abhāvas: (a) Prāgabhāva, anterior negation which implies anterior eternity, (b) Pradhvansābhāva, posterior negation which implies posterior eternity. The meeting point of prior eternity and posterior eternity is the "specious present"; अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि (c) All negation involves affirmation. Cf. प्रतियोगिप्रमितिं विना निषेधानुपपत्तेः (तर्कदीपिका) (d) Anyonyābhāva, reciprocal negation which implies the law of contradiction, e.g., the sun is not the moon. And (e) Atyantābhāva, absolute negation which is negation proper, e.g., hare's horn or mountain of gold. Mountain मेरु does not exist, but it exists in parts, viz. Mountain and Gold. In that way also negation implies affirmation. शशशृंग does exist according to Rāmānuja. Also पित्तोपहतः शंखमपि पीतं पश्यति according to Rāmānujā, is not a भ्रान्ति. This Abhāva has no reference to time and is independent of the past, the present, and the future.

(iii) While Abhāva is supposed to be apprehended by Pratyakṣa in Nyāya Philosophy, it is supposed to be apprehended by a new criterion, viz., Anupa- labdhi in Mimāṃsā. Nyāya is right and not Mimāṃsā.

(iv) That Abhāva is regarded as a category involves that negation implies affirmation. Cf. Bosanquet who says that all negation has a positive basis. The very fact that prior negation and posterior negation imply prior eternity and posterior eternity, itself makes Abhāva a positive category. Also the fact that the Naiyāyikas say that Abhāva is apprehended by Pratyakṣa, is another argument for its positive character. Two significant negations, says Bosanquet may imply a valid conclusion. Cf. also, the Pragmatic view of negation in Bergson.

Negation implies affirmation; but this does not mean that it is a positive entity. अभाव has thus no characteristics of a separate category.

2. An indefinite regress in Viśeṣas. "Qualitative" distinction between atoms of the different elements. Viśeṣas among atoms even of the same element (Svatovyāvartaka). Consequent merger of Vaiśeṣika in Nyāya. Contrast Jainism, where all atoms of any element whatsoever are always alike.

3. (i) The Nyāya conception of Sāmānya attacked by Vedāntins, Buddhists and Jainas. Criticism by Parmenides and Śaṅkarācārya: Divisible or Plural.

(ii) The Vaiśeṣikas retort by saying that this criticism is wrong because it presupposes a spatial view. On the other hand, they say that the particular is only the revealer (vyanjaka) of the universal.

(iii) There is no Sāmānya for Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, Samavāya and Abhāva. There is Sāmānya for the first three Padārthas Dravya, Guṇa and Karma, e.g. Dozenness, Quality-ness seem to be an absurdity, also Actionness. There is not merely Dravyatva, Guṇatva and Karmatva, but there is also cowness, redness and running-ness.

(iv) Sāmānya is also of two kinds : Para and Apra Sāmānya. This highest Sāmānya is Satta, thus indistinguishable from reality. This involves probably a hierarchy as in Plato's "Theory of Ideas". If there are two Sāmānyas, there must be a Sāmānya for them. Nityam *Ekam Anekanugatam Sāmānyam*. Why then two kinds of Sāmānyas?

(v) Two meanings of the word 'Sāmānya': (a) A universal characteristic and (b) a class-concept (Jāti). In the first it is a correlative of Viśeṣas, involving quality; in the second it is a correlative of Vyakti, involving number:

Connotation Denotation
Universal Particular
सामान्यविशेष
जाति व्यक्ति
Genus Individual

The particular and the general together constitute the Definition of Aristotle.

4. (i) Criticism of the concept of Samavāya or the relation of inherence as the red colour in the rose. This is also supposed to be an eternal and intimate relation. (Differentia or

inseparable accident?). The separation of the relata conjoined by it, means the destruction of at least one of them. Such relata are called Ayutasiddhas i.e. those which are not Yutasiddhas. They are five:

अवयव-अवयविनी: गुण-गुणिनी, क्रिया-क्रियावन्ती, जाति-व्यक्ती, विशेष-नित्यद्रव्ये चेति।

अवयव-अवयविनी; there is no Samavāya relation between part and whole (Avayava and Avayavin); while it is doubtful whether there is such between Kriyā and Kriyāvān, Jāti and Vyakti.

(iii) The problem of external (Samyoga) and internal (Samavāya) relations. Samyoga, a Guṇa; Samavāya, a Padārtha. Bradley's criticism of relation as involving infinite regress. Similar criticism by Śamkarācārya. The maternal relation is in the mother; the filial relation is in the son. These can not be brought together. The relation of aboveness is in the book and that of belowness is in the table; they can not be brought together. Infinite regress in these cases also. To relate relata and the relation between them, new relations must be found out, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Samyoga always predicable about Ākāśa as well as Atman, in relation to things.

(iii) Intensification of the difficulty in Samyukta-samavāya, Samaveta-samavāya, or Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, hence Samavāya does not exist. A useless category. The unrelated Absolute.

5. and 6. Dravya, Guṇa and Karma.

An exhaustive investigation of the different *Dravyas*. The seven categories are reduced to one, viz. substance as in Citsukha. Substance is that which exists by, and for itself—Spinoza. Atman the only ultimate substance and not fire, water, air and earth. Cf. Truth as the adjective of Reality (Bradley) and Ānanda as the adjective of Brahman (Śamkarācārya).

Guṇa and *Karma* adjectival to Dravya. Adjectival existence but not substantival. An exhaustive investigation of the different Guṇas.

Details

(Dr̥vya. Pṛthvi, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu, Ākāśa, Kāla, Dik, Atman, and Manas. These have been very severely criticised by Buddhists and Advaitins. They make a common attack. Ākāśa is ether, while Dik, is space. Ākāśa and Dik distinguished from each other by Kumārilabhaṭṭa. Śrīharṣa's view (?).

Ākāśa— ŚabdaGuṇam ākāśam. Modern views -ether carries light-waves while air carries sound-waves. The Pythagoreans called it the fifth entity over and above earth, water, fire and air: the "quintessence" or fifth essence as we may call it. But the Pythagoreans did not care to define what this fifth entity is.

Kāla and Dik both realistic and objective in Naiyāyika philosophy; subjective according to the Buddhists, and phenomenal according to Vedantins. Bhartṛhari, Dikkālādyanavacchinna.

Atman: difficulties about it (i) Put on a par with other elements; (ii) All Atmans are Vibhu, jostle with one another qualitatively; (iii) Jivatman and Paramātmān. God comes under Paramātmān, reduced to an epiphenomenal entity. The Buddhists bring in the doctrine of relativity in Kāla and Dik.

Guṇa. Sāṃkhya is a quality! The objections of Vedantins and Buddhists. One quality qualifies another. Three colours, two colours, for example (TadGuṇa- lamkāra). Samyoga is also a Guṇa. External relation separated from Samavāya which is regarded as a Padārtha. "Aboveness" is a Padārtha.

Karma. Five kinds.

Śāmānya (connotation, general characteristics), Parasāmānya and Apra-sāmānya. Sāmānya for Sāmanāyas? Sāmānya for Viśeṣas?

Four kinds of Abhāva. The whole scheme not well carried out. Has Abhāva a Sāmānya? Samavāya between Dravya and Guṇa. Samyoga is separable relation. Samavāya is inseparable. To say that there is Sāmānya for Guṇa and Karma is nonsense. Self, a Dravya.)

Contents

II. Analysis of the concept of Cause

1. The three-fold definition of Kāraṇa as Samavāyi, Asamavāyi and Nimitta' not tenable. The Samavāyi and the Nimitta compared to Aristotle's Material and Efficient cause. As the Formal or the Final cause of Aristotle is not a real cause, similarly the Asamavāyi in Nyāya philosophy is not a cause. The Final Cause useless in Science Bacon. As illustrations of Samavāyi or the material cause we have earth for the pot, and atoms for the world (The word Samavaya has got nothing to do with Samavāyi) and its illustrations of Nimitta or the efficient cause, the rod, the wheel and the man. Also the ass. The ass plays such an important part in Indian Logic. Nimitta=exciting or predisposing cause, not occasional cause.

2. Futility of the conception of the Asamavāyi. By definition the Asamavāyi is said to be either Guṇa or Karma as the Samavāyi is said to be Dravya. The Sāmkhyas do not recognise Asamavāyi(?). In the ease of Paṭa, the Tantu (Dravya) is Samavāyi-kāraṇa, and the Tantu-samyoga (Guṇa) or Tantu- prasāraṇa (Karma) Asamavāyi-Kāraṇa. In the ease of Paṭarupa, Paṭa (Dravya) is Samavāyi-Kāraṇa, and the Tanturupa or the whiteness of the Tantu (Guṇa) the Asamavāyi-Kāraṇa. (Difficulties in the conception of Asamavāyi arise because a quality or a motion can never be a cause. Presentationism). Emergence of new qualities out of old. Ultimately there is no cause except God; all causation is artificial.

3. (i) Three points in the Nyāya definition of cause. That which is not epiphenomenal (ananyathāsiddha), that which invariably precedes the effect (niyataPurvavṛtti) and that which is unique (asādhāraṇā), is the cause. Anyathā- siddha—that which can be dispensed with. Ananyathāsiddha—indispensable. Five kinds of epiphenomenal causation.

(ii) the Conception of Sādhāraṇā Kāraṇas. such as time, space, God. Definition of Cause which corresponds to Mill's definition of cause, as the invariable (ananyathāsiddha) and unconditional (asādhāraṇā) antecedent (niyataPurvavṛtti). If S. C. Vidyabhushan is right in saying that Gautama borrowed his syllogism from Aristotle, then why did he not borrow the definition of Cause from Mill? Four thousand years hence, a man might rise up and say that Gautama had borrowed from Mill.

4. Unnecessary distinction between Kāraṇa and Karaṇa. In the conception of Kāraṇa the expression Vyāpāravat is occasionally added. Four such Karaṇas:Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda.

Kāraṇa—Vyāpāravat Asādhāraṇām Kāraṇam. Process becomes a cause. Criticism by Citsukha.

Sādhakatamam Karaṇam—Pāṇini's definition of Karana in Aṣṭādhyāyī.

III. Proofs for God's Existence

- (1) Cosmological proof.
- (2) Logical or Ratiocinative proof.
- (3) Udayana's proof by experiment.
- (4) Moral proof.
- (5) Intuitive proof.
- (6) Jaina Criticism of Nyāya Doctrine of God.

1. *Cosmological*—

(a) All production requires perception of materials by Agent. God so required for perceiving the super-sensuous atoms.

(b) God is required for the original motion: Prime-mover.

(c) God is required for creating the first binary compound : 2 ! Why not bring in God in between all stages from 2 ! to n ! ? Occasionalism.

(d) Adṛṣṭa : Unseen force : Physical, Biological and Moral. Adṛṣṭa thus responsible for earth-quakes, growth of plants, and recompense for actions. In a physical sense, it is equivalent to the conception of original motion in Democritus which he super-added to those of atoms and void. Adṛṣṭa in the moral sense is equivalent to Apurva in Mimāṃsā philosophy. It is also equivalent to the doctrine of Karma. Five proofs given by Udayana for Adṛṣṭa: Sāpekṣatvāt, Anāditvāt, Vaicitryāt, Viśvavṛttitah, Pratyagātmaniya. Problem of God in Nyāya doubly precarious on account of the presence of Adṛṣṭa. Is Adṛṣṭa dependent on God or independent of Him? If the first, it is unnecessary; if the second, God is not all powerful. Adṛṣṭa is an impersonal force, and Daiva is the power of God. Cf. ' Daivam caivātra pancamam ', Bhagavad Gitā XVIII, 14, Adṛṣṭa in Nyāya is like Satan in Christianity as one opposed to God.

2. Logical—

God must be proved by reason alone.

(a) All revelation condemned as proof of God. Revelation according to Naiyāyikas is created, and hence non-eternal. Contrast Nyāya on this head with Mimāṃsā and Vedānta.

(b) Syllogistic argument. A blade of grass exists; therefore, God exists. Cf. the causal argument in Descartes: I exist, therefore God exists.

(c) Fused with Teleological. Teleology only incidentally brought in. A blade of grass (Ankurādīkam) or a flower (Tennyson) on all fours with a watch (Palley) or an eye; only analogical inference.

(d) Denying God is worshipping Him, says Udayana. Udayana a rational theologian. A logical investigation of God, he says, is also His worship. Even those who are controverting His existence, are earnestly meditating on Him.

3. Udayana's proof by experiment

Solvitur ambulando or *Argumentum ad baculum mortuum*. * •As pointed out here, Udayana's argument is a glaring fallacy as the adversary is silenced by inflicting death on him. There is no logic in the argument; there is only appeal to brute force—Editor. He throws down a Buddhist and a Brahmin from the top of a hill; the Buddhist dies, the Brahmin survives and therefore God exists.

4. Moral argument—

(a) Cf. Kant. Supervisor God required to equate virtue with happiness and vice with misery. Dhammapada: tata enam duḥkhamanveti cakramiva vahataḥ padam. Moral law instead of God.

(b) God the painless Soul. cf. यन्न दुःखेन संभिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनंतरम्..... एव नीतं च तत्सुखं स्वः पदास्पदम्—मीमांसक स्वः – स्वर्ग.

5. *Intuitive proof by Vātsyāyana*.—Probably only negative. God, says Vātsyāyana, transcends perception, scripture and inference; he thus sees the limits of reason and

possibly inclines towards intuitive apprehension of God. Yogajapratyakṣa is recognised by all Naiyāyikas.

6. The Jainistic criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of God (vide Das Gupta) is of the routine type.

IV. Nyaya Doctrine of Epigenesis or Qualitative Novelty

- (1) General Theory of Epigenesis.
- (2) Epigenesis in Atomism :
 - (i) Differences of quality among atoms.
 - (ii) Formation of Dvyaṇuka.
 - (iii) Factorial n, an Epigenetic product.
- (3) Epigenesis in Generation :
 - (i) Generation of a Product.
 - (ii) Emergence of Qualities.
 - (iii) Cumulative *versus* Total Metamorphosis.
- (4) Epigenesis in Causation.
- (5) Epigenesis in Knowledge.

- (1) General Theory of Epigenesis :

The Ārambhavāda or the Asatkāryavāda of the Naiyāyikas is a doctrine of Epigenesis or new creation. The Parīṇāmavāda or the Satkāryavāda of the Sāmkhyas is a doctrine of Equilibration or evolution. The Naiyāyikas suppose that the effect was not present formerly viz. in the cause; hence epigenesis. The Sāmkhyas suppose that the effect was present formerly viz. in the cause; hence equilibration.

- (2) Epigenesis in Atomism :

(i) Nyāya philosophy lays stress on differences of quality between atoms, not merely of the different elements but even of the same element; not so Jainism which recognises only differences of quantity. To use another terminology, Nyāya considers the differences as physical, Jainism considers the differences as mathematical. Physical differences or differences of quality are epigenetic in character.

(ii) It is strange how from the अणु which according to the Naiyāyikas, enjoys only infinitesimality (Parimandalya) or a mere ideal content, a Dvyaṇuka should ever be formed. The rise of the Dvyaṇuka is an illustration of epigenesis.

(iii) The general formula for successive atomistic formations or patterns is $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times \dots \times n$, or $n!$. The द्व्यणुक the त्र्यणुक the चतुरणुक and the rest are all epigenetic formations as they involve the process of multiplication and not of summation.

(The Mimāṃsā differs from Nyāya in regarding the Tryaṇuka as the minimum, visible (minimum perceptible) and not the द्व्यणुक as the Nyāya supposes).

(3) Epigenesis in Generation :

(i) Generation, destruction. The doctrine of momentary existence of the Buddhists is a hob-goblin to the Indian Logicians. Two moments instead of one. Momentary existence according to them can explain neither generation nor destruction. For both generation and destruction, more than one moment is necessary. Thus they hold that the Ghaṭa comes into existence one moment after the Kapālas are united, thus involving epigenesis; also they hold that the Ghaṭa is destroyed one moment after the Kapālas are destroyed.

Criticism. This latter doctrine as applied to an organism would be manifestly absurd because the cells would have to die first before the body dies. Now it is a fact of experience that the cells live even after the body dies. The most that we can say is that the body and the cells die together. Also the action of a decapitated frog or a decapitated warrior show that the parts are active even though the whole may be dead, e.g. Bajiprabhu Deshpande.

(ii) Emergence of qualities. The Indian Logicians are not content with explaining generation and destruction only as occupying more than a moment's span. They say that every product e.g., a pitcher at the moment of production, is a neutral entity, and that qualities e.g. red colour in the pitcher or smell in the rose, emerge later, say, in the second moment, and which are therefore epigenetic.

(iii) पीलुपाक, पिठरपाक. Much discussion has centred on the emergence of qualities in the product between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas who are respectively called पीलुपाकवादिन् and पिठरपाकवादिन् or those who hold the doctrines of cumulative metamorphosis and total metamorphosis respectively. According to neither, is the

emergence of qualities co-eval with the emergence of the object. It comes later, is emergent and therefore epigenetic. The पीलुपाकवादिन् in their different schools hold that the emergence of red colour, for example, may occupy 5, 9, 10 or 11 moments and would involve disintegration first into द्रवणुकः and then into अणुः which having assumed the new qualities reintegrate into new द्रवणुकः and a newly metamorphosed red pitcher. This has a significance for cosmogenesis. The पिठरपाकवादिन् say that the whole black pitcher is metamorphosed into red without the process of disintegration and integration.

The quality of holding water in a pitcher, for example, could be explained on the hypothesis of the पिठर school and not of the पीलु school, as evidently that quality belongs to the whole pitcher, and not to the atoms or parts constituting it (R.D.R.).

(4) Epigenesis in Causation :

We have also the doctrine of epigenesis in the concept of the Asamavāyi Kāraṇa of the Indian Logicians. They hold, for example, that the many Tantu- rūpas constitute a qualitatively new Paṭarūpa being its Asamavāyi Kāraṇa. The whitenesses of the Tantus, in other words, produce a new whiteness of the Paṭa which is unique and *sui-generis*. As compared with the Tanturūpas, therefore, the Paṭarūpa is an epigenetic formation.

(5) Epigenesis in Knowledge:

The self, according to the Naiyāyikas, is without knowledge in Susupti, while Jñāna emerges later in Jāgrti and is therefore epigenetic in character.

(In Prabhākara the soul is always Jāḍa. In Nyāya the soul is Jāḍa in Susupti, but in Jāgrti it gets the attribute of knowledge. Knowledge is thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, adventitious; a quality of the self (Cf. Buddhi in the चतुर्विंशतिगुण), and not its substance. In Kumārila the soul has Samvit even in deep sleep not to speak of the state of wakefulness. In Vedānta the soul is Samvidrupa at the least. There may be even Aparokṣānubhūti. We may thus, so far as the problem of knowledge is concerned, arrange the four systems in a graded order as follows: Prabhākara, Nyāya, Kumārila, Vedānta).

V. Nyaya Criticism of Buddhism

1. (i) Vātsyāyana criticises the Buddhist Relativism in his Bhāṣya on IV. 1.39 and IV. 1.40. He shows that Relativism is self-contradictory. The long and the short must be regarded as self-existent; otherwise no relation can be established between them, and relativism would be impossible.

(ii) He criticises the Buddhist doctrine of Vijñāna or knowledge alone as real, in his Bhāṣya IV.2.26 and IV.2.27. He tells us that the doctrine is self-destructive. in as much as the Buddhist in separating things from thoughts is giving a reality to them.

(iii) The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is criticised in his Bhāṣya, on III .2.11. We must always suppose that there is a connecting link between the origination of an entity and its cessation.

(2) (i) Udyotakara, in his Nyāya-vārtika, III. 1.1, criticises the Buddhist doctrine of Soul-less-ness. He tells us that the Bhadanta teaches that there is a burden and there is a burden-bearer. The five Skandhas are the burden, and the burden-bearer must, therefore, be the soul.

(ii) In his Vārtika on the Nyāya-sūtra I.1.37, Udyotakara criticises a Buddhist logician who says that the middle term and the major term co-abide in a syllogism. Udyotakara passes two criticisms: (a) How can a Buddhist, a holder of the doctrine of momentariness, hold to the doctrine of co-abidance; and (b) If we take such a syllogism as Śabda'nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghatavāt. Anityatva which designates posterior non-eternity, and kṛtakatva which designates prior non-eternity will have to co-abide in the Ghata, which according to the Buddhists exists for a moment.

(3) Udayana's Kusumāñjali is devoted to the refutation of Kalyāna Rakṣita's Išvara-Bhanga-kārikā. Udayana in his Ātma-tattva-viveka, refutes the four Buddhist theories: (i) Kṣana-bhanga, (ii) Bāhyārtha-bhanga, (iii) Guṇa-guṇi- bheda-bhanga, and (iv) Anupalambha. The last doctrine tells us that a substance exists in relation to its qualities only, and the qualities exist in relation to the former. In this net-work of relations which constitutes the veil or Samvṛti, the world is verily void, says the Buddhist.

(4) Jayanta, in his Nyāya-manjari, says that the Buddhists hold that there is no soul and yet they raise the Caityas. They hold that every thing is momentary and yet they construct Viharas or monasteries. They say that the world is void and yet require that wealth should be given to the Gurus. [This criticism of Jayanta, in our opinion, is multi-pronged and is applicable to all those who deny the reality of the world but revel in its enjoyment. Then why crow over Buddhism alone ?—Editor.]

(5) Buddhist criticism of Nyāya. (See Śantarakṣita's and Kamalśīla's criticisms.)

FAIR : LATER DRAFT

VI. Doctrine of Perception

(1) The doctrine of atomicity of sense, also this sense exists at the tip of the respective sense-organ, Nāsāgravartī and Jivhāgravartī etc. (अणुपरिमाणमिन्द्रियम् । अतीन्द्रियम्)

(2) Perception requires actual contact between sense and object. This is to be effected by the further artifice of the motion in sense-organ. Doctrine of three-fold contact; contact between soul and mind, mind and sense, and sense and object. Sannikarṣa has two aspects: (i) Contact and (ii) Proximity e.g. vision is aprāpyakāri, touch is prāpyakāri. This is a truly crass materialistic conception (Cf. Windelband).

(3) Gaṅgeśa criticises this original doctrine of perception, saying that it is both too wide and too narrow. It is too wide because it includes recollection, which is the contact between the mind and the image; and too narrow because it excludes perception by God. Has God, for example, mind and the senses? The question whether God perceives or not can be solved by the Naiyāyikas only by taking an anthropomorphic view of God.

(4) With this Naiyāyika theory of perception, we may contrast the Vedantic theory as well as the Buddhist theory. The Buddhist theory of perception is presentationistic in the extreme; so their theory of perception consists in the following of one presentation by another, not involving the mind at all. The Naiyāyika's theory involves mind, but says that, perception consists in the physical contact of the mind and the object through the senses. The Vedantic theory takes a *via media*, the Antaḥkāraṇavṛtti taking the form of the object, and it is this form which is known (Cf. Dharmarājādharmaśāstra). The present scientific theory would explain perception as due to an electro-magnetic influence being carried by the

sense-organ through its respective nerve to the nerve centre. Another theory which might be contrasted with the Vedantic is the theory of *eidola* or *similacra*.

(5) Difference between sensation and perception recognized by Vācaspati and Udyotakara. A very clever anticipation of modern theory. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka. In this, the Naiyāyikas with their realistic bias fall into the mistake of supposing that there is a 'perception of the Universal'. Dinnāga had said that perception concerns itself with the individual and not with the universal. The Naiyāyikas answer that we must be supposed to perceive the universal, otherwise, we cannot communicate it to our fellow-men (Cf. Russell and his doctrine of the perception of the universal). Stout's doctrine takes however, a *via media* between idealism and realism. All categories of the understanding are latent in sense, and there is only a difference of degree and not of kind. This is a doctrine to which the Naiyāyikas should have subscribed in respect of their distinction between sensation and perception.

(6) We have thus a sensuous perception of the cow, and again a sensuous perception of cowhood; but we have a supersensuous perception of cows (Cf. Laukika and A-laukika pratyakṣa). Really speaking we ought to have a super-sensuous knowledge of cow-hood.

(7) Gangeśa however tries to evade the difficulty by making a three-fold classification of non-sensuous perception. (i) Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (ii) Jñānalakṣaṇa, and (iii) Yogaja. According to the first we have a super-sensuous perception of all cases of smoke or cow—past, present and future. According to the second, we have an associational perception of fragrance, when we perceive a piece of sandal wood: according to the third, we have an intuitional perception of the supreme Being, of atoms, of duty, of things past and future, and so on. In this last doctrine of Yogaja pratyakṣa, Gangeśa is playing into the hands of Intuitionists.

FAIR : LATER DRAFT

VII. Judgement, Inference and Induction

(1) The Naiyāyikas are scientists and realists and not idealists. Hence they start with perception and conception and not with judgment as the unit of thought. Jayanta alone of Indian Logicians regards the sentence or the Judgment as the beginning of all thought;

'words' he says,'are parts of a sentence.' This is a position very similar to that of Bosanquet who regards the judgment as the unit of all thought. As against the position of Bosanquet, one might ask why we might not start with the percept or concept on the one hand, or, with inference on the other. Jayanta alone takes the idealistic view of judgment. His theory is like that of the Anvitābhīdhānavādins, who take a representational view, as against the Abhihitānvayavādins, who take a presentational view. The one view depends upon meaning, the other upon fact.

(2) Nature of inference. We cannot understand the nature of inference in Nyāya without contrasting it with that of the Buddhists or of Bosanquet.

(i) In the first place inference as with Dinnāga, moves from particular to particular, and yet Dinnāga feels the necessity of taking recourse to the law of causation. Herein he commits the same fallacy, as Mill who says that inference moves from particular to particular and yet recognizes the law of causation. Causality among particulars is a contradiction in terms. Hume was thus more consistent than Mill when he recognized the particulars but denied the law of causation.

(ii) Bosanquet also denies causation, but substitutes the law of ground and consequent, as the basis of inference. No time element is involved in inference. When reality is the subject of all judgment, there is no reason why causality should exist.

(iii) The Naiyāyikas on the other hand recognize Causation. They however overhit the mark in that, they recognize all cases of inseparable accident also as cases of causation (for example, the green colour of parrots). It is only our ignorance of the real nature of things which makes us suppose that there is anything like accident.

(3) Nature of Induction. The chief problem is - how do we arrive at scientific laws, how is it that we are able to formulate the major premise? What, in short, is the 'Vyāptigrahopāya' or the means of attainment of the knowledge of induction, as Gaṅgeśa puts it.

(i) According to the Buddhists there can be no scientific induction as logic deals merely with perception. Inference they take as invalid. As against this, Gaṅgeśa tells us that those who try to prove the invalidity of inference cannot do so without themselves invoking the aid of inference. Mere percepts without concepts are beads without a thread.

(ii) Udyotakara, an earlier logician, however says that the 'vyāptigrahopāya' can be explained by the combination of perception and remembrance: perception of the minor term, and remembrance of the concomittant of the major term and the middle.

(iii) Even against this, Gangeśa argues by saying that perception is not required for induction at all. Induction is arrived at by the Methods of Agreement and Difference: (a) To illustrate this we have to understand what the older logicians called the Sapakṣa and the Vipakṣa, i.e. to say, the positive instance and the negative instance, corresponding respectively to the table of presence and the table of absence in Bacon. (b) Again, Vācaspati's doctrine of Upādhi as Sādhavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhi. The syllogism to be valid must be free and unfettered and have no delimiting conditions. The Upādhi is the delimiting condition [for example, in the transposed or re-adjusted (Inverted) syllogism, parvato dhūmavan vanhimatvāt. contact with wet fuel. ārdrendhana-samyoga is the Upādhi]. In Udyotakara, there is no ārdrendhanasamyoga; while, however, wherever there is ārdrendhanasamyoga there is smoke. The fallacy called Vyāpyatvasiddha, which is one of the three kinds of Asiddhas. (c) Gangeśa, like Mill, tells us that it is the Method of Agreement and Difference, and the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference which would give us the induction. This he calls respectively, the Kevalānvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki anumānas. In short, it is reason alone which, according to Naiyāyikas, gives us the major premise.

(iv) As contrasted with this, is the Aristotelian explanation of the formation of inductive law, as due to the combination of experience and intuition, which supervenes all of a sudden, and gives us the knowledge of a scientific law. In the last resort, therefore, laws are discovered by intuition and not by reason.

VIII. Problem of Validity in Nyaya and Mimamsa

(a) The Nyāya theory of Knowledge is known as Parataḥ-prāmāṇya, while the Mimāṃsā theory of Knowledge is known as Svataḥ-prāmāṇya. The Nyāya theory of Error is known as Anyathā-khyāti, while there are two Mimāṃsā theories of Error, the Akhyāti of Prabhākara and the Viparītakhyāti (which is almost equivalent to the Anyātha-khyāti of Nyāya) of Kumārila. (The difference between the two Mimāṃsā theories of Error, viz. the Akhyāti and the Viparītakhyāti we shall notice under "Prabhākara and Kumārila" in the next chapter). At present we shall consider the Mimāṃsā and Nyāya theories of knowledge, viz. Svataḥprāmāṇya and Parataḥ prāmāṇya, as well as the very famous discussion by

Vācaspati of the five theories of Error (See S. C. Vidyabhushan. History of Indian Logic, Pp. 138-39). The five theories of error here enumerated are: (i) The Ātma-khyāti of the Yogācāra Buddhists (Vijñānavādins), (ii) The Asat-khyāti of the Mādhyamika Buddhists (Śūnyavādins), (iii) The Anirvacaniya-khyati of the Advaita-Vedantins, (iv) the Akhyāti of the Prābhākaras and (v) the Anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas. As Vācaspati is a Naiyāyika, he puts the Anyathā-khyāti last. The Advaita-Vedantin may put the Anirvacaniya-khyāti last. A fuller discussion of all these theories should be carefully read from Kuppuswami Sastri's Primer of Indian Logic. Pp. 157 180, where there is a Vedantic criticism (from the point of view of the Anirvacaniya- khyāti) of the other theories of Error; See P. 160 where he puts the Anirvacani- ya-khyāti last. The Rāmānujian theory of Error is referred to on P. 164. This will enable one to form one's own independent opinion of all the different theories, and then to construct one's position.

(b) (i) Corresponding to the Svatahprāmāṇya and Paratah-prāmāṇya of Mimāṃsā and Nyāya, theories of Intrinsic and Extrinsic validity, we have, so far as the authorship of the Vedas is concerned, theories of Apauruṣeya and Pauruṣeya-vāda. According to Mimāṃsā , knowledge has its criterion within itself. According to Nyāya. knowledge has its criterion outside itself. Mimāṃsā inclines towards internal coherencc. Nyāya towards external reference.

(ii) Thus according to Nyāya, knowledge would be valid, provided the source from which it springs is perfect, or the causc from which it proceeds is real (Keith, P. 18), provided the sense-organs are not deficient, or provided that it leads to some useful purpose. Thus e.g., the dream-consciousness would be invalid because there is no perfection in its cause; the yellowness of the conch would be invalid because there is jaundice in the eye; and again, the water of the mirage would be unreal, because it does not lead to the quenching of thirst. The realism of Nyāya, however, is tinged with Pragmatism. Thus, according to Naiyāyikas, knowledge *is* not true by its very nature, but *becomes* true by the fulfilment of an extra condition, Samvādi-pravṛtti, e.g. quenching of thirst. Cf. the Arthakriyākāritva of the Buddhists. Thus Nyāya includes in its criterion of reality both correspondence and satisfaction, objective verification as well as subjective utility. See Hiriyanna.

(iii) The criticism which Mimāṃsā would pass on the Nyāya theory of knowledge is that to guarantee one cognition, such as reference to a correct source, another cognition would be required, this, another cognition, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that no knowledge could be valid.

(c) Realistic pragmatism in Nyāya.

(i) The Realism of Nyāya. All secondary qualities reduced to primary. Even secondary qualities objective. Compare the tertiary qualities in Neo- realism. Holt's physiologism.

(ii) Realistic theory of Error. The illusory yellow colour itself objective. The Naiyāyikas hold that when a jaundiced man sees a conch to be yellow, the 'yellowness' as well as the 'Samavāya' relation in which it stands to the conch, are equally real along with the conch itself.

(iii) Yet, Error results because there is no correspondence with fact: the silver is Āpaṇastha. Also, no quenching of thirst follows. Hence, fusion of Realism and Pragmatism.

(d) In regard to Prāmānyavāda or validity of knowledge, Gangeśa tells us that two questions arise: (i) *Whence* is the validity of knowledge derived, and (ii) How are we *conscious* of it ? (In our opinion these two questions reduce themselves to the same thing). The Mimāṃsākas answer the questions by saying that knowledge is self-evident. If so, says Gangeśa, invalid knowledge would be identical with valid knowledge. It follows therefore that knowledge is not self- evident, but is inferred from the fruitful correspondence between the knowledge and the activity. After Ghaṭa is known a quality called Jñātata is produced in Ghaṭa according to Mimāṃsā kas and a quality called Jñātr̥tva or संबित्ति is produced in Atman (knower) according to Naiyāyikas.

As regards Apramā or invalid knowledge, the Mimāṃsākas (Prabhakar?) do not admit invalid knowledge or error at all. All knowledge according to them is valid. According to Gangeśa, Apramā is that knowledge which does not abide in its own subject but in the subject of another generic nature (Anyathā- khyāti). Moreover, in our consciousness 'this is silver', says Gangeśa, we must suppose that there is only one kind of knowledge, and it is cumbersome to assume two like the Mimāṃsā kas, viz. perception and recollection. See Vidyabhushan.

(e) In a general way, the problem of validity and invalidity may be mathematically exhibited as follows:—

Validity	Invalidity
(a)	(b)
Self-evident	Other-evident
(c)	(d)
abcc	Sāmkhya,
abdd	Nyāya,
acbd	Mimāṃsā ,
adbc	Buddhism.

and

Worked out in plain language this means:—

Sāmkhya—Both Validity and Invalidity self-evident;

Nyāya— Both Validity and Invalidity other-evident;

Mimāṃsā—Validity self-evident, Invalidity other-evident; and

Buddhism—Validity other-evident, Invalidity self-evident.

See Kane Pūrva Mimāṃsā (references to Ślokāvārtika and PraKāraṇa- pancikā).

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CHAPTER SIX

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF PURVA MIMANSA

I. Reduction of all Pramāṇas to one

Progressive delineation of the six Pramāṇas :

Cārvāka	Pratyakṣa				
Vaiśeṣika	"	+	Anumāna		
Sāmkhya	"	+	" +	Śabda	
Nyāya	"	+	" +	" +	Upamāna
Prabhākara	"	+	" +	" +	" +
Kumārila	"	+	Arthāpatti		
			Anumāna	" +	" +
			Arthāpatti +	Anupalabdhi	

Bauddhas do regard Anumāna as Pramāṇa but their Anumāna is invalid.

Criticism of these Pramāṇas in the light of the Vedantic "Anubhava".

A. (1) Anupalabdhi or non-perception cannot be a criterion at all. It is invented to explain our apprehension of "Abhāva" or negation. Set a thief to catch a thief. Both are non-existent. If Abhāva is Bhāva-rupa, Pratyakṣa will suffice.

(2) Pratyakṣa does not lead to valid knowledge. We see the sun to be only of a span's length. Rāmānuja makes Upamāna or Pratyakṣa as follows : ज्वालाभेदानुमानेन प्रत्यक्षोपदर्शितं ज्वालाभेद = भिन्नज्वाला. But Rāmānuja who believed in the reality of the world should not stultify Pratyakṣa.

B. (3) (i) Upamāna involves the analogy of a "गवय" with "गो", as well as of a "गो" with "गवय". Indefinite and infinite reciprocity. Reciprocal similarity involves an unending series of resemblances.

(ii) At most, it may be a case of Anumāna only. Analogy, such as the "counting" of points of resemblance between the Earth and Mars in respect of their suitability as

habitations for life. Mars is a planet like the Earth. Therefore, must have a life on it. Does not "weight" but only count. Analogical inference cannot be valid inference. It only leads to probability.

4. (i) Arthāpatti or "Implication" (which is the soul of inference). It can, therefore, be very well reduced to Anumāna either of the Kevalānvayi or the Kevalavyatireki type, which can be shown to be not linear inference, but Implication (Bosanquet).

(ii) Prabhākara says that there is doubt in Arthāpatti which is ultimately resolved. Kumārila says there is contradiction which is ultimately reconciled. Sanśaya is required as an initial stage even in Anumāna नानुपलब्धे न निर्णयार्थे न्यायः प्रवर्तते । Both recognise Arthāpatti.

(iii) While the Mimāṃsākas contend that we must recognise Arthāpatti to be a new Pramāṇa, as we cannot assign a Linga or Hetu or middle term which alone would justify its being classed under Anumāna, the Naiyāyikas hold that we cannot regard Arthāpatti as a new Pramāṇa, but that it can very well be shown to be included under Anumāna: and Nyāya is right. The formula for Arthāpatti can very well be exhibited in the form of "Barbara" (AAA) in the first Figure as follows :—

All fat non-eaters by day must eat at night,
S. N. is a fat non-eater by day.
Therefore, he must eat at night (Kevalānvayi type.)

The "non-eater" here, however, is a negative expression. Or, alternatively, the formula could be exhibited as follows in Celarent (EAE) in the first Figure:

No fat man non-eating by day is a non-eater at night,
Devadatta is a fat man non-eating by day,
Therefore, Devadatta is not a non-eater at night (Kevalavyatireki type).

Formally, this Anumāna would be correct: also the "implication" of it would cover what is intended to be proved by Arthāpatti. Arthāpatti is thus implicative inference.

(5) The Anumāna gives us only a partial grasp of reality. Judgment and inference are only appearances and not reality. Truth, as Bradley says, always falls short of Reality. Therefore, Anumāna invalid. (see Buddhist criticism of Anumāna in Śāntarakṣita, as well as

Vedantic criticism in Śrīharṣa.) We can not bring all the Tārīkikas, together: पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात्, Śamkara, Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt. Śamkara uses logic to combat the logicians and to defend 'insight'.

C. (6) Varieties of opinion in regard to the value of Śabda as a philosophical criterion. The Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise this at all. The Sāmkhyas recognise it hoping that the Upaniṣads might be regarded as advocating only Sāmkhyaism. Cf. अजामेकांलोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम्-श्वेताश्वतर IV 5. The Naiyāyikas believe in it: but make it ancillary to God. The Mimāṃsākas exalt it above every other Pramāṇa making it supreme even above God whom they feel no necessity of recognising. At the most Deva=Devatā. ŚabdaPramāṇa would only be a ritualistic dogma unless we mean by Śaba the eternal sound, which can be validated only by "Anubhava". In that sense it becomes equivalent to Sphoṭa or the primal sound which is validated only by 'Anubhava'. Hence it follows that "Anubhava" is the only true criterion of Reality.

For a complete statement of the relation between Śabda and Sphoṭa see next point.

II. The Doctrine of Sabda and the Doctrine of Sphota

(Max Muller, Pp. 516-544; also Das Gupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, Appendix)

(A) The supremacy of the criterion of Śabda, in Mimāṃsā. Śabdapraā-nakā vāyam yacchbd aha tadasmākam Pramāṇam, Śabara on III. 2. 35. The eternity of sound. Its self-creation. Word greater than God, Apauruṣeya- vāda. Contrast the Pauruṣeya-vāda of the Naiyāyikas, and their insistence on God as the creator of the Vedas. The Naiyāyikas give only lip-service to Vedas. The Vaiśeṣikas take this tendency to its logical conclusion in the denial of Āpta-vākya. According to Vaiśeṣikas, verbal testimony is included under inference. As against this Gangeśa tells us that verbal testimony does not depend upon invariable concomitance, like inference; hence, it cannot be included under inference. Like Laplace, the Mimāṃsākas did not feel the necessity of a Creator.

Mimāṃsā doctrine of the supremacy of Word attacked by the Naiyāyikas on various grounds: (i) Word, adjectival, not substantival, "Śabda" Guṇam Ākāśam. *Pettio Principii*. (ii) Śabda is a product, is made, changes, is augmented, perishes (See Max Muller, p. 524). (iii) Eternity of Word only in the sense of "uninterrupted tradition" (Sampradaya). Sound,

according to Naiyāyikas, is non-eternal. Also there are certain "branches" of the Vedas that are lost as we know from Smṛtis and tradition. Hence the Veda is non-eternal; and the Mimāṃsākas are wrong in saying that it is eternal because its continuity is uninterrupted, (iv) Word created by God. God, author with unlimited intelligence; hence, God greater than Word, Pauruṣeya-vāda.

The thesis and the anti-thesis of Mimāṃsā and Nyāya reconciled by Vedānta by identifying Word with God. Śabda-brahma; Cf. Kabir Śabda. While with Mimāṃsā . Word is greater than God; and in Nyāya, God, greater than the Word, in Vedānta, Word is made co-equal with God. There are also personal Vedāntins and impersonal Vedāntins.

(B) In spite of their differences in regard to the Word, however, the Mimāṃsākas (Das Gupta, Pp. 181-182), the Naiyāyikas, and the Vedāntins (Max Muller, Pp. 537-39) all agree in attacking the doctrine of Sphoṭa advocated by the Vaiyākāraṇa and Yoga philosophers. The identity of the two Patanjalis, Cf. Yogena cittasya padena vācām. The Naiyāyikas denied both the supremacy of the word as well as the doctrine of Sphoṭa; the Mimāṃsākas and the Vedāntins made Śabda supreme but denied Sphoṭa. Even the Vedāntins failed to understand the mystical significance of Śabda. It was Pāṇini alone who said that the Śabda, which he identified with the Sphoṭa (explosion), was the primal energy of the world. "What bursts forth". स्फुटति इति स्फोटा; Sounds as against स्फुटति अर्थः अनेन; अर्थ —meaning. Liberation in consequence of the study of Śabdānuśāsana. Cf. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita : Sphuṭyate avidyā anena iti Sphoṭah, that by means of which ignorance is destroyed (Śabdānuśāsana., first Āhnika). Cf. एक शब्दः सम्यग्ज्ञातः सभ्यक् प्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके च कामधुक् भवति । पातञ्जलभाष्य.

Pāṇini also refers to one Sphoṭāyana In his Sutra, AvañSphoṭāyanasya. Later grammarians failed to catch the mystical significance of Pāṇini, e.g. Paianjal Kaiyaṭa (Max Muller. P. 529). and Bhartṛhari (Das Gupta, Pp. 183-184). We should like to exclude Patanjali from this company, if possible. With them Sphoṭa meant the power of signification (Das Gupta, P. 183)? or "Meaning" of a word: Cf. स्फुट्यते अर्थ अनेन । A logical instead of a mystical view (see Sarva-darśana-sangraha, Pp. 114-119).

Various difficulties in the conception of Sphoṭa as meaning : Is meaning subjective or objective? Is it individual or collective? Is it implicit or explicit? Is it a string or an aura? Does it depend upon the order of the words? दीन and नदी. Does it reach progressive consummation? अन्त्यवर्णनिर्ग्राह्य (The Yoga Philosopher Vācaspati, Das Gupta, P. 185). Does it precede or follow the word? Different varieties of Sphoṭa: Varṇa-Sphoṭa, Pada-Sphoṭa,

Vākya-Sphoṭa. These are tried to be established by Bhartṛhari in his Vākya- padīya. Is there any Meaning for sentences, such as the Vākya-Sphoṭa (Das Gupta, Pp. 185-186, Anvitābhīdhāna-vāda) (Lotze and Bosanquet: Concept and Judgment). Where shall we stop? Grantha-Sphoṭa! *ad infinitum*. Epistemologically, ultimate reality would be thus the meaning of meanings.

From another point of view, viz., the logical, as Bhartṛhari cleverly saw (Max Muller, P. 531), Śabda or Sphoṭa is highest Sattā or existence, the *Summum Genus*. All genera merely "vanishing species" of it, merely illusory forms (Bhartṛhari, Max Muller, P. 532). वाक्यपदीय ungrammatical for पदवाक्यीय Relation like that of Paramātmān to Jivātmāns (Max Muller, P. 532). Compare all ideas as species of the Idea of the Good in Plato.

From the philosophical point of view, all words ultimately mean God, the Logos, (Max Muller p.,532). Cf. the Nārāyaṇa of Sannyāsins. Cf. also Bosanquet. "Reality" as the only subject of all judgments.

Three points of view therefore: Epistemological, Logical and Philosophical. From any one of these approaches, Śabda or Sphoṭa becomes identical with absolute reality.

All these approaches however, are merely intellectual and not mystical. Panini alone saw the mystical significance of it. "The eternal Word", says Madhava in his Sarva-darśana-samgraha, "which is called Sphoṭa, and which is without parts, is the true cause of the world".

Bādarāyaṇa (1.3.28) and Śāṅkara in criticising the doctrine of "Sphoṭa" failed to sympathise with the mystical significance of it. Both Bādarāyaṇa and Śāṅkara say that the world comes from the "Word" (and not Śphoṭa), and this Word is Brahman (Max Muller, P. 521). Contrast जन्माद्यस्य यतः । यतः = from God. In his criticism of the doctrine of Sphoṭa, Śāṅkara particularly quotes Upvarṣa, the Mīmāṃsāka-Vedāntist, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constituent letters (वर्णसमुदाय शब्दः) as against grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a supersensuous entity called Sphoṭa which is the cause of the apprehension of the meaning of a word (Thibaut, P. xxxvii). (1) उच्चरित शब्द and (2) स्फोट (Idea) suggested by उच्चरित शब्द. Inquilab Zindabad should be uttered proximately. उच्चरित शब्द is to शब्द (स्फोट) what वाच्य is to ध्वनि. The doctrine of Sphoṭa as understood in a mere logical sense may indeed be

objectionable, but when it is identified with the mystical doctrine of Śabda, the Vedantins and especially Śamkara need have no cause of grievance against it.

For the doctrine of Sphoṭa, cf. the *Logos* of St. John, the "Let there be Light" doctrine of the Old Testament, the *Kun* (let it be done) in Arabic Philosophy, the Vāk in Rgveda, and the Anāhata Nāda in Kabir. The Ālan- Kārikās utilised the conception of Sphoṭa in their doctrine of Vyangya or Dhvani.

III. Metaphysical Doctrines of the Mimāṃsā

The World, Self and God:

- (1) The Reality of the World.
- (2) Proofs for the Existence of the Self.
- (3) Criticism of the Doctrine of God.

1. The world: (a) Critical : Criticism of Buddhistic unreality. The external world is not a product of mere idea. Also no momentariness like that of an idea.

(b) Epistemological: Object exists because the report of one sense is corroborated by that of another. Hence the world objective and real.

(c) Cosmological : The world is also eternal :

तस्मादद्यदेवात्र सर्गप्रलयकल्पना । समस्तक्षयं जन्मभ्याम् न सिध्यत्यप्रमाणिका । तस्मात्प्रागपि सर्वेऽमी
स्त्रष्टुरासन् पदादयः । अन्वेष्ट्यो व्यवहारोऽयम् अनादिर्वेदवादिभिः । श्लोकवाक्तिक, संबंधाक्षेपपरिहार verses 113-
17. Uncreated (अनादि) and indestructible (अनंत). No Creator or God. The Atomistic Realism of
the Mimāṃsākas begins with the Tryaṇukas and not the अणुः. Cf. Jaina Philosophy about
Atma and Sṛṣṭi.

2. Self: Jaimini does not, but Śābara does give elaborate arguments for the existence
of the Self.

(a) Critical: Criticism of Buddhistic doctrine that one Idea knows another. Hume and
Buddhism: Separate and contiguous ideas. Like beads. James: enveloping Idea. Unity and
continuity of mental life must be explained.

(b) स्वर्गकामो यजेत । Therefore the self is Anumeya.

(c) (i) Cognition implies a cogniser. Self different from senses and mind. Cf. Śālikanātha: बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरेभ्यो भिन्न आत्मा विभुर्ध्रुवः ।

(ii) Yet the one self becomes many, Cf. the next line of Śālikanātha: नानाभूतः प्रतिक्षेत्रमर्थवित्तिषुभासते । The विभु आत्मा who is प्रतिक्षरीरं नानाभूत is no other than the Vedantic परमात्मा. Here there is incipient recognition of God. Śālikanātha, however, does not make clear whether the manifoldness is merely apparent or real. "नानाभूत" may mean both. If नानाभूत means apparent then the individual self is unreal. If it is real, then it must posit a परमात्मा.

(iii) According to Prabhākara and Kumārila similarly, selves are many; all eternal, नित्यः सर्वगतिः पुमान् । (श्लोकवार्त्तिक; आत्मवाद, verse 73). Is this not itself ambiguous?

(iv) The real argument for plurality of selves in Mimāṃsā , however, is epistemological. Plurality of selves, because same reports about an object e.g. the sun. Also analogy of the relation of bodily activity and feeling to mind.

(d) Even dream experience, say the Mimāṃsākas, implies a real substratum viz. the self.

(e) The self as the seat of APūrvā.

(f) Reality of moral values. Punishment. The sower and the reaper must be the same.

(g) Transmigration also implies the soul. The sea remains despite the movements of its waves. The serpent uncoils without change of essence.

3. God: (a) Vedas and no God; APūrvā or invisible potency of actions, and no God. Yet Āstika Darśana, Apauruṣeya. "नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः" According to मीमांसा therefore, Naiyāyika is Nāstika in this sense. अपूर्व of the मीमांसा is a moral force; and the अदृष्ट of the वैशेषिक is a cosmic force.

(b) *A fortiori*, no deities. हविस् more important than देवता. हविषा. नियम्येत सुक्तभाजो हविर्भाजश्च देवताः । Deities partake in हविस् which is, therefore, more fundamental. The fruit of sacrifice does not proceed from deities. Devatās are (subordinate). They are only

symbols. Mantras are deities मंत्रशरीराः देवताः No synonym can be used, e.g. Pāvaka for Agni cannot be used. For अग्निमीळे पुरोहितम् we cannot use वह्निमीळे पुरोहितम्

(c) Criticism of the proof of God; Jainistic: No omniscience, no omnipotence, no benevolence, no fore-knowledge. Contradictions of one with another. What motive again could God have for creating? Vaiṣamyā and Nairghṛṇya, seem to be the objections urged against God by Mimāṃsākas. Vaiṣamyā and Nairghṛṇya are arguments used by Jainas also for the disproof of God. Cf. स्याद्वादमंजरि. Finite God. God is the sum-total of all privation of knowledge: ज्ञानाभावनिश्चयः (see Kane).

Rough Draft

Sections III and IV in this rough draft are made to constitute Section III in the fair draft above and are together entitled: *The Metaphysical Doctrines of the Mimāṃsā*.

Mimansa Criticism of Buddhism

(See Keith, Pp. 44 -52; also Pp. 64-69. Also Śloka-vārttika).

(i) We must posit the reality of the external world; of virtue and vice; of teacher and pupil. Even in dream cognition, we must posit a real substratum. The external world is not a product of mere intellect. Our ideas are imposed upon us by an external unity.

(ii) It is wrong to say that "cognition" alone exists, to the exclusion of cogniser and cognised.

(iii) No idea can comprehend itself; nor any one idea be comprehended by another. It is wrong to say that one idea as it originates becomes known to the first.

(iv) The unity and continuity of our mental life cannot be explained without the recognition of a substantial unity of the self. In Hume and Buddhism one idea contiguous with and yet separate from another. In James the next idea envelopes the first.

(v) The law of Retribution requires that the sower and reaper of actions must be the same.

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(vi) The Buddhist cannot explain "transmigration". A momentary idea cannot transmigrate itself, it is the soul alone which transmigrates. "The sea remains despite the movements of its waves; the serpent uncoils, without change of essence."

(vii) The fact that I *feel* with my hand what I *see* with my eyes shows that there exists something *beyond* sense-organs.

(viii) Other souls also exist. The "perception" of another soul is impossible, but one can "infer" another soul from the activity of its body.

The Metaphysical doctrines of the Mimamsa

(1) The World eternally existent:

Tasmādadyavadevātra sarga-pralaya-kalpanāḥ

Samastaksaya janmabhyām na sidhyatyapramāṇikāḥ

Tasmāt-prāgapī sarvomi sraṣṭuḥ asan padādaya

Anvesyo vyavaharoyamanādirvedavādibhiḥ

— Ślokavārttika, Sambandhākṣhepa-parihāra,
verses 113-117.

Neither creation nor destruction of the world. No creator required.

(2) Jaimini gives no Sūtras for the establishment of the self. Tho Self is only to be inferred: Svargakāmo yajeta. Though Jaimini is silent, Śabara enters into an elaborate proof of the soul which is independent of the body and senses, and beyond pleasure and pain. According to Prabhākara and Kumārila, there are many souls, all eternal: *Nityah sarvagatih pumān* (Śloka-vārttika, Ātmavāda, verse 73). Cf. also Śalikanātha—

Buddhindriyaśarirebhyo bhinnā ātmā vibhūḍhrvah

Nānābhūtaḥ pratikṣetram arthavittiṣu bhāsate.

—PraKāraṇa-pancikā, Ātma-tattva, Pp.141 ff.

(3) God is not required in Mimāṃsā for giving rewards and punishments. The APūrva or the invisible potency alone can do so. Jaimini says that the deity is *Guṇa*, or subsidiary in a sacrifice, *Haviṣa* is more important than *Devata*, Cf. Haviṣa niyamyeta (Pūrva Mimāṃsā VIII. 1.32), and Guṇatve datatāśruth, (Pūrva Mimāṃsā IX. 1.9). The deity has no body. The sacrifice cannot be intended to please the deity. The deity is not the Lord of all things. The

fruit of the sacrifice does not proceed from the deity. The deities of the sacrifices are merely symbols and objects, and to whom Sūktus are addressed: Sūktabhājo havirbhajāśca devatāh. They are to be distinguished from the deities of the Puranas, which occupy a higher position. No synonym can be employed for Devatas. We cannot substitute the word Pāvaka or Śuci for Agni. No personal god required for creating the world. God is not omniscient. As there can be no object of knowledge, God has neither knowledge nor omniscience. He is only the sum-total of all privation of knowledge. Jñāna bhāvanīṣṭayah (see Kane).

For the arguments which Mimāṃsā uses against God, see Keith, Pp. 61-64; also Śloka-vārttika. Cf. Jainistic arguments against God. The arguments can be summed up as follows: (i) Impossibility of God having a body. If he has a body, then there must be a matter which must have existed before him. (ii) What can be his motive in creation? Why does he feel a desire to multiply? (iii) Why should God create a world full of misery, if he is all good? Hence God is not benevolent. Vaiṣamya nairghṛṇya-prasangāt. (iv) If there is moral evil in the world, God is either not omniscient or not omnipotent, (v) He has also no fore-knowledge. Did God fore-know the Bamrauli disaster? God's knowledge and power conflict with his goodness, his fore-knowledge conflicts with man's freedom.

Here the Rough Draft Ends

IV. Contribution to the Science of Interpretation

The Tarkapāda of Jaimini, viz., I.1, is dedicated to a discussion of philosophical topics. The remaining Pādas of the first, and the other Adhyāyas upto the twelfth are devoted to a discussion of the principles of ritual interpretation.

The "Arthavāda" discussed in I.2 has its value in extolling desirable, or censuring forbidden acts; it thus comes into immediate connection with injunctions or prohibitions.

I.3 discusses the relation of Smṛti to Veda. Below Smṛti in value comes the practice of good men. I.4 discusses the subject of names or Nāmadheya. It seems that the Mimāṃsā felt the necessity of dealing with a number of obscure sacrificial terms.

Mimāṃsā (II. 1) develops such principles as Ekavākyatā (syntactical unity) Vākyabheda (syntactical split) and Anuṣaṅga. i.e., the principle of extension.

Contents

Vidhis or injunctions are encitements to actions. Action may be either positive or negative, or may partake of both characters. When it is negative, it is called Pratiṣedha and when it partakes of both characters, it is called Paryudāsa.

Actions may also be classified as Puruṣārtha and Kratvartha, done for the sake of the agent and done for the sake of the offering.

Injunctions or Vidhis are primarily of three kinds; Adhikāra-vidhi or Vidhi relating to qualification, Utpatti-vidhi or originative injunction, and Viniyoga-vidhi or injunction of application.

Originative injunctions are few in number, relating that they do to the principal Vedic offering only; they do no more than excite in the mind of a hearer the desire to perform the action.

Injunctions of application denote the exact manner of procedure (itikar- tavyatā) by specifying the numerous subsidiary actions. These subsidiary actions are called Śeṣas, and the distinction between Śeṣa and Śeṣin occupies the greater part of the attention of the Mimāṃsā.

While dealing with injunctions of application, we may note the six means by which the relations of subordination of actions may be determined. These are: Śruti or express declaration; Linga or indirect implication; Vākya or syntactical connection; Prakāraṇa or context; Krama or order which is the same thing as Sthana or position; and finally Samākhyā or names. Each of these means is deemed to be of "less" value than the preceding. Contrast the Paribhāṣā of Śekhara (38): Pūrvāpara-nityāntarangāpavādānām uttarottaram baliyah (Kielhorn translation, P. 185).

In addition to this division according to content, injunctions may be classified on the basis of the knowledge possessed by the agent of the mode of performance. There are thus three kinds of Vidhis again, Apūrvā-vidhi or original injunction, Niyama-vidhi or restrictive injunction, and Parisamkhyā-vidhi or injunction of limitation or exclusion.

Over against these Vidhis or injunctions which direct a positive act, there are prohibitions or Niṣedhas. e.g., the Brahmacārin must not look at the sun.

The above are the main topics with which Pādas 2-4 of Adhyāya I and Adhyāyas II-VI of the Mimāṃsā -sutra deal. Adhyāsa. VII and VIII discuss Atideśa or transference. The process of transference, however, involves modifications (Ūhas) which are discussed in Adhyāya IX. In other cases, the transference must be accompanied by the annulment of details, which are discussed in Adhyāya X. Adhyāya XI discusses the relation of subsidiary to principal offerings, and Adhyāya XII discusses the topic of options or Vikalpa. These last might be either Vyavasthita, fixed or limited and Avyavasthita, that is to say, unlimited (see Keith, Chapter V).

The rules of interpretation which the Mimāṃsā laid down were later utilised by the Dharma-śāstras for the interpretation of their texts, and they may also be found to harmonise with the rules of interpretation which modern Law employs. Compare Maxwell.

The first rule of the interpretation of Statutes is that words and sentences must be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning, which is the same as the Mimāṃsā rule of Śruti. Another rule is that conflict between the statutes is not to be readily assumed, which is the same as laid down in Mimāṃsā, that an option is to be declared only in the last resort. Another rule is that we must take into account the history of the causes of an enactment corresponding to the rule of Prakāraṇa or context in Mimāṃsā. Another rule is that all parts of a statute are to be construed together and each part is not to be construed separately, which corresponds to the rule of Vākya or syntactical connection in Mimāṃsā.

The Mimāṃsā tells us that the principal word in a sentence is the verb, and that the subject is, therefore, subordinate; and hence the attributes or Viśeṣaṇas of the subject are not to be supposed to be intended as a necessary part of the rule or proposition. The king is entitled to the tax on land, and not to the land itself. The sovereign ruler is not an absolute owner of his kingdom, and cannot make a gift of it. In the Viśvajit sacrifice where everything is to be given away, the sacrificer cannot make a gift of the things deposited with him, or of his wife or of his children.

Then again there is arguing from similars; thus for example, if a Niṣada is allowed to offer a Rudrayaga, it follows that a Śūdra can also do so.

An Arthavāda is not a positive command like Vidhi. When Mitākṣarā says that one should kill without deliberation even a Guru, a child, an old man, or a learned Brāhmaṇa if he comes as an Ātatāyin, this is merely an Arthavāda and not a Vidhi or command. That sons

have not the competence to divide in their father's lifetime is merely an Arthavāda extolling the prohibition to do so.

Kratvartha Vidhis are those which are of absolute obligation, and Puruṣārtha Vidhis are those which are addressed to the conscience of the agent. A breach of the first brings on sin, of the second only blame or censure. Compare duties of perfect and imperfect obligation in Kant. When Yājñavalkya says that one should marry a girl who is free from disease, who has a brother, and who is not of the same Gotra or Pravara, the last is Kratvartha, and the first two are Puruṣārtha. When Manu tells us that the son to be adopted is to be given by the mother or father "in distress" the "distress" is not Kartavartha but Puruṣārtha.

Krama is illustrated in allowing, e.g., a mother a prior claim, for the word 'pitarau' is explained in grammatical treatises as Mātā pitarau which means mother and father and not father and mother. Sometimes, however, there is difficulty about the understanding of this Krama, e.g., when Yājñavalkya says that the heirs of a hermit are the teacher, the good pupil, and a fellow student in order, the Mitākṣarā says that the order is to be reversed as common sense would require it. We may not, however, agree with Mitākṣarā

Options are always an improper procedure, as both texts are thereby nullified. Hence, if possible, an endeavour should be made to explain the negative proposition as an exception (Pāryudāsa) or as an Anuvāda.

The Anuvāda is merely a variety of Arthavāda, e.g., in the Vedic sentence 'Fire should not be consecrated on the bare ground, nor in the sky nor in heaven'. Every one knows that no one can consecrate fire in the sky, and therefore this sentence is a mere Anuvāda for praising the Vidhi that fire must be consecrated on ground with gold. As an illustration of the Nityānuvāda we can give the instance that a man can donate what he owns, but there is no ownership in a deposit, or in wife, or children, e.g., Dharma and Draupadi. This prohibition repeats only what is well-known. When, again, Manu apparently both allows and condemns Niyoga, the Mitākṣarā tells us that this is to be understood in a "limited" sense, viz., that a maiden may marry the deceased's brother, if the intended husband dies before actual marriage. Manu smṛti (IX.59) defines Niyoga as follows:

Devarādvā sapinḍādvā striyā samyanniyuktayā
Prajepsitādhigantavyā santānasya parikṣaye.

In this way Paṇḍu and Dhṛtarāṣṭra were born from Vyāsa from the widows of Vicitravirya.

When it is enacted that words in the singular shall include the plural, the Mimāṃsā illustrates this by enjoining that when it is said that a vessel is to be cleansed, it is implied that all vessels are to be cleansed.

Finally, the fault called Vākyabheda occurs when one and the same sentence is construed as laying down two different rules or Vidhis, *vide* Śābarabhāṣya P. I and P. 44 for examples of Vākyabheda (see Kane).

V. The Ethical Ideal of the Mimāṃsā

- (1) Jaimini's Division of the Veda in Five Parts.
- (2) Relation of Vidhi to Arthavāda.
- (3) Dharma : the Ideal in Earlier Mimāṃsā .
- (4) The Meaning of Apūrva.
- (5) Mokṣa, the Ideal in Later Mimāṃsā .
- (6) Doctrine of Jñāna-karma-samuccaya.

1. The mass of the Vedas being vast Jaimini divides it into five parts: Vidhi, Arthavāda, Nāmdheya, Pratiṣedha and Mantra.

2. Difference between Vidhi and Arthavāda, Command-injunction and fact-assertion. Cf. Hume : Relations of Ideas and Matters of fact. Sometimes Arthavāda may not be a fact. e.g. (i) Rāma says to Cara : अर्थवादः खल्वेषः। दोषं तु मे किञ्चित् कथय (उत्तररामचरित). (ii) बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम्, says the priest. सोऽरोदित् etc. because they adduce the story that when अग्नि ate the oblation on the way, he was beaten by the gods and his tears became silver. Therefore gold should be given in sacrifice as Dakṣiṇṣā and not silver this is Stuti of Suvarṇa and Nindā of Rajata. Various kinds of Vidhi (see Kane page 20) such as Niyama, Parisankhyā, Nitya, Naimittika, Kāmya. Utpatti, Viniyoga, Prayoga and Adhikāra; also Krativartha and Puruṣārtha. Vidhi or Niyoga means a mandate of the Veda. Arthavāda has no independent logical status and has to be interpreted as contributory to Vidhi. "Action" is the final import of the Veda: आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्। आनर्थक्यं अतदर्थानाम्. Contrast Upaniṣads which are not क्रियार्थ but only ज्ञानप्रतिपादक. The Upaniṣadic dictum *Tattvamasī*, though assertive in character, refers only to

a kind of action (Kriyā), which will bring on the result. Cf. Tantra-vārttika P. 13: एतेन क्रत्वर्थ-कर्तृप्रतिपादक-प्रतिपादन द्वारेण उपनिषदां नैराकाङ्क्षं व्याख्यातम् । No "is" but "ought" in *Tattvamasi*.

3. It is the Vidhis which can lay down Dharma. The ideal in earlier Mimāṃsā is Dharma; Artha and Kāma being subordinated to it. Nitya and Kāmya Karmas constitute Dharma and Pratiṣiddha Karmas constitute Adharma. The Kāmya may be, and Pratiṣiddha Karmas must be avoided but Nitya- karmas cannot be so avoided. The ideal in later Mimāṃsā is Mokṣa.

4. (i) Relation of Dharma to Apūrva: The true sphere of Dharma is trans-empirical. धर्ममिदं धर्म स्वरूपी राहणे हा स्वधर्म. Providing Prapās e.g. says Śābara, would not constitute Dharma because Vedas do not enjoin it. The Aṣṭakārādhā (Aṣṭamīrāddha) may have been enjoined by a Luptaśruti; therefore it may be performed, says Śānaka, Cf. Śānkarabhāṣya on Smṛtipāda. Prabhākara gives the name Apūrva to Dharma and Adharma. Apūrva is inaccessible to any Pramāṇa except Veda (Mānāntarāpūrva). Different kinds of Apūrva, such as Phalāpūrva, Samudāyāpūrva, Utpattāpūrva, Angapūrva, vide Jaiminiya Nyāya Mālā-vistāra on II. 1.5 Cf. also यदि अन्यदनुत्पाद्य यागो विनश्येत, फलमसति निमित्ते न स्यात्.... Śābara on II. 1.5 (see also Ganga Nath Jha, "Prābhākara School" in detail. The whole book must in fact be studied. See our markings of contents.

(ii) Adṛṣṭa and Apūrva : The Adṛṣṭa of the Vaiśeṣikas was a cosmical principle. The Apūrva of the Mimāṃsākas is the moral counter-part of it. Atoms, Adṛṣṭa and God. Cf. Matter, motion and void in Democritus, as well as the indeterminate jumping of electrons in modern science. The Jack out of the Box. "Indeterminism". The Apūrva of the Mimāṃsākas is equally indeterminate.

(iii) The five-fold character of Apūrva :—

(a) The ritualistic character of Apūrva as being the indeterminate effect of a sacrificial act which abides in the self (Ātmasamavāyi).

(b) The metaphysical character of Apūrva as taking the place of God.

(c) The moral character of Apūrva as bestowing reward and punishment for virtue and vice. A lame moralism and a lame theism.

(d) The psychical character of ApŪrva as being the traces (Samskāras) in the self as brought out in a dream, a fact of which the Mimāṃsākas make epistemological use. (Cf. Keith Page 20). See below.

(e) The epistemological character of ApŪrva as being responsible for the fusion of impressions which in Prabhākara leads to Akhyāti, and for new creation which in Kumārila leads to Viparitakhyāti.

(iv) Vedantic criticism of ApŪrva. While Jaimini regards Dharma or ApŪrva as the bestower of fruit, Bādarāyaṇa regards God or PŪrva as the bestower (Cf. III. 2.38-40, 41). The PŪrvamimāṃsā is really ApŪrvamimāṃsā and Vedānta is really pŪrvamimāṃsā as it deals with God.

5. The conception of Mokṣa in Mimāṃsā : For Prabhākara's and Kumārila's opinions on this head see next point. The Mimāṃsā refutes the Vedantic view that the physical world is sublated or transcended in the state of Mokṣa. "The world" endures in the same form, even if the soul becomes free. Cf. also Mimāṃsā criticism of the Vedantic "Absolute" and of "Neiscience".

6. Doctrine of "Jñāna-karma-samuccaya": Jñāna or the knowledge of the self obtained in the process of meditation is only a "contributory" aid, and then the doctrine is known as "Jñāna-karma-samuccaya". But this might be criticised both by Mimāṃsā and Vedānta which respectively uphold Karma and Jñāna. (e.g. See Sureśvarācārya's criticism of Jñāna-karma-samuccaya in his Naiṣkarmya-siddhi.) In that doctrine, however, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta meet. विद्यां चाविद्यां चउभयसह ॥ ईशोपनिषद्.

Five theories about the relation of Jñāna and Karma:

(i) Only Jñāna	Advaita Vedānta
* (ii) Only Karma	Mimāṃsā
*(iii) Jñāna and Karma on the same level		A kind of Mimāṃsāka. Cf. the two wings of a flying bird and also ईशावास्य उपनिषद्
(iv) Jñāna higher and Karma subordinate.		Rāmānuja
*(v) Karma higher and Jñāna subordinate.		Mimāṃsā

*These three Schools of Mimāṃsākas.

VI. Prabhākara and Kumārila

The two great Mimāṃsā philosophers : Prabhākara and Kumārila, one inclining, on the whole, more towards Nyāya, the other inclining, on the whole, more towards Vedānta. The chronological relationship between Prabhākara and Kumārila: according to some, Prabhākara is earlier, while according to others Kumārila is earlier. These latter say that Guru was a title bestowed by Kumārila on his discipic Prabhākara, when Prabhākara intelligently interpreted अत्रापि नोक्तं तत्र तु नोक्तम् ।

Prabhākara	Kumārila
(i) Bheda (hence inclined towards Madhva) between different categories, hence no sanction to Pariṇāma. No recognition of Abhāva as a category, or Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa.	(i) Bhedābheda between the different categories hence Kumārila's doctrine of Pariṇāma (hence parallelism with सांख्य in परिणाम and also with निर्वार्क in भेदाभेद) The Bhedābheda doctrine was probably an inspiration to Nimbārka who came about 800 years later. Das Gupta however finds the Bhedābheda doctrine in Badārāyaṇa himself (see Vol. II) Ahikunḍalavat? Recognition of Abhāva as a category and Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa
(ii) Tho self is unconscious or Jaḍa (If the soul is Jaḍa how can it be the locus of Apūrvā?) even in the state of liberation, as contrasted with the self in Vedānta which has Caitanya. The expression स्वसंवेद्य of Prabhākara is meaningless because it is bodily or physical.	(ii) The self is conscious or has Jñānaśakti even in Susupti. Kumārila, however, occupies an intermediate position between Nyāya which says that the self has no knowledge in the state of sleep and Vedānta which says that it has happiness also; of. Sarvajñātma Muni, who, in his Samkṣepa-śāriraka tells us that the self enjoys bliss even in the state of deep sleep.

- (iii) The self though unconscious, yet an eternal subject
- (iii) Tho self conscious, and an eternal unity of subject and object. Cf. tho "I am I" of Vedant

No self in Buddhism; a Jaḍa self in Prabhākara; a conscious self in Nyāya, though the consciousness is adventitious; a fully conscious entity in Kumārila; the self-illuminator in Vedānta : (a) happiness enjoyed in deep sleep, and (b) bliss enjoyed in ecstasy.

(iv) *Anvitābhindhāna-vad*

(iv) *Abhihitānvaya-vāda*

Both Anvita and Abhihita refer to Padas.

Mimāṃsā theories of Error

(v) Akhyāti (or Alpakhyaṭi) Three forms :

(v) Viparitakhyāti, Cf. the Anyathākhyāti of Nyāya. No fusion or combination, but experience new and unique. Illusionistic tinge. Doctrine of aberration or distortion on the way to Śāṅkara's doctrine of Adhyāsa or Vivarta.

(i) Fusion of Presentation and presentation such as is involved in illusions of perception : (a) A crystal appearing road on account of an adjacent rose; (b) appearance of two moons (visual); (c) two pencils (tactual); (d) conch appearing to be yellow (here, the sense organ is defective).

In Anyathākhyāti according to Naiyāyikas there is a memory of silver. In Viparitakhyāti according to Kumārila, there is no memory of silver but only an aberration of the mother-of-pearl as silver. In Viparitakhyāti as against Anyathākhyāti there is an element of distortion.

(ii) Fusion of Presentation and Memory, such as is involved in hallucinations: (a) presentation of shell and memory of silver; (b) presentation of rope and memory of serpent.

(iii) Fusion of Memory and Memory such as is involved in cases of doubt: A tall object appearing either like a pillar, or like an ascetic in meditation.

All these cases involve a fusion of two elements, both of which are real, and yet in combination lead to error. Realistic tinge. Error, thus, a grade of reality (Bradley).

Satkhyāti (Rāmānuja). Macbeth's dagger real Cf. the realistic tendencies in Nyāya according to which the secondary qualities are reduced to primary. Real particles of silver in

Śukti. The चाकचक्य in mother of pearl is according to Rāmānuja due to veritable particles of silver. Real yellowness in conch.

Asatkhyāti (Mādhyamika or Śūnyavādin). void meeting void, idea void; object void. Nothing exists.

Ātmakhyāti (Yogācāra or Vijñānavādin). Really it ought to have been called Jñānakhyāti or Vijñānakhyāti. No justification for use of the word Atman which does not exist. It only means; "The idea manifests itself as an object".

Akhyāti (Prabhākara): Alpakhyāti. Grade of reality. Two reals [(a) perception + perception; (b) perception + memory; (c) memory + memory] produce an unreal.

Anyāthākhyāti (Nyāya). Silver is Āpaṇastha. Or else it is remembered. Viparitakhyāti कुमारिल. The shell forsakes its nature, and appears as silver.

Anirvacaniyakhyāti of Advaitins. Beyond being or not-being. Neither real nor unreal. Unknowable, Inexplicable, Ineffable, Agnosticism. Anirva-caniya-khyāti connected with;

(i) Adhyāsa or superimposition of bodily characteristics on self (Kṣāma Kṣiṇa); of world on God.

(ii) Vivarta, mal-transformation opposed to Pariṇāma which is transformation only. Rajjusarpa or Śūktikā-rajata.

(vi) Categorical Imperative or Duty. Kāryatā-Jñāna. Neither pleasure nor pain.

(vi) Recognition of end, either positive or negative, in the shape of Duritakṣaya or Ānanda. Iṣṭasādhana-tā-Jñāna.

(vii) Prabhākara understood Mokṣa as the setting of Avidyā, Avidyāstamayo Mokṣah or as the destruction of all Dharmas and Adharmas (Nihṣeṣadharmādharmaparikṣaya Vedantic tings of उभे तीर्त्वा सुकृतदुष्कृते-उपनिषद्. He however, makes room for Atmajñāna as supported by Śamadama.

(vii) Kumārilla also regards Mokṣa as the destruction of Karman, but Moksh is only of a negative character (na hi Abhāvātmakam muktava MokṣanityatvaKāraṇam.) The Pratyavaya is to be taken away. Its mention is mere Arthavāda. Mokṣa follows

(आत्मज्ञान? थाप) [The Marathi word थाप means a white lie or bluff. Any talk of AtmaJñāna in the mouth of a person who regards the self as जड, is funny. The word थाप is a later addition to the text by whomsoever it might have been suggested—Editor.]

immediately on Karmakṣaya. It is thus of the nature of Abhāva. Kumārila's position is halting. Is is a step from Prabhākara to Śankara.

Though thus there is a general agreement between Prabhākara and Kumārila's views about the nature of Mokṣa, it is to be remembered that in the one case, it is Pratyavāya-parihāra, while in the other case it is Duritakṣayadvārā parameśvarapriyartham. Kumārila recognises that Mimāṃsā before his time had altogether become atheistic (Lokāyatikṛta). Also he inclines towards recognising the utility of Vedānta, Cf, Nāstikyanirākariṣṇurātmāsti tam bhāṣyakṛdatra yuktyā, dṛḍhatvametaadvīṣayatśca bodhah prayāti vedāntaniśevanena. When Kumārila makes obeisance to Somārdhādharin in his Mangalu, Śloka-vārttika, first śloka, Nāmah Somārdhādharīṇe, we can conclude: (i) that he was a Śivopāsaka, (ii) that he was a Parameśvaravādin but he does not believe that God was the creator of the world: see Ganga Nath. Jha तंत्रवार्तिक, Introduction, (iii) that he was Śākta, Cf. Soma, (iv) that he had nevertheless his teachings grounded in Mimāṃsā as the half cup of Soma was directed to be drunk in Mimāṃsā teaching. In any case, he saw that the consummation of Mimāṃsā must be in Vedānta.

In the historical development of Mimāṃsā there is a passage from स्वर्गप्राप्ति (conception of स्वर्गप्राप्ति) to the conception of Mokṣa. Cf.

यन्न दुःखेन संभिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।
अभिलाषोपनीतं त तत्सुखं स्वः पदास्पदम् ॥

Compare स्वः for the conception of स्वर्गप्राप्ति.

VII. How Kumarila leads to Vedānta

- (1) Bhedābheda leads to Abheda (Bheda, Bhedābheda, Abheda).
- (2) Jñānasakti leads to happiness, (Ajñāna, Jñānasakti, ĀnandaMāyā).
- (3) Consciousness leads to self-consciousness, self-luminousness and self-revelation.
- (4) Teleological ethics leads to the doctrine of bliss, and
- (5) Viparita-khyāti leads to the doctrine of Adhyāsa or Vivartn.

The tradition related about Kumārila and Śankara has got a great meaning underlying it.

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Author

Book

- Keith* .. Karma-Mimāṃsā Chap. I is historical containing among other things an account of Prabhākara and Kumārila. Chap. II is epistemological containing an account of स्वतः प्रामाण्य as well as an account of the various Pramāṇas comparatively with those of Nyāya. The account of अर्थापत्ति, अनुपलब्धि may be read; but particularly the account of शब्द or verbal testimony as the Vedas themselves play such an important part in the system. Chap. III contains the very celebrated criticism by Kumārila of Buddhist nihilism and idealism; also an account of the Mimāṃsā doctrine of categories comparatively with those of न्याय वैशेषिक. Chap. IV contains a very good account of a disproof of God and a proof of the souls. Chap. V deals with ritual interpretation and Chap. VI with Hindu Law (for this see Ganga Natha Jha, Prabhākara School).
- Jha* .. Translation of Kumārila Bhatta's Tantravār Tika by Gangā Natha Jha (Asiatic Society of Bengal) 1924, 2 Vols, with a fine Introduction "On the Tantra-Var Tika and its author Kumārila" by Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj Pp. V to XVIII. Also a small 4 page Introduction of Dr. Ganga Nath Jha. The brief Introduction of Ganga Natha Jha contains reply to Pasupatinatha Shastri's criticism on the author's work on the Prabhākara School. Gopinath Kaviraj discusses Kumārila and Buddhism: Kumārila's last scene; Kumārila's date etc. in Introduction to Vol. I.
- Jha* .. Translation of Śloka-vārttika by Dr. Ganga Nath Jha (Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1900) with a very fine Introduction, by the author, of 45 pages on the "Pūrva-Mimāṃsā System"). Śloka-vārttika (in verse)—I. i of Kumārila's work is the Tarakāpada, given to metaphysics and epistemology. The excellent introduction of Ganga Natha Jha contains discussions of Dharma (Page iii); The means of knowing Dharma viz, Veda (Page v); The word as supreme Pramāṇa (Page vi), Six objections urged to the view along with answers thereto (Pp. vii and viii); Constructive arguments of Jaimini for the word (Page viii). Nature of Jñāna and स्वतः प्रामाण्यवाद (Pp. viii ff). The Apūrva (Page xv). The meaning of Vidhi; अपूर्व विधि,

नियम विधि, परिसंख्या विधि. (Pp. xviii and xix), Subsidiaries (Page xxii), secondary actions and primary actions (Pp. xxiii to xxvi). Three kinds of primary actions नित्य नैमित्तिक and काम्य (Pp. xxvi and xxvii). Arthavāda of four kinds निंदा, प्रशंसा परकृति and पुराकल्प (P. xxxv). Three kinds of results : ऋत्वर्थ, पुरुषार्थ and उभयार्थ (P. xl), and Íswara, Categories. Mokśa, Jñāna, Pramāṇas, Srsti and Pralaya and Devata (Pp. 32-34). In *Slokavarttika* Dr. Jha discusscs Kumārila more or less, as he discusscs Prabhākara in the next work

Jha .. "Mimāmsā Sūtras of Jaimini" translated by Ganga Nath Jha (Sacred Books of the Hindus Vol. X) with his own English commentary. Only Suras in Chapters 1 to 3 i.e. Sloka-Varttika and Tantravarttika, the remaining 9 chaps, being Tup Tika), The very brief introduction contains an account in English (P. ii) of the contents of the 12 Adhyāyas. The translation also contains headings to the different AdhiKāraṇas of the first three Adhyāyas.

Jha .. Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mimāmsā (Doctorate Thesis 1911). Very important work on Prabhākara particularly, and Prabhākara and Kumārila generally. Chapter I is historical and discusses the relation of Prabhākara to Kumārila. Pp. 5 to 18. (Read particularly our markings in the table of contents in 1820 / 96 Philosophy Department Allahabad University). Chap. II (Pp. 18 to 101) discusscs the nature of cognition and its self-validity (Page 22). The very important discussion of word as the supreme Pramāṇa (Pp. 52- 68). Prabha- kar's doctrine of the self in relation to that of Kumārila (Pp. 73-82). The nature of Liberation (Pp. 83-85). Arguments against God's existence (Pp. 85-83) and Categories in Kumārila and Prabhākara (Pp. 88-101). Chap. III discusses Dharma. Word, Arthavāda. Vidhi, different kinds of APūrva (Pp. 159-168). Motives of actions etc. among other ritualistic matters. Chap. V discusses relation of Mimāmsā to Law such as Evidence, Inheritance, Adoption, etc.

Ganga Nath Jha .. Translation of शावरभाष्य 3 Vols. (Baroda).

Edgerton .. Mimānsā Nyāya Prakāśa or Āpadevi (Yale University Press 1929) regards Metaphysical and Epistemological aspects as less important, stresses ritual law.

CHAPTER SEVEN

POINTS IN GAUḌAPĀDA'S PHILOSOPHY

1. Gauḍapāda, a real Vedāntist.
2. Gauḍapāda and Buddhism.
3. Doctrine of non-creation.
4. Illusionism.
5. Analysis of causality.
6. Absolutism.
7. The place of God.
8. The superconscious.
9. Asparśayoga.
10. The status of morality.
11. The nature of illumination.
12. Prevarication about bliss.
13. Intuitionism.
14. Intellectualism.

Argument

1. That Gauḍapāda is a real Vedāntist can be seen from the unity of his four Prakaraṇas; from his continued reference to AUM, as well as to the Amātra which leads to Jivanmukti; from the four states of consciousness; also from his doctrine of God as immanent in sweet reciprocation (Madhu-vidya). 2. Gauḍapāda adopts the same terminology and the same method of argumentation as the Buddhists and erects his absolutistic philosophy thereon, cf. Jñāneśvara and Mahānubhāvas. 3. His doctrine of non-creation is original even though he once regards creation even as an emanation (Svabhāva). 4. His doctrine of illusion is based upon the non-distinction between the waking state and the dream state as well as upon his theory of Kalpanā as in Yogavaśiṣṭa. He regards it is not necessary to sublate the dream state in the waking state and the waking state in the superconscious state: the waking state *is* a dream, cf. 'Imaginism' from a different point of view. 5. As regards causality he maintains that time is an illusion as there are no relations of prior and posterior. Causation thus becomes impossible and an illusion. Nor does simultaneity involve causation, as the horns of a bull. Nor does he believe in the identity theory of cause and effect. 6. His absolute is defended from the stand-point of Neti as

abolishing all difference, as well as from the product being identical with the substratum. Nor does Gauḍapāda believe in the doctrine of grades or degrees of reality which is a mere compromise between monism and pluralism. But as in Gauḍapāda there is no pluralism, there are also no grades of reality. 7. Still Gauḍapāda has to make orthodox-wise a concession to God. 8. His belief in Reality is dependent upon the superconscious state. 9. Gauḍapāda is again original in his doctrine of Asparśayoga or the philosophy of non-contamination. 10. Every absolutist has to make some place for morality and so does Gauḍapāda. 11. His doctrine of Vaiśaradya or illumination may involve a mystical element, but it is also intellectual and consists in the belief that all souls have been for ever in a state of illumination and liberation. 12. Once he regards bliss as identical with Reality, and, at another time, dissuades aspiring souls from merging themselves in bliss. Finally there is a usual conflict of intuitionism and intellectualism in Gauḍapāda. 13. He uses Vijñāna in a different sense from the Vijñānavādins. His Vijñāna comprehends the trinity of knowledge, knower and known; and hence is identical with intuition. 14. While his intellectualism consists in the assertion that as the unmoving firebrand produces no illusion, so does unmoving knowledge cease to produce the world of imagination. This is an intellectual ascent to Reality no doubt! Here, as elsewhere also with many authors, Vedānta seems to be infected with intellectualism.

Gauḍapada's philosophy

Points in detail

1. The theory of Gauḍapāda's "Buddhism", exploded. Unity of four Prakāraṇas of Gauḍapāda Continued reference to AUM. Also four states. Praṇava is the fearless Brahman. The Amātra carries nowhere (= Jivanmukti, originality of Gauḍapāda). नैतस्य प्राणव्युत्क्रामन्ति। Brahman immanent in sweet reciprocity (Madhuvidyā).

2. Gauḍapāda and Buddhism: Terminology and method of argumentation. Dharma used in three senses: (i) Atman (Śamkara) Jarāmarana..... (ii) Object (Buddhists), Dharma in Vaibhāṣikas or Sarvāstivādins. cf. Stcherbatsky, (iii) Attribute. Bhāva, Nirodha, Vijñāna (subject and object both Vijñāna), Samghāta, Nirvāṇa (in a beatific sense), Agrayāna = Mahāyāna. Being: Not Being; Bondage: Freedom: Creation: Destruction. Creation an illusion, motion an illusion and thinghood an illusion. Neither perishable nor imperishable. Neither aspirant nor Siddha. Neither unity nor multiplicity. Neither patient nor agent. Neither coming nor going. Neither the Bhūta born nor the Abhūta born. Neither from itself nor from another is a thing produced. Reference to both Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda: Doctrine of

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two truths (Samvṛti and Paramārtha) (IV.73). Four-fold Āvaraṇa: Asti Nāsti, Asti-Nāsti and Nāsti-Nāsti (IV.83): Buddhistic in character. This applied to Samsāra and Nirvāṇa by the four Buddhistic schools, see Stcherbatsky. Moving, not moving etc. as in Aristotle. Reference to Buddhas and Buddha. "Buddha (in the singular) has not said that the knower becomes ultimately identical with knowledge and the known" (IV.99). द्विपदांवर may mean Purusottama instead of Buddha. "He alone is entitled to the name of Bhagavān who knows that by the clasping of any individual Dharma (Atman) misery yawns und happiness hides its face " (IV. 82). Is this a criticism of the Buddha?

3. Nature of creation: neither enjoyment nor sport, but emanation. Doctrine of non-creation: non-creation in Sāmkhya, Jainism and Nyāya in the sense of eternal existence. "With them we have no quarrel, we heartily sympathise with them". Ajāti in Buddhism, because no concatenation; in Vedānta, because delusion or semblance. Sāmkhya teaches Ajāti of the world in the sense of permanence, Gauḍapāda teaches Ajāti in the sense of non-existence. Philosophers have proclaimed the doctrine of Jāti being afraid of Ajāti. They have maintained that things are (Sarvasti-vadins). Reality on account of Upalambha and Samācāra. Criticism of Bādarāyaṇa, Nā bhāva upalabdheh (cf. Samkarism also). Upalambha and Samācāra are also found in Māyāhasti (IV.44). The enlightened or Buddhas have taken resource to Ajāti on account of the regressus in the conception of causation.

4. Comparison with Pancadaśi (Alātaśānti?): Islamic mysticism (The Mujaddid) and with Yogavāsiṣṭha (Kalpanā) imagination. Even Kalpanā does not exist! The Atman makes an imaginative construct of himself. Sleight of hand and castle in the sky. Doctrine of Māyā: Rajjusarpa: the dream analogy. No difference between waking and sleeping states. Māyā means also power or powers, cf. Indromāyābhih.

5. Analysis of causality: neither cause nor effect: neither past nor future, hence no concatenation. Identity of cause and effect not tenable, (IV. 12). Reciprocal causation involves infinite regress (IV. 18). Also Bijānkura Nyāya (IV.20), therefore no causality at all. No simultaneity. Horns of a bull are not causally related. No time relations as prior and posterior. "God stands above cause and effect". 'He who realises causelessness realises the sorrowless absolute' (IV.78).

6. One without a second: Neti negates all difference. Unborn, sleepless, nameless, and formless. No metaphor in what we say. Advaita is the only reality and Dvaita is its differentiation. There is Advaita between Advaita and Dvaita. Vaiśāradya does not fall to the

lot of those who are immersed in difference (Bheda). The individual self is neither a part of nor a mode of the universal self (III. 7). The description of a product as different from the primordial substance such as earth, fire, iron, etc., is only for the sake of comprehension or understanding. No grades of Reality (III. 10). The Dvaitins fight with one another, but we fight with none. "There is no difference anywhere. God manifests himself in plurality by his powers" (III.24).

7. Reference to God or Deva. This Deva is Isāna, Prabhu, Advaita. Genesis of the idea of Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahman. Praṇvā is both Apra-Brahman and Para-Brahman. (Atman God, Tanmanīṣā, his will cf. च्यवन्ते तन्मनीषया). Same as Turyā.

8. The superconscious (Amanibhāva). Reality experienced in the super-conscious state. "In that state knowledge rests in itself having Ajāti as its counterpart". Apprehension of unity (?) in the superconscious state. The superconscious transcends both Laya and Vikṣepa. This is the unshakable Samādhi where all discourse comes to end; the fearless, where all anxiety ceases; hard to attain even by great Yogins.

9. Asparśayoga : Realisation of the identity of substance and attributes, or God and souls (IV.2). Moral description also. Also psychological. Drop of water produces no surge in an ocean. Asparśayoga in its metaphysical, moral and psychological aspects.

10. Ethics and Upāsanā justified. Āśramas, Muni, Bhagavan. Fearlessness, auspiciousness, peace and bliss. Having realised, one should behave like a mad man. Pity, devotion, duty. Anxiety and sorrow cease.

11. Vaiśaradya or illumination सकृद्विभात etc. That is consummate illumination when the knowledge is attained (Vaiśaradya, that all souls have enjoyed tranquillity from the very beginning, that they have never been born, that they are by nature blissful, that they are all equal. (This contradicts the assertion साम्ये सर्व साम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विद्यते) and that they are one. All souls are forever in a state of illumination (IV.92). Tattvamasi and *not* Tattvambhavasi. Against Buddhism.

12. Prevarication about Bliss. One should not partake of highest Bliss; (III.45) and Reality of the nature of Bliss (III 47).

13. Intuition and Intellectualism in Gauḍapāda. Vijñāna as intuition: apprehending the trinity of knower, knowledge and known (IV.89). Contrast the Vijñāna of Vijñāna-vādins. Omniscience proceeds. Higher intuitionism.

14. Alātāśanti as the highest end is a negative conception. Alātāśanti: the unmoving firebrand does not produce any illusion, similarly unmoving knowledge produces no illusion (IV.48). Cessation of the world of imagination; not the realisation of the Absolute. Vedānta infected with Intellectualism.

VII. Was Gaudapada a Buddhist?

Gauḍapāda in relation to Nāgārjuna. Instead of Gauḍapāda having received his doctrine from Nāgārjuna, it is better to say that Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda were offshoots of the same sceptico-mystical tendency; just as six centuries later, Śrīhaṛṣa and Śantarakṣita were offshoots of the same logico-dialectical tendency. कालो वा कारणं राज्ञः etc. Time is the cause of the schools. Is a great man the creator of his time or the creature of his times? Or else we might say that Gauḍapāda erected his absolutist philosophy on the basis supplied by the teachings of Nāgārjuna, just as Madhusudana later on erected his new absolutism on the basis supplied by Navya-Nyāya. For Nāgārjuna see Das Gupta. For Gauḍapāda see our Points. अजातिं ख्यापामहे. Three stages of the Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna: (i) Nothing Real, (ii) Buddha and Nirvāṇa therefore unreal, (iii) two kinds of Reality: Samvṛtisatya and Pariniṣpannasatya, (see Winternitz, Vol. II). Opinion and Truth in Parmenides. Being and not-Being in Plato. Appearance and Reality as in Bradley. Intellect and intuition in Bergson. Instead of Gauḍapāda being Pracchanna Buaddha, Nāgārjuna may be regarded as a Pracchanna Advaitin. The continuance of Nāgārjuna's teaching in Śāntideva. (Śāntideva a Proclus of Buddhist philosophy 800 A.D. after whom Buddhism was absorbed in Hinduism, see Winternitz Vol. II). Only the sceptical side of Nāgārjuna ordinarily stressed, (cf. Das Gupta), rather than his mystical side. cf. Stcherbatsky. Doctrine of mystic intuition in Nāgārjuna (Stcherbatsky).

THE KĀRIKĀS OF GAUDAPĀDA

The Kārikās of Gauḍapāda are divided into four sections: (i) Āgama, (ii) Vaitathya, (iii) Advaita, (iv) Alātāśanti. There is unity among them. The first can not be dissociated from the rest and is said to be Vedāntic in character, while the last particularly is said to be

Buddhistic in character. In fact Gauḍapāda uses only the terminology and the manner of argumentation of Nāgārjuna, but rears an Advaitic philosophy upon them.

I Āgama

9. Reference to God or Deva whose nature it is to create. Some people say that creation is for enjoyment, others say it is for pastime. Essentially however it is but the nature of God; Creation only flows from God.

10. This Deva is Iśāna, Prabhu and Advaita and he is the same as Turyā.

16. How the individual soul wakes up from his sleep of ignorance into the day of Advaita.

17. The world does not exist; if it had existed it would have come to an end. In reality there is only Advaita.

18. Even Kalpanā does not exist. The word is used only for the sake of discourse:
उपदेशादयं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ।

23. A, U and M lead respectively to Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña; the Amātra which is the fourth, carries nowhere (Jivanmukti). This verse tells us how Gauḍapāda owes complete allegiance to the Vedāntic teaching of the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad.

25. One who concentrates his mind on Praṇava,—for Praṇava is the fearless Brahman—He who has his heart set for ever on Praṇava has no cause for fear anywhere or at any time.

26. Praṇava is both the Apra-Brahman and Para-Brahman, the lower Brahman and the higher Brahman.

28. Praṇava is the same as Iśvara who abides in the heart of all beings and fills the universe.

29. He alone deserves to be called a Muni who has known this Omkāra, which is all auspiciousness and in which all duality ceases.

II. THE FALSITY OF THE WORLD

1. All objects (Bhāvas) chariots, mountains, elephants etc., are unreal as in a dream. There is no difference between dream state and waking state:

स्वप्नजागरिते स्थाने ह्येकमाहुर्मनीषिणः।

12. The Atman God makes an imaginative construct of himself by his own power of illusion (Māyā) and hence knows difference.

17. Reference to the Rajjusarpa dṛṣṭānta. The Rajju appears like a snake in darkness.

18. The imagination of a snake ceases when the rope is known; similarly the world ceases when the Atman is known:

निश्चितायां यथा रज्ज्वां विकल्पो विनिवर्तते ।
रज्जुरेवेति चाद्वैतं तद्वदात्मविनिश्चयः ॥

19. It is the power of illusion of God himself by which he gets himself infatuated.

31. The world appears to the wise as a dream, or a sleight of hand or a castle in the sky:

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥

32. There is neither destruction (Nirodha) nor creation, there is neither bondage nor freedom, there is neither aspirant nor one who has reached the goal. This in fact is what may be called Verity (Paramārthatā). This is almost in the spirit of Nāgārjuna.

34. There is neither unity nor multiplicity

35. The one without a second is reached in the Nirvikalpa state. There the world-appearance ceases.

36. Recognising the falsity of the world (Vaitathya) one should devote oneself to the one Existence without a second (Advaita) and having reached this One, one should behave like a mad man.

III. ADVAITA

2. Doctrine of Ajāti or non-creation in Vedānta, because semblance :

अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पण्यमजातिसमतां गतम् ।
यथा न ज्ञायते किञ्चिज्जायमाने समन्ततः ॥

5. As the space inside a jar is not contaminated by dust or smoke, similarly the Atman is not contaminated by happiness or sorrow.

7. As the space inside a jar is neither a part of nor a mode of the universal space, so the individual self is neither a part of nor a mode of the universal self.

8. As the foolish people regard the sky as soiled by dust so do they regard the Atman as soiled by evil.

10. All objects or collocations (Samghātāh) are like dreams produced by the self in illusion. There is no ground for either superiority or equality among them. No grades or degrees of Reality.

12. In the sweet interdependence of pairs of objects (Madhuvidyā) is the same Brahman reflected or immanent.

15. There is unity (Abheda) all round. The description of a product as distinct from the primordial substance, such as earth, iron or fire (मृल्लोहं विस्फुलिङ्गैः) is only for the sake of comprehension or understanding (उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथंचन।)

16. Upāsanā has been taught with a sense of pity in order that the functions of the three

Āśramas might be properly discharged.

17. Dvaitins fight with one another, but we fight with none:

स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् ।
परस्परं विरुद्धन्ते तैरयं न विरुध्यते ॥

18. Advaita is the only true reality. Dvaita is the differentiation of it. There is Advaita between Advaita and Davita.

24. There is no difference anywhere. God manifests himself in plurality by his powers. This is truly the Advaitic position.

26. Reference again to the Śruti, Neti Neti to negate all differences or plurality.

31. Difference is produced by consciousness, but when the super-conscious is reached there is unity all round.

35. In Suṣupti there is Laya, but this Laya is transcended in the super-conscious state. In that state there is the fearless light of illumination all round.

36. This is the unborn, the sleepless, the dreamless, the nameless, the formless. This is the omniscient. There is really no metaphor in what we say.

37. This is the unshakable and the fearless Samādhi where all discourse comes to an end where all anxiety ceases. It is peace and illumination all at once:

सर्वाभिलाषविगतः सर्वचिन्ता समुत्थिताः ।
सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः समाधिरचलोऽभयः॥

38. There is neither taking nor giving in that state. Knowledge in that state rests in itself having Ajāti for its counterpart.

39. This is what we understand by Asparśayoga, a thing hard to attain even by great Yogins. For they verily see fear where they should not see any:

अस्पर्शयोगोवै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः ।
योगिनो विभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ॥

40. There is an end to all sorrow in that state and there is perpetual wakefulness and an unending peace.

41. As a drop of water can produce no surge in the ocean, so no emotion can disturb the consummate tranquillity of such a mind.

45. One should not taste of bliss in that state. By the force of intellect one should make one's mind veer round the Atman:

नास्वादयेत् सुखं तत्र निःसंगः प्रज्ञया भवेत्।
निश्चलं निश्चरान्चित्तमेकी कुर्यात् प्रयत्नतः ॥

Śamkara says that Sukha is only Avidyā-kalpita.

46. Brahman is reached when both Laya and Vikṣepa are transcended when the mind becomes unshakable and ceases to give rise to any illusions.

यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः ।
अनङ्गि-गनमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥

47. That unshakable bliss or Nirvāṇa is itself Brahman:

स्वस्थं शान्तम् सनिर्वाणमकथ्यं सुखमुत्तमम् ।
अजमजेन ज्ञेयेन सर्वज्ञं परिचक्षते ॥

This contradicts the statement in verse 45. Gauḍapāda uses the word Nirvāṇa in a beatific sense.

48. What ultimately remains as the truth is the doctrine of non-creation or Ajāti.

IV ALĀTASANTI

(The extinction of the fire-brand).

This conception of the extinction of the fire-brand is also familiar in Muslim Mysticism, cf. The Mujaid.

1. Some people understand Dwipadām varam to mean Buddha (Das Gupta). Śamkara understands by Dwipadām varam Purusottama. or Nārāyana. By Dharma Śamkara understands Atman. cf. also (IV 10). Dharma is also used elsewhere for attribute or object? Obeisance to that foremost among men who by his knowledge (Jñāna) establishes the identity between attributes (Dharma) and substance (Jñeya) or by intuition realises the identity between the individual souls and God.

2. This is the Asparśayoga which does not admit of discussion and which does not come into conflict with any other theory. See Asparśayoga above.

4. Even when dualists say (e.g. Sāmkhyas or Buddhists) that the Bhūta is not born nor is the Abhūta born, they are advocating the doctrine of Ajāti or non-creation.

5. We heartily sympathise with them; with them we have no quarrel. Gauḍapāda in this verse says, he has no quarrel with those who maintain the doctrine of non-creation. The Jainas and Sāmkhyas and the Naiyāyikas maintain Ajāti because they regard the world as eternal Gauḍapāda maintains Ajāti because the world is an illusion. The Bauddhas maintain Ajāti because there is neither cause nor effect and hence no production. Unconnected particulars can not produce anything. Gauḍapāda maintains the doctrine of Ajāti, because his substance also is neither cause nor effect but is transcendent.

10. That the word Dharma means the soul may be determined from the expression जरामरणविनिर्मुक्ताः। जरामरणनिर्मुक्ताः पदं गच्छन्त्यनामयम्॥ जरामरण मोक्षाय मामाश्रित्य यतन्ति ये which in Bhagavad-gītā is applied to souls in passages like these. Souls which are essentially free from old-age or death get themselves entangled in old-age or death on account of the will of God. Śamkara understands by तन्मनीषा as तद्भावभावित्व.

12. If you maintain an identity between Kārya and Kāraṇa you would have to regard the Kārya itself as uncreated. Gauḍapāda here seems to criticise the identity doctrine of cause and effect in the very manner of Bradley and support the illusionistic theory.

14. Some regard the effect as prior to the cause, others regard the cause as prior to the effect. How can cause and effect entangle him, who stands above them?

16. Cause and effect can not be simultaneous. The horns of a bull are not causally related:

सम्भवे हेतुफलयोरेषितव्यः क्रमस्त्वया ।
युगपद् संभवे यस्मादसंबन्धो विषाणवत् ॥

18. If the causc can be proved from the effect and the effect from the cause, which would you say was prior? Regressus ad infinitum.

19. The Buddhas or the enlightened have taken recourse to the conception of Non-creation or Ajāti only on account of this regressus.

20. The analogy of Bija and Amkura involves the fallacy of Sādhyasama.

22. Neither from itself nor from another is an end produced. It is neither being nor not-being, nor again being and not-being together. (This manner of argumentation is really Buddhistic).

42. The enlightened or Buddhas have spoken about creation or Jāti being afraid to proclaim the doctrine of Ajāti. They have maintained that things are (for example, the Vaibhāṣikas). The argument by which they support this position are Upalambha and Samācāra; either you actually find the world or that morality must be supported, cf. the Sutra of Bādarāyaṇa, नाभाव उपलब्धे: Gauḍapāda refers probably to this Sutra in his expression Upalambha. (Criticism of Bādarāyaṇa). cf III. 15:

मूल्लोह विस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोहिताऽन्यथा ।
उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्तिभेदः कथं चन ॥

44. Because Upalambha and Samācāra are found in Māyāhastī also Gauḍapāda means to say that Upalambha and Samācāra are invalid arguments to prove the reality of the world:

उपलम्भात् समाचारात् मयाहस्ती यथोच्यते ।
उपलभ्यात् समाचारात् अस्ति वस्तु तथोच्यते॥

45. Vijñāna is the only Reality. Gauḍapāda is imitating probably the Vijñānavādins. Creation is an illusion, motion is an illusion, thinghood is an illusion. Objects do not exist, Vijñāna exists. There is no peace and no motion. There is one-ness and no creation.

जात्याभासं चलाभासं वस्त्वाभासं तथैव च ।
अजाचलमवस्तुत्वं विज्ञानं शान्तमद्वयम् ॥

47. The straight or the curve line described by the moving fire-brand or by a falling star are merely an appearance. Object and subject, receiver and giver, knower and known are only Vijñāna or knowledge and nothing else.

48. The unmoveing fire-brand does not produce any illusion. Unmoving knowledge similarly produces no illusion.

57. What appears to be created is only the force of Samvṛti. There is neither anything which is imperishable nor anything which is destructible.

73. Samvṛti is opposed to Paramārtha.

78. He who thus realises causelessness, takes leave of all sorrow and desire, and reaches the fearless goal.

81. This is the un-born, the sleepless and the dreamless illumination. The Atman shines once for all by the force of his nature or by the grace of the Almighty.

82. He alone is entitled to the name of Bhagavān who knows that by the clasping of any individual Dharma, misery yawns and happiness hides its face.

83. The fool perceives only the four-fold Āvarana; Asti, Nāsti, Asti-Nāsti and Nāsti-Nāsti : moving, not-moving, both and neither. See Aristotle.

89. Omniscience proceeds when by intuition are realised the trinity of knowledge, knower and the known; when the fourth state, namely, Turyā apprehends all the three previous states.

92. He alone reaches immortality whose forbearing comprehension includes the knowledge that all souls have been forever in a state of illumination. Ādi-Buddhāh.

93. That is consummate illumination when the knowledge is attained (Vaiśāradya) that all souls have enjoyed tranquillity from the very beginning, that they have never been born, that they are by nature blissful, that they are all equal and that they are one.

94. This Vaiśāradya does not fall to the lot of those who are immersed in difference.

99. Buddha has not said that the knower becomes ultimately identical with knowledge and the known.

100. Obeisance to that illumination which is hard to gaze at, which opens up the vista of equality and before which all duality comes to an end.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RĀMĀNUJA

- I. Introduction.
- II. Class-Notes on Rāmānuja.
- III. Rāmānujian Ontology.
- IV. A Note on the Dhyānaniyogavādins.
- V. Rāmānuja's Criticisms of the Doctrinc of Māyā.

I. Introduction

1. Biographical

Born Saka 938 or 1016 A.D. line of spiritual succession. Nātha Muni, Yāmunācārya and Rāmānuja. Renounced the Advaitic teachings of Yādavprākāśa. Taught in Srirangam near Trichinapalli.

2. Brahman or the Absolute=God + Self + World (भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं त्रिविधं ब्रह्ममेतत्) but God particularly. Rāmānuja not definite as to whether God is identical with Brahman, or a part, though a major part of Brahman, cf. God or Ívara as Cidacidviśiṣṭa. Trinity in unity, cf. the organic view of Pringle-Pattison. The Brahman Saguna instead of Nirguna. No evil in Brahman.

3. God:(i) Philosophical aspect: Ānandamaya and Jñā. cf. Cidānanda. Three viess: Is God bliss? Is God blissful? Is God beyond bliss? Similarly is God knowledge? Is He a knower? Or, is He beyond knowledge? According to Rāmānuja, He is blissful and knower. Śamkara wavers between the first and the third view. God as supremo self (Paramātmān) must be the body of some higher self. Infinite regress (Pandora's box). Inner controller or Antar- yāmin. Immanent both in selves and nature. God is self of selves. God both the material and efficient cause of the world, cf. Śamkara.

(ii) Theological aspect : Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu. Stress on Viṣṇupurāṇa, not Bhāgavata. Full of auspicious qualities. Bhagavān:

ऐश्वर्यस्य समग्रस्य वीर्यस्य यशसः श्रियः ।

ज्ञान वैराग्ययोश्चैव षण्णां भग इतीरणा ॥

(a) Four Vyūhas or forms of God: Samkarṣaṇa, Vāsudeva, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Jñāna, Bala, Aiśvarya, Virya, Śakti and Tejas; all six belonging to Vāsudeva and two each to the three others.

(b) Vibhavas are the ten Avatāras. Pancarātra + Nārāyaṇa and Viṣṇu. No Rādhā.

(c) Arcāvatāras or idols.

4 Self: Individuality, therefore reality. Atomic, therefore plurality. (Aṇu does not mean atomic, R.D.R.); (according to Śamkara soul not atomic). Mode (Prakāra). attribute or adjective (Viśeṣaṇa) of God. Three views about the relation of subject and predicate, (i) The absolute, the only reality; the predicates are illusory (Bradley); (ii) The absolute, the only substance; predicates have only an adjectival existence (Bosanquet). In Rāmānuja the self and world are predicates. They can not be both substantival and adjectival at once, as Rāmānuja would have them; (iii) A third view also possible. Subject and predicate both substances (Pluralism). The self a Kartā; in Śamkara, self not a doer: in Sāmkhya, Draṣṭā. Interpretation of Tattvamasi attributive. The self being an adjective (Viśeṣaṇa) of God, not identical with Him. cf. the jar is white. If God is blissful and knower, the self is also blissful and knower, though on a smaller scale (Alpa). Subject of consciousness instead of consciousness itself. Consciousness is its attribute. No absorption, merging or annihilation (personal immortality). Similar and not same. परमं साम्यमुपैति. Self as controlled by God and as dependent on Him.

5. World: Reality against the illusionism of Śamkara. Criticisms of the Māyā doctrine. World like the self, a mode, attribute or an adjective of God. Doctrine of causality in Rāmānuja: Satkāryavāda or Pariṇāmavāda. Effect existing in cause. Arachnomorphism. Brahmapariṇāmavāda. Creation is evolution as in Sāmkhya and not epigenesis as in Nyaya: destruction is involution. From subtle to gross and from gross to subtle.

6. The way to God :

(i) Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti. Navavidhā Bhakti of Bhāgavata. Karma produces Jñāna as in Śamkara. Bhakti is the result of Jñāna (contrast Śamkara). Bhakti is supreme. Bhakti in Rāmānuja takes the help of Yoga. Meditation, intuition. Stress on God-vision.

Continuous meditation on the supreme soul. Śeṣa or an attribute of God; Ācāryābhimānayoga discussed in Arthapancaka. Vicarious suffering. Christian influence (R. G. B).^{*} This refers to Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's book—Vaishnavism, Shaivism and Minor Religious Systems—Editor. Mother takes medicine herself to cure the infant. Meditation stressed more than love (R. G. B.). Prapatti or self-surrender a rarified form of Bhakti. The first three orders can practise Bhakti. All the three along with the Śūdras can practise Prapatti.

(iii) Definition of Papatti or Śaraṇāgati:

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| (a) आनुकूल्यस्य संकल्पः | (b) प्रातिकूल्यस्य वर्जनम् |
| (c) रक्षिण्यतीति विश्वासः | (d) गोप्तृत्ववरणं तथा |
| (e) आत्मनिक्षेप | (f) कार्पण्ये षड्विधा शरणगतिः |

- | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---------------|---|
| (iii) Vadakalai | | Tenkalai | |
| (Northerners) | } | (Southerners) | } |

Man's effort	God's grace
(a) Monkey	(a) Cat (Kangaroo or even a cock a better illustration).
(b) Prapatti must begin from the aspirant.	(b) Prapatti must begin from God
(c) Prapatti must come last	(c) Prapatti must come first
(d) Self-assertiveness	(d) Self-abandonment
(e) Depressed classes last (untouchability) (less liberal)	(e) Depressed classes first (Untouchability) (more liberal)
(f) AUM omitted	(f) AUM allowed

II. Class-notes on Rāmānuja

1. Nyāya: first Nirvikālpaka Jñāna, then Savikalpaka; first, continuum, then differentiation. In Rāmānuja, no Nirvikālpaka; the Nirvikālpaka a psychological myth. Hence, also, Rāmānuja's God is Saguṇa, with qualities and not Nirguṇa.

2. Realism: Reality of self, world and God. Reality also of the dream-object, the shell-silver, the rope-serpent, the yellow colour or the conch and of the watery particles of the mirage. Satkhyāti. Realistic theory of error. Other people do not see the conch yellow, because the yellowness is very faint and adequate only to the deranged vision of the jaundiced patient. Two kinds of illusion referred to by Rāmānuja: public and private, mirage for all and yellow colour for one, but no essential difference between the two.

3. Meaning of Viśiṣṭādvaita:

Quality depends upon substance, is inseparable from substance, but is not substance. Similarly the self and the world depend upon God, are inseparable from God being His body, but are not God. They are Prakāras or Viśeṣaṇas. Even Amśa can not be a good conception as it brings in the relation of part and whole. Analogy rather like that of substantive and adjective. For Tattvamasi cf. the lotus is blue. In Nyāya the substance and the quality are external to one another and not organically connected as in Rāmānuja. In Kumārila and Nimbārka there is Bhedābheda but in Rāmānuja there is no Abheda. Or again, the two terms lotus and blue have different meanings and yet refer to the same substance, (Prakāryadvaita).

4. Difference between Samavāya and Aprthaksiddhi : while Samavāya tries to unite what are supposed to be distinct, Aprthaksiddhi tries to separate what is supposed to be one (Hiriyanna Pp. 409 to 410).

5. Karma preparatory to Jñāna as in Śamkara, but obligatory even after Jñāna as against Śamkara. The Advaitic ideal of Karma-sanyāsa, therefore rejected by Rāmānuja. Tilak's Karmayoga.

6. Prapatti open to all; Bhakti open to three classes only. Grace: Śaraṇāgati. Resignation in excelsis. A single moment of earnest sincerity is enough; but that moment would not come without continual experience. How can you reach the peak of the Everest without being on the top level for a long time? Social reform. No untouchability in spirit. Rāmānuja in his commentary on Bhagavad-gītā XVI.11.66 सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं ब्रज asks us to renounce Karmayoga, Jñānayoga and *even* Bhaktiyoga for Śaraṇāgati or Prapatti, thus establishing the complete supremacy of the way of resignation. कर्मयोगज्ञानयोगभक्तियोगरूपान् सर्व धर्मान् परमनिःश्रेयससाधनभूतान् मदाराधनत्वेनातिमात्र प्रीत्या यथाधिकारं

कुर्वाण एव उक्तरीत्यादि फलकर्मकर्तृत्वादि परित्यागेन परित्यज्य मामेकमेव कर्तारमाराध्यं प्राप्यमपायं चानुसंधत्स्व । नानाविधाननन्तान् दुरुनुष्ठानान् सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य भक्तियोगारम्भसिद्धये मामेकं परमकारुणिकं..... वात्सल्यजलधिं शरणं प्रपद्यस्व ।

III. Rāmānujan Ontology

The Yatindramatadipikā is an excellent epitome of Rāmānujan ontology. In the first three chapters it discusses the three Pramāṇas recognised by the Rāmānujan system, viz., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda and no other. From chapter four to chapter nine, both inclusive, it discusses the six Dravyas recognised by Rāmānuja and in the tenth chapter it discusses the ten Adravyas.

The six Dravyas may be classified under two heads: Jaḍa and Ajaḍa, Tho Jaḍa Dravyas are Prakṛti and Kala, Nature and time. Tho Ajaḍa Dravyas are four, viz., Nitya-vibhūti. Dharmabhūtajñāna, Jiva and Íśvara.

The Prakṛti of Rāmānuja is the same as that of the Sāmkhya, with the distinction that while in the Sāmkhya, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are the constituents of Prakṛti, in Rāmānuja they are only attributes or qualities. Time as a separate Dravya in Rāmānuja implies two things: (i) The reality of the system, (ii) the reduction of space to time.

The Nityavibhūti which is Śuddha Sattva, which in fact is different from tho Sattva which is the attribute of Prakṛti, constitutes the substance of which the bodies of God and souls are made.

Dharmabhūtajñāna is, as its name implies, Jñāna which is secondary to God and souls. It is peculiar that Jñāna should be recognised as a Dravya, when it is really also a Guṇa of God and souls. Nevertheless there is this thing in common between Rāmānuja and Nyāya that this Jñāna would itself be known; but it is known in Rāmānuja by itself and not through another Jñāna as in Nyāya.

Cf Jiva and Íśvara we have spoken elsewhere. Rāmānuja recognises a relation Aprithaksiddhi instead of the Samavāya of tho Naiyāyikas, and it consists of the non-separable existence of qualities or attributes from substance, that is, in the organic dependence of modes upon substance. The modes are the Prakāras and the substance is the Prakārin.

The word Viśeṣaṇa includes these Prakāras as well as the Adravyas which are ten in number.

The abolition of the distinction of Prakāra and Viśeṣaṇa is one of the chief peculiarities of the Rāmānujīan system (Hiriyanna).

ten The Adravyas are the three psychical qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; the five sensible qualities, Śaba, Sparśa, Rupa, Rasa, and Gandha and Samyoga and Śakti.

IV. A note on the Dhyānaniyogavādins:

Rāmānuja discusses the doctrine of this school of Contemplatives in his commentary on the Samanvayādhikāraṇa, I. 1.4. The question is, what is the ultimate import of the Vedāntic texts? The Mimāṃsākas contend that their utility is for injunctions only, commendatory or prohibitory; they can not establish Brahman, the idea of which is already established. The Dhyānaniyogavādins contend that their utility is for a life of "meditation or contemplation" (Dhyāne niyogah). They say that the knowledge to be attained by the Vedāntic texts is ancillary to a life of meditation by which alone we can realise God. The Advaitin maintains that the import of the texts is for the knowledge of the identity of the Brahman and the self. The Bhedābheda-vādin School maintains that the import of the Vedāntic texts is to show the distinction and the non-distinction of the two at the same time. The Viśeṣṭādvaitin maintains along with the Advaitin that the import of the texts is for knowledge, but he regards the knowledge as subsidiary to devotion. The Dhyānaniyogavadin school seems to have some sympathy from Rāmānuja, the intuition or direct realisation of the one not being contradictory of the devotion or the self-surrender of the other, and both being the results of the knowledge to be attained by the Vedāntic texts.

Class-notes on the above.

The help that Yoga renders to Vedānta.

Rāmānuja seems to be in sympathy with the Dhyānaniyogavādins. Intellect vs. intuition. Thought vs. meditation. Action produces knowledge and knowledge gives rise to Bhakti, (Rāmānuja); action produces knowledge and knowledge leads to the life of meditation (Dhyānaniyogavādins).

To Śamkara Jñāna is the be-all and the end-all; to the Dhyānaniyogavādins it is preliminary to Dhyāna. The Mimāṃsāka: the Veda is, and the Deva is not. The Word gives injunctions regarding Dhyāna (Dhyānaniyogavādins), not injunctions about Karma (Mimāṃsāka). The knowledge produced by the Vedānta is abstract, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin.

The Dhyānaniyogavādin agrees with the Advaitin in saying that our aim should be the identification of the self with God, but while the Advaitin says that this is to be attained by knowledge, the Dhyānaniyogavādin says that it is to be achieved by meditation. The Advaitin maintains Jivan-mukti; the Dhyānaniyogavādin, Videhamukti.

Liberation before death, Jivanmukti; liberation at death. Videhamukti; liberation after death, Kramamukti. We must be liberated while living, and though living, says the Advaitin.

Two objections to Jivanmukti: (i) If one is liberated during life, his body must fall at once, (ii) If one is liberated, all must be liberated along with him (Sarvamukti).

Death is not an event but a process; similarly, even when Jivanmukti is attained, the body may continue for some time.

Disembodiment of the self can not be effected by mere knowledge; it can be done only by meditation.

Summary of the Doctrines of the Dhyānaniyogavādins.

(Niyoga — charge, command, order, duty.)

1. The ultimate aim of the Vedantic text is to inculcate a life of meditation or contemplation, not a life of mere injunction.

2. They teach intuitional realisation which is concrete, not intellectual knowledge which is abstract. Mere knowledge can not destroy the actual sensory perceptions of phenomena; meditation would.

3. The Advaita conception of Jivanmukti is illogical, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin, and contrary to scripture as Āpastamba maintains. There is only Videhamukti. (This criticism of Jivanmukti is wrong because the scriptures uphold it: इह चेदवेदीदथ सत्यमस्ति, and is logical, because even after the attainment of Jivanmukti the body may continue for a while

by the force of Karmika inertia. Desirelessness, destruction of ignorance, realisation of the self may all be the meanings of Jivanmukti, and particularly the last; and when this is attained liberation is attained. Nothing valuable might be achieved by liberation at death (Videhamukti); or enjoyment of bliss then; Kramamukti is merely a theological makeshift; nor need Jivanmukti involve Sarvamukti, R.D.R.

4. There is really Abheda between the self and God, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin. Herein he agrees with the Advaitin. The Bhedābhedavādin maintains that there is both difference and non-difference between selves and God, as there is both difference and non-difference between individuals and the genus, or between the pot-ethers and the universal ether. This, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin, is wrong. There is only Abheda; and the Abheda can be experienced by contemplation only, and not, as the Advaitins say, by mere knowledge.

5. Self-realisation is attained when the unembodied condition of the soul is realised.

6. The object of meditation is real, say the Dhyānaniyogavādins and not a mere mental concept as the Mimāṃsākas would say. There is no hallucination or delusion about it.

V. Rāmānuja's Criticisms of the Doctrine of Māyā.

1. आश्रयानुपपत्तिः।

Ignorance can not reside either in the self or in God. It can not reside in the self, because self-hood is itself projected by it; it can not reside in God who is supreme intelligence.

2. तिरोधानुपपत्तिः।

It is impossible that ignorance should have the power to eclipse the all-luminous Brahman.

3. स्वरूपानुपपत्तिः।

Ignorance must be either real or unreal; if real, it cannot be an illusion; if unreal, it can not be an adjunct of Brahman.

4. अनिर्वचनीयत्वानुपपत्तिः।

Ignorance can not be indefinable, because this itself would constitute its definition.

5. प्रमाणानुपपत्तिः।

There are three criteria of truth according to Rāmānuja: (i) Pratyakṣa (ii) Anumāna, (iii) Śabda, (i) Pratyakṣa can not prove illusion for whatever Pratyakṣa points out is real; e.g. a dream-object is real, the shell-silver is real, the mirage is real and so on. It is here that Rāmānuja makes a distinction between the two aspects of error: public and private; mirage and jaundice. The fact that all so-called illusions have reality proves that there are no illusions at all. (ii) Inference can not prove unreality, because any illustrative example which it may call to its aid will be found defective. (iii) There is no authority in scripture for the existence of Avidyā.

6. निवर्तकानुपपत्तिः।

The knowledge of the Advaitin is the knowledge of the attributeless Brahman which does not exist. What are the world and the selves except the attributes of God? An impossible knowledge of the attributeless Brahman, therefore, would not be competent to destroy ignorance. Or again, according to the Advaitin, knower, known and knowledge are an illusion. A knowledge of this kind would not be adequate to destroy illusion because it will require another knowledge to destroy itself. The regressus can be set at rest only by regarding knowledge, knower and known as verities.

7. निवृत्यनुपपत्तिः।

The individual soul's bondage or ignorance is determined by his Karma and is a concrete reality. It can not be destroyed by knowledge which is merely abstract.

CHAPTER NINE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHVA

- I. Introduction.
- II. Metaphysical Affiliations.
- III. The Law of Difference.
- IV. Efficient and Material Causation.
- V. Nature of God.
- VI. Way to Liberation.
- VII. The Nature of Liberation.
- VIII. Interpretation of Mahāvākyas.

I. Introduction

1. Summary

Pāncaratrāsamhitā but no Vyūhas.

No Rādhā or Gopalakṛṣṇa; Instead, Lakṣmi and Nārāyaṇā Criticism of Rāmānujās doctrine of the composite personality of God.

Vaiśeṣika categories accepted with some changes. God, the supreme substance or Dravya. God expressible by all words, pantheistic in character which is against Madhivism. Creation begins with the disturbance of the equilibrium of Prakṛiti by God.

The category of difference. The law of correlations, fundamental in the universe; man-woman, merit-demerit, Brahma-jiva, Brahma- Prakṛiti and so on.

Five eternal differences between God, self and nature *interse*.

Lakṣmi possesses the same extension in time and space as does Viṣṇu.

God, efficient and not material cause which is Prakṛit. Attributes of God six; Bhagavān. Way to liberation; moral, spiritual and even intellectual virtues.

Paramātmabhakti when it becomes Sthira immediately leads to Mokṣa. Fear and love of God consequent upon the knowledge of His power and goodness.

Intellectual qualifications such as Bhedajñāna and reprobation of false doctrines necessary for liberation. Jiva not one with Brahman even in Mokṣa. Similarity not favoured by Madhva, dependence. Three classes of persons.: (i) Fit for liberation, (ii) Always revolving (iii) Fit for perpetual darkness. Urdhvam gacchanti sattvasthah etc. Mokṣa is attained by direct knowledge or perception of Hari. Three kinds of knowledge like lightning, like the sun, like reflection in a mirror, cf Yathādarśe tathatmani.

Interpretation of Mahāvākyas :

Tattvamasi (i) Tadiyah, (ii) Atattvam, (iii) Tattvam—real.

Ayamātmā Brahma. Atanaśilah Bṛamhaṇaśilah.

Ekamevādvitīyam Brahma, without parallel.

Sarvam khalvidam Brahma, all pervading.

Mṛtyoh.....Nāneva paśyati, many momentary cognitions.

2. Biographical

Birth 1119; death 1198 of tho Saka era

Guru: Acyutaprekṣa. Four chief disciples: Padmanābhatirtha, Narahari-tirtha, Akṣobhyatirtha and Mādhavatirtha. Two white lines, one black line and a red spot. Heated Mudras. Eight Mathas. Udupi, Karnatak. Pāncarā trasṃhitā but no Vyūhas. Gopalakṛṣṇa absent. No Rādhā or Gopis.

II. Metaphysical Affiliations

1. Upaniṣads : Dvā suparṇa.....Muṇḍaka (III. I.) Ajāmekām.....

2. Śamkara: Criticism of Śamkara's doctrine of the unreality of the world.

3. Rāmānuja: Criticism of Rāmānuja's doctrine of the composite personality of God which lends to deprecate His independent majesty. Rāmānuja's "composite personality" is a contradiction in terms.

4. Vaiśeṣika Categories like substance, quality etc. acknowledged with some modifications. God is supreme Substance. God expressible by all words, which is pantheistic in character, therefore against Madhvaism.

5. Paurāṇika Sāṃkhya: Creation begins with the disturbance of the equilibrium of Prakṛti by God.

III. The Law of Difference

(a) Difference (pairs or correlatives), the law of nature: man-woman, merit-demerit, knowledge-ignorance, Brahman-Jiva, Brahman-Prakṛiti, Niyamya-Niyāmaka, Jiva-Jaḍa, Bhoktā-Bhogyā. Absolute realism.

(b) Five eternal differences: God and self, God and nature. Self and nature, self and self, natural object and natural object.

(c) God: Independence; one in many forms. Lakṣmi eternally different, but dependent though she possesses the same extension in time and space as does Viṣṇu. Jiva dependent, ignorant and other defects.

IV. Efficient and Material Causation

Madhva denies that God is material cause. Therefore recognition of Prakṛiti as a heteros. Only efficient cause. Unintelligent world can not be produced from intelligent God.

V. Nature of God

(a) His attributes: six: Bhagavat: ऐश्वर्यस्य समग्रस्य वीर्यस्य यशसः श्रियः। ज्ञानवैराग्ययोश्चैव षण्णां भग इतीरणा॥ Auspicious qualities. Same as other Vaiṣṇava philosophers, (b) His functions: eight: 1. Creation, 2. Preservation 3. Destruction, 4. Control, 5. Incarnation [All his forms (Avataras) are his full manifestations], 6. Bestowal of knowledge, 7. Tying down to existence and 8. Deliverance from existence.

VI. Way to Liberation

The way of liberation consists of the attainment of moral, spiritual and even intellectual virtues. They are:

(a) Vairāgya, Śama, Dama, work without attachment, sympathy for inferiors, love to equals, reverence for superiors.

(b) Ācāryopāsanā [Guru and not books (books only in rare cases)], Paramātmabhakti when it becomes Sthira, immediately leads to Mokṣa, Íśvararpaṇabuddhi (resigning all works to God), Love or Fear of God consequent upon the knowledge of His power and goodness. Meditation on Bhagavat (Nididhyāsana).

(c) Intellectual qualifications: Bhedajñāna and reprobation of false doctrines.

VII. The Nature of Liberation

(1) Difference (Jiva not one with Brahman even in Mokṣa. Different in Samsāra, non-different in Mokṣa impossible) and similarity (Sāmya); (similarity is favoured by Rāmānuja and not by Madhva).

(2) Three classes of people (R. G. Bhandarkar)

Ṛṣis, holy people and manes belong to the first class, ordinary men to the second Class ; Demons, ghosts and wicked men to the third class. Ūrdhvam gacchanti sattvasthāh etc. Bhagvad-gītā.

(3) Mokṣa is attainable by the direct knowledge or perception of Hari.

(4) Direct knowledge possible for all (?). Madhva prevaricates between two views viz. possible for all and possible for good souls only.

(5) Direct knowledge of men may be compared to the coruscation of lightning; that of gods to the steady brilliance of the sun, and that of Garuḍa to reflection; cf Yathādarṣe tathātmani.

[(i) Fit for final Bliss, (ii) Always revolving through the circle of existences, (iii) Fit for darkness, Gods.]

[The reference is to Dr. R.G. Bhandarkar's book – Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems.]

VIII. Interpretation of Mahavakyas

1. Tattvamasi: Tadiyah or tasya. Also Atattvamasi (Nagaraja Sarma) or Tattvamasi: Thou art real, तत्त्वं असि।

2. अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (a) Atanaśilah (b) बृहणशीलः (c) eulogy अर्थवाद (Upacāra?) of Jiva (d) for the sake of meditation, (e) Pūrvapakṣa which is later refuted.

3. ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति। Similar to Brahman, almost like, Brahma iva.

4. एकमेवाद्वितीयम्। without a parallel.

5. सर्वं खलु इदं ब्रह्म। All-pervading.

6. मृत्योः..... नानेव पश्यति। Criticism of many momentary cognitions as opposed to one eternal knowledge; cf. Criticism of Buddhistic Asat in असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् etc.

CHAPTER TEN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHA

- I. Introductory.
- II. Foundations of Vallabha's Philosophy.
- III. Metaphysics.
- IV. Vallabha and the Doctrine of Māyā.
- V. Doctrine of Bhakti.

I. Introductory

Born in Telangana, 1479 A. D. Village Kānkarava; Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda; Settled in Mathura, Vrindavana and Govardhana. Influence in Gujarat, Śrināthaji Sampradāya. Nābhāji in his Bhaktimālā said that Jñāneśvara, Nāmadeva and Vallabha were all disciples of one Viṣṇusvāmin, a Drāvida saint. Vallabha had seven grandsons who founded seven temples. The cult of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. The cow, the trees, animals, the river Yamuna, brooks, birds, Gopas and Gopis are the forms of the associates of God. One perpendicular white mark on the forehead. Presentation of all things to God. "Moral rigidity culminating in indifference to worldly enjoyments and self-abnegation does not appear to be a characteristic of this school." R. G. Bhandarkar, P. 82. The Bhāgavata like the Prasthanatraya cardinal in Vallabha's teachings.

II. Foundations of Vallabha's Philosophy

(i) Sphulinga and Pāvaka, (ii) Ūṛṇa-nābhi. (iii) The personal category possibly higher than the impersonal with Vallabha, cf. Puruṣottama is superior to Kṣara and even to Akṣara, superior to self and even to the Absolute. Bhagavad-gītā XV यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः। Kṣara = changing world, Akṣara = unchanging self. अक्षरादपि चोत्तमः पुरुषोत्तमः involves Akṣara = Puruṣa — self. Puruṣottama is the highest self viz. the God. (If Akṣara means Brahman then alone would Vallabha be supported). One should not forget that Akṣara may mean Prakṛti. Also cf. Bhagavad-gītā XII ते प्राप्नुवन्ति मामेव, (iv) Doctrin of Amśa cf. अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्. Relation of Amśa and Amśin, (v) Conception of sport or Lilā. Origin of the conception of Lilā in Lokavattu lilākaivalyam. Sport, the alpha and the omega of Vallabha's philosophy: physical and metaphysical. The Brahman can manifest itself either in Jiva or Jaḍa through sport. The metaphysical significance of sport. 'Difference' manifested through

sport and therefore not ultimately real. It is real in Nimbārka and Madhva. The category of identity, Śamkara; similarity, Rāmānuja; difference, Madhva and sport, Vallabha.

III. Metaphysics

From the one primeval soul who was originally alone, were born (i) Išvara (Saccidānanda), (ii) Self (Sat-cit) and (iii) the world (Sat.). By his power He made Ānanda imperceptible in the second, and Ānanda and cit in the third, cf. Sayana in his introduction to Ṛgveda. The three qualities Sat, Cit and Ānanda are respectively treated in जन्माद्यधिकरण I.1.2; ईक्षत्यधिकरण I. 1.5; and आनन्दमयाधिकरण I.1.6; in a and 3TFPWTr- 1,1.6 in a consecutive order.

(a) The Absolute is God or Bhagavat. Abolition of the distinction between Saviśeṣa and Nirviśeṣa, i.e., distinct and non-distinct because both these exist in Brahman; breaking of the law of contradiction; opposites can co-exist in it. The Absolute or God is extraordinary or Jagad-vilakṣaṇa. The doctrine of 'Sarvam khalu idam-Brahma means that all things are verily the Brahman. All things in every thing; the Ghaṭa is the Paṭa because both of them are Brahman. cf. the present-day scientific reduction of all things to one element. No limit to God's omnipotence, may break the law of contradiction. Omnipotent, omniscient, possessed of an infinite number of attributes, e.g. Aiśvarya and so on. It is Śuddha, i.e. never contaminated by Māyā. Spiritual realism. The vaunted spiritual realism not valid because, the three ultimate reals inconsistent with the one ultimate real.

(b) Jiva possesses Sat and Cit with Ānanda obscured. The world and the self are as real as Brahman and identical with it. They are both Brahmātmaka and Brahma-kārya. But they can not be both. Souls, fulgurations of the deity or scintillations, effluences or emanations. Self Aṇu and yet like the fragrance of sandal moving outwards, pervades the whole body by its intelligence, Vyatireko gandhavat, Avirodhah candanavat. cf. the presence of the self in Orion by its intelligence in James. The self non-different from Brahman and yet a part of it. Hence numerical plurality and qualitative identity. Tattvamasi literally true (Abhidhā), and not metaphorically (Lakṣaṇa) as in Śamkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. In Śamkara jahad-ajahad-lakṣaṇā. cf. Vedāntasāra.

(c) Nature possesses only Sat, with Cit and Ānanda obscured. Identity of cause and effect. Causality is identity cf. Śamkara. God is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe, cf. अूर्ण नाभिः तन्तुः; पृथिवी and ओषधिः ; पुरुष and केशलोम.

In the third they are only an emanation; but Keśaloma do not become Puruṣa again. Creation and destruction arachnic in character. (i) Āvirbhāva and Tiro- bhava, (ii) Manifestation and disappearance and (iii) evolution and involution. Creation=expression in the form of product. Destruction = reduction to the form of causc.

IV. Vallahha and the Doctrine of Maya

No Māyā in Vallahha, hence Śuddhādvaita. (a) Still Vallabha in his conception of disappearance or obseuration does recognise Māyā, (b) So also in his doctrine of subjective reality (Pratiti) and Objective un-Reality of things (Svarupa), he recognises Māyā, (c) Also in his recognition of Avidyā or infatuation in Jiva. (d) Also Relativism. The Prapanca which is real appears in three different forms to three different kinds of persons. To the liberated, it appears as Brahma-dharman, to the philosopher as Brahma-dharman and Māyā-dharman; (ब्रह्मधर्मन् भ्रमधर्मन्) to the ignorant it appears as Miiya-dharman alone. Relativity is unobjectivity and therefore unreality. (e) The apparent motion of the trees when it is really the boat which is moving. This, the same as superimposition (Adhyāsa): superimposition of motion where there is none.

V. Doctrine of Bhakti

Bhakti is superior to Jñāna, contrast Śamkara. Two kinds of Bhakti, Maryādā bhakti and Puṣṭi bhakti; (i) limited and unlimited. (ii) Effort and grace. यमेवैष वृणुते। Maryādā involves Sādhana or effort on the part of the devotee. Puṣṭi involves grace (Anugraha). Grace of God may be enjoyed even in worldly life. Grace over grace arising. Puṣṭi-Puṣṭi. Mahāpuṣṭi leads to the direct attainment of God. The Vrindavana on earth has an archetype in heaven. Goloka (Kṛiṣṇa and Rādhā) higher than even Vaikunṭha (Viṣṇu and Lakṣmi). Puṣṭi has three stages : Preman, Āsakti and Vyasana. Sport or Līlā is superior even to Sāyujya, not to speak of other kinds of Mukti. लोकक्तु लीला कैवल्यम् । (iii) Maryādā may be utilitarian, Puṣṭi is altruistic where the Altar is God. (iv) Maryādā -bhakti is restricted to the three higher castes; Puṣṭi-bhakti is open to all persons, cf. the "open religion of Bergson. (v) Thus Maryādā -bhakti is ceremonial religion; Puṣṭi-bhakti is the religion of divine love.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIMBĀRKA

- I. Introductory.
- II. God, Self, Nature.
- III. Doctrine of Bhedābheda.
- IV. Nimbārka and Rāmānuja: Similarity and difference.
- V. Summary of Nimbārka's Doctrine (R.G.B.) [[A Summary of the account in Dr. R.G.Bhandarkar's book-Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious System – Editor \(the foot note is typed\)\]](#)]

I. Introductory

Nimba, name of a village in Bezwada District. Nimba also the name of his father. Tailanga. Later resided in Vrindāvana. Influence in Vrajaśesa (Mathura) and Bengal. His date not fixed, but he may be supposed to have come after Rāmānuja. Wrote two works: Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, a commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, and Daśaśloki, an epitome of his system. kṛṣṇa and Rādhā instead of Nārāyaṇa and Lakṣmi of Rāmānuja. Vyūhas and Avatāras. Nimbārka, supposed to be an incarnation of the disc of Viṣṇu. Sanaka-Sampradāya. Followers wear a black mark inside two white lines on the forehead. Keśava Kāśmirin, a philosophical descendant 30th in the list; wrote a Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras like Nimbārka himself.

II. God, Self and Nature

Three principles as in Rāmānuja: Cit. Acit and Ívara. Bhoktā, Bhogyam, Preritā.

(a) *Ívara*—Doctrine of Antaryāmin or Niyantṛi. God, the abode of auspicious qualities as in Rāmānuja.

(b) The self is both agent and enjoyer "even in the state of liberation". The self Aṇu, as in Rāmānuja, and plural. Also Niyamya. Nimbārka talks of the Paratantra-karṭṛitva of the self, which is a contradiction in terms. Self is Prajñānaghana and Jñānamāyā; both knowledge and knower: both Jñātā as well as Jñāna. Interpretation of ज्ञो स त एव: synthesis of the interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja. Dependence.

(c) Acit (matter is both Prakṛtika and Aprākṛtika. Prākṛtika matter constitutes the world; Aprākṛtika matter constitutes, as for example, the sunlike refulgent body of God, his crown or his flute. God the material (Upādāna) and the efficient (Nimitta) cause of the world, as in Rāmānuja, Śamkara or Vallabha. Upādāna, because the gross springs from the subtle (doctrine of Pariṇāma). Nimitta, because God unites action with fruit.

III. Doctrine of Bhedabheda

Extreme similarity, says Nimbārka, leads to the conception of identity, as for example, of self and God. "Extreme similarity implies not necessarily absolute identity but the non-preception of difference"(Ghate). (i) Identity and difference as between snake and the coil (Ahikuṇḍalavat); Bādarāyaṇa. This Sūtra is the foundation of Nimbārka's philosophy of Bhedābheda, just as the Puruṣottama verse in the Bhagavad-gītā XV is the foundation of Vallabha's philosophy. (ii) Kṛiṣṇa calling himself Paramatman in the Bhagavad-gītā implies both identity and difference of self and God, (iii) The Cit and Acit are distinct from Brahman because their attributes are declared to be different from those of Brahman by Śruti: and they are non-different from Brahman because they are dependent on Him. The analogy of fire and its sparks is invalid: it implies part and whole. The sun and its light implies emanation. (iv) In Tattvamasi, the Tvam is what is dependent on the Tat: difference and non-difference at once, (v) Dharma and Dharmin, qualified and qualifier; both difference and non-difference between Dharma and Dharmin. (vi) The conception of Bhedabheda violates the law of contradiction.

IV. Nimbārka and Rāmānuja: Similarity and Difference

(i) Three principles as in Rāmānuja; but the triune unity or composite personality of Rāmānuja rejected by Nimbārka. (ii) In Nimbārka. Bheda and Abheda stand on the same level. On the other hand Rāmānuja stresses the Abheda more than the Bheda (while Nimbārka stresses Bheda more than Abheda). (iii) Nimbārka criticises Rāmānuja's doctrines of Viśeṣaṇa and Prakāra. The self is the body and not the adjective or the attribute of God. (iv) Criticism of Māyā doctrine as in Rāmānuja. Super imposition implies that the thing superimposed exists somewhere, (v) Doctrine of Prapatti and its six elements borrowed from Rāmānuja. Navavidhā Bhakti, instrumental to Prapatti which is the highest. Feeling of enjoyment or bliss consequent on Bhakti. (vi) Greater inclination towards Yoga in Rāmānuja and towards Bhakti in Nimbārka.

V. Summary of Nimliarka's doctrine

"These five things should be known by the devotees; (i) The nature of the being to be worshipped; (ii) The nature of the worshipper; (iii) The fruit of God's grace; (iv) The feeling of enjoyment consequent on Bhakti or love; (v) Obstructions to the attainment of God. The first is the knowing of the nature of the supreme. Being as existence, intelligence and joy (Saccidānanda), of his possessing a celestial body (non-material), of his dwelling in such places as the cow-settlement (Vraja), which is called the celestial city (Vyomapura), of his being the cause of all, omnipotent, tender, merciful, gracious towards his devotees and so forth. The second consists in knowing the worshipper as an atom, possessing knowledge and joy, and as the servant of Krishna etc. The third is the self-surrender and the giving up of all actions except the service of God which results in self-surrender. The fourth arises from serenity, servitude, friendliness, affection and enthusiasm. These states of mind are consequent upon the peculiar relation to God of each individual, as affection was the feeling of Nanda, Vasudeva and Devaki, and enthusiasm of Rādhā and Rukmini. (विष्णोस्तु स्मरणे परीक्षितिरभूत् etc). The fifth are such as regarding the body as the soul, dependence on others than God and one's preceptor, indifference to the commands of God contained in the sacred books, worshipping other Gods, giving up one's own peculiar duties ingratitude spending one's life in a worthless manner, vilification of good men, and many others". (R. G. Bhandarkar, p. 65).

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE VEDANTA AND WESTERN THOUGHT

Part I	The Vedantic Philosophy: Lecture 1 - Vedanta in the Upaniṣads. Lecture 2 - Vedanta in the Bhagavad-gītā. Lecture 3- The Systems of the Vedanta,
Part II	The Vedanta and Ancient Philosophy: Lecture 4- Parmenides and Vedanta. Lecture 5- Plato and Vedanta. Lecture 6 -Plotinus and Vedanta.
Part III	The Vedanta and Modern Philosophy: Lecture 7 -Berkeley and Vedanta. Lecture 8 -Spinoza and Vedanta. Lecture 9 - Kant and Vedanta.
Part IV	The Vedanta and Contemporary Philosophy: Lecture 10- Vedanta and Personal Idealism. Lecture 11- Vedanta and Absolute Idealism. Lecture 12- Vedanta and Mysticism.

Detailed Synopsis

Lecture I

For the source of all the systems of Indian Philosophy, and of Vedantic Philosophy in particular, we must go back to the Upaniṣads. Here are to be found the earliest forms of Sāṃkhya and Yoga; here are to be found the germs of Buddhism and Jainism; of Śaivism and Mimāṃsā; and of all the various Vedantic systems. Here are to be found various impersonalistic and personalistic theories of Cosmogony, which remind us of similar theories

of Greek Philosophy; various doctrines of personal and impersonal immortality; various theories of the moral ideal, such as self-realisation, beatificism, and supermoralism. Above all, there are to be found here the roots of all the later Vedantic systems, such as monism, qualified monism, and pluralism which rent the Indian Philosophical world in times to come.

Lecture 2

Next to the Upaniṣads, the Bhagvad-gītā has exercised a profound influence on the development of Vedantic thought. Even here, as in the Upaniṣads, the doctrines of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, of God and Appearance, have been advanced with a naivete, which would reject the philosophical architectonics in favour of a direct mystical attainment of God. The doctrine of Karmayoga which is the central doctrine of the Bhagvad-gītā, is an advance upon earlier moral theories, and the aim of the Bhagvad-gītā is to teach a life of reconciliation between works and knowledge. In this lecture, an attempt will also be made to answer the objection that the theism of the Bhagvad-gītā was overlaid by a later interpolated pantheism, and it would be pointed out that theism and pantheism though they be contradictory as philosophical systems, may yet be reconciled in a mystical attainment of God.

Lecture 3

After the Upaniṣads and the Bhagvad-gītā, the Brahmasūtras supply us with the perennial bedrock of Vedantic philosophy. These Sūtras themselves, like the texts of the Upaniṣads and the Bhagvad-gītā, have been pressed into service by different systems of Vedantic thought, each trying to interpret them in its own way. Thus arise the various schools of Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and others. All these are at one in making an attack against non-Vedantic systems, such as Buddhism, Jainism and the rest as well as in their spiritual presentation of philosophy. Where they differ is about the nature of God and the self, and the reality of nature. An attempt will be made in the lecture to envisage a clue for the reconciliation of these different Vedantic systems in a doctrine of mystical realisation, which cancels none of these systems, and yet absorbs all of them giving to each an appointed place and level in the thought-evolution of the Vedānta.

Lecture 4

After having given an outline of the development of the Vedanta, we have now to compare it with the great systems of ancient, Modern, and Contemporary thought in the West, and see how it stands related with them. Parmenides is easily the greatest early philosopher, whose teachings can be compared with those of the Vedanta. His doctrine of Being and not-being adumbrates the Vedantic doctrine of reality and Māyā, and his identification of Being with Thought, the Vedantic conception of the unity of Sat and Cit. By an exhaustive consideration of Parmenides' Poem, as well as of the analogous teachings of Xenophanes, Zeno, and Melissos, we shall see how the Eleatic School is the earliest forerunner of Vedantic thought in the West.

Lecture 5

Plato is evidently the greatest of the Greek Philosophers whose thought has a Vedantic significance. Though his Theory of Ideas is peculiarly Greek in character, the central conception of the theory, namely the Idea of the Good, and the emanation of the other Ideas therefrom, has a close parallel to the Idea of the Great Brahman in Vedantic philosophy, and the manner in which other things stand related to It. As the Idea of the Good is the only ultimate reality in Plato, similarly the Idea of the Great is the only ultimate reality in the Vedanta, all other things being merely appearance.

Lecture 6

The emanatory tendency in Plato is carried to its logical conclusion in Plotinus, whose mysticism almost faithfully represents the mysticism of the Vedanta. As opposed to creation and evolution, both Plotinus and Vedanta speak of emanation, God being the central effulgent light, which dissipates itself into existences of secondary and tertiary order, such as the self and nature. A practical appropriation of the Godhead is the aspiration of the one as of the other; and Plotinus represents the mystical side of Vedantism more faithfully than almost any other Philosopher of the West.

Lecture 7

When we come to Berkeley, we come to problems of epistemology and metaphysics. Berkeley's Philosophy is a compound of sensationalism, idealism and spiritualism, and

though sensationalism of the lowest type is conspicuous by its absence in Vedantism. it will be the business of the present lecture to consider to what extent idealism and spiritualism are present in Vedantic philosophy. And though Vedanta condemns an extreme idealism as of the Buddhistic school, we shall consider in this lecture to what extent the Vedanta is an idealistico-spiritualistic philosophy.

Lecture 8

Spinoza's philosophy is a philosophy of God- intoxication, and Vedantism like Spinozism is often compared to a lion's den to which all steps point, but from which none returns. Though, thus, Vedantism and Spinozism are at one in their presentation of the ultimate nature of substance, a guarantee of truth indirectly admitted by Spinoza to the modes in his scheme of psychophysical parallelism is absent in the Vedanta in its final doctrine of appearance.

Lecture 9

The problem of Appearance was tackled in another way by the German philosopher Kant, who made a distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, giving to phenomena the things which are of phenomena, and to noumena the things which are of noumena. The distinction between phenomenal and noumenal is closely akin to the distinction between Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika of Vedantic philosophy, but where Kant failed and the Vedanta succeeded was in the problem of a first-hand apprehension of noumenal reality, which Kant in a vein of Spencerian agnosticism declared unknowable, but which the Vedanta regarded as the only object of knowledge, because alone real. Here consciousness turns upon itself, making self-consciousness the only reality that exists.

Lecture 10

In Hegel's hands, reality consists of this very self-consciousness, a circle of circles self-closed. It is interesting to see how both Hegelianism and Vedantism ramify into two different, though allied branches of thought, the monistic and the pluralistic, Śankara and Rāmānuja in Vedantism have as analogues Bradley and Bosanquet, and Ward and Rashdall in European Philosophy. The same ineradicable plurality of selves, the same reality of nature, the same doctrine of personal immortality, and the same identification of God with

the Absolute which we find in Rāmānuja, we also find in theories of personal idealism like those of Ward, and Rashdall.

Lecture 11

Of even greater interest is the comparison of absolute idealism as represented in Bradley and Bosanquet with that of Śankara. The same annihilation of space and time, the same identity of cause and effect, the same phenomenal character of the world, the same doctrine of degrees of reality, the same subordination of God to the Absolute, which we meet with in Bradley, we find also in Śankara. Would that Bradley were more of the mystic temperament than he was! Would that he sympathised with the practical way of God-realisation which the Vedanta advocated! He would then have been the veriest Śankarācārya of European philosophy!

Lecture 12

This leads us to the ultimate mystic consummation of the Vedanta. Vedanta is not mere intellectual doctrine but a practical appropriation of the God-head by suitable means. Inge and Underhill and Otto represent the mystical side of thought in Contemporary European philosophy. The truest Summum Bonum for the mystic is not liberation, either of the asymptotic or of the catastrophic kind, but the enjoyment of divine bliss here and now. Thus Vedantism may be seen to be like a multilateral diamond, which has its facets in the philosophies of Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus, of Berkeley, Spinoza, and Kant, of Ward, Bradley, and Inge.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE VEDANTA IN RELATION TO WESTERN THOUGHT

Lecture 1

The Upanisads and the Vedanta.- In the first lecture, an attempt will be made to find the perennial bed-rock of all later Vedantic Philosophy in the Upaniṣads themselves. Here are to be found the eternal problems of the relation of the Individual to the universal soul, of creation, of the Nature of God, and such others, which have supplied all later Vedantic Philosophy with an eternal basis upon which to build. The standpoint of the present Lecturer would be, as detailed in his "A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy" that the Upaniṣads supply the basis for speculation for various kinds of Vedantic systems, but that a supreme clue for the reconciliation of these could be found in a mystical interpretation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, which would cancel none of these systems and yet absorb all of them, and give to each an appointed place in the thought-evolution of the Vedanta.

Lecture 2

The Bhagavad-gītā and the Vedanta.—Next to the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā has played an important part in the moulding of Vedantic Thought. Even here, as in the Upaniṣads, the doctrines of nature, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, of God, of Appearance, of the Relation of Theism to Pantheism, and such others have been advanced in a naive spirit, which would reject the philosophical architectonic in favour of a direct mystic attainment to God. The Doctrine of Karmayoga, as taught in the Bhagavadgītā, is really an advance upon any early moral theory, and the aim of the Bhagavadgītā is to teach the doctrine of reconciliation between divine attainment and the life of activism. An attempt will also be made in this lecture to probe into the real nature of Bhakti, and to answer the objection that the Theism of the Bhagavadgita is incompatible with an interpolated pantheism, as it will be pointed out that theism and pantheism, even though they may be contradictory as philosophical systems, can yet be reconciled in a theory of mystic attainment to God.

Lecture 3

The Sāṃkhya and the Vedanta—All the later Vedantic systems have joined hands in condemning the basal principles of Sāṃkhya philosophy, in spite of the fact that they have

all been much indebted to the doctrines of the Sāmkhya. An examination will be made in this lecture of the basal ideas of Sāmkhya Philosophy, the relation which these bear to the ideas of the Vedānta, together with the objections which the Vedāntic systems have urged against them. A critical and philosophical evaluation of the doctrines of Sāmkhya philosophy is much needed, and it is possible that new light would be thrown upon it, especially in view of the fact that Buddhi in Sāmkhya philosophy is almost as Janus-faced as the Kantian "schema", and plays almost the same part in Sāmkhya philosophy as the "schema" plays in the Kantian.

Lecture 4

Buddhism and Vedāntism.—The Vedāntic Systems, in their criticisms, have generally not taken into account the early Pali Buddhism. It is only the later schools of the Hinayāna that have been refuted by the Vedāntic writers, as also certain tenets of Mahāyānism. A detailed examination would be made in this lecture of the various doctrines of Buddhism from the Vedāntic standpoint, and the value would be determined of the Buddhist doctrine of the causal chain, of its doctrine of the non-ego, of its relation in its various forms of idea to reality, of its metaphysical denial of absolute existence, as well as, finally, of its doctrine of Nirvāṇa. In many of these respects, the Vedānta may be seen to be a good antithesis to the Buddhist doctrine.

Lecture 5

The Vedāntic Systems.—The architectonic systems of the Vedānta have all of them claimed descent from the Upaniṣads, interpreting the texts of the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, and the Brahma-Sūtras in their own way. An attempt will be made in this chapter to find out what justification there is for the doctrines of Śhankara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Vallabha in the texts themselves. Three points are note-worthy in a discussion of these Vedāntic systems: (a) the common attack they make against the non-vedāntic systems, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, the Bauddhas, the Sāmkhyans, the Jainas, and so on: (b) the fundamental points of agreement of these systems; (c) the fundamental disagreements of these systems, which constitute a line of differentiation between them. An attempt will also be made to envisage a clue for the reconciliation of these different Vedāntic systems in a doctrine of mystic realisation, giving to each its appointed place and level.

Lecture 6

The Vedantic Criterion.— We are now prepared to enter upon the details of Vedantic philosophy. The question of the criterion would be a fundamental one at the very outset. An attempt will be made in this lecture to contrast the Vedantic criterion of Anubhava with such other criteria familiar to students of contemporary European thought as the idealistic criterion of coherence, the realistic criterion of correspondence, the pragmatic criterion of satisfaction, and so on. At the same time, an inquiry would be instituted into how "Anubhava", the supreme criterion of the Vedanta, differs from such other criteria of the other systems of Indian Philosophy, namely those of perception, inference, belief and the rest. An inquiry would also be instituted into the psycho-metaphysical nature of Anubhava, and it would be shown how it blinks at intuition on the one hand and beatification on the other. Finally, an examination would be made as to how far the elements of necessity and objectivity of the Kantian criterion pertain to this supreme criterion of Vedantic philosophy.

Lecture 7

The Problem of Nature - Next comes the problem of nature. In the light of the three different theories of cosmogony familiar to European thought, viz. creation, emanation and evolution, an attempt will be made in this lecture to adjudge the value of the cosmogony of the Vedanta. The relation of the world to God will be thoroughly investigated, and an examination will be made of the doctrines of the fundamental reality or unreality of the world, citing parallels from Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel. An attempt will be made to see whether the doctrines of the reality or unreality of the world in the Vedanta could be explained in the light of the theories which make a difference, in Sankarite fashion, between the Vyāvahārika and the Pāramārthika on the one hand, or, on the other, in Kantian fashion, between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The question would be raised how far the world of nature is a mere appearance.

Lecture 8

The Problem of the Self - The central problem of all philosophy is the relation between the self and God. Here an examination would be made of the different doctrines held about the relation between the self and God by the various Vedantic thinkers. A numerical pluralism, it would be shown, is not inconsistent with a qualitative monism. The teachings of Śankara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and others on the subject could be set

on a par with those of Bradley. Bosanquet, Ward. Royce and others in European thought. So far as the question of transmigration is concerned, after citing parallels from Platonic philosophy, a discussion would be made of the doctrine that reincarnation is an illusion from the absolutistic standpoint. All the theories of the later Vedanta on the subject would also be requisitioned, wherein the self and God are regarded as adjectival and substantival existences (Avacchedavāda), or the category of part and whole is made applicable to the relation between them (Anśa-vāda), or the conception of the archetype and the image is introduced to explain their relation. (Bimbapratibimba-vāda). or even where the self is regarded as merely an appearance before God (Ābhāsavāda).

Lecture 9

Doctrine of Appearance.—The doctrine of appearance affects both the existence of nature as of the self. Examination would be made of the theory that both these are appearances before God, and the inner meaning of the dream-analogy of the Brahma-Sūtras III.2 would be brought to light. Opinions on the subject would at the same time be cited from various European philosophers, such as Plato, Kant, Hegol, Bradley, and others. The objections, which Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva raise against Śankara's doctrine of appearance, would be examined, while it would be contended that though, in sensuous experience, the reality of the world could never be gainsaid, it is only in the ecstatic state that the doctrine of appearance would have sufficient vindication. Finally, the great moral value of the doctrine of the nppearancc, as apart from the metaphysical, would be brought to light.

Lecture 10

God and the Absolute in the Vedanta.—An attempt will be made in this lecture to focus together the various characterisations of Brahman as in the first chapter of the Brahma-Sūtras, and to deduce therefrom the nature of the supreme Godhead, while it will be shown that the categories of the personal and the impersonal are inapplicable to the supreme Godhead. An examination would also be made of the conceptions of God and the absolute in contemporary European thought, and a parallelism would be cited from the difference in the teachings of Rāmānuja and Śankara on this subject. Consideration would also be made of the theory that while God is a theological conception, the absolute is a philosophical conception of reality, and it would be established that there is no necessity for making that distinction between God and the absolute as is contended.

Lecture 11

The problem of Human Conduct.—It is difficult to characterise the Vedantic ethics in one word. The various theories of anti-hedonism, pessimism, super-moralism, beatificism, and self-realisation, which the Upaniṣads advocate, have each of them a place in the full scheme of Vedantic ethics; while it owes not a little to the activism of the Bhagavadgītā. In any case, the exuberant optimism of the Vedantic mystic is in decided contrast to the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa, if we interpret this latter in a negativistic, annihilationistic, sense. The realisation of the divine bliss for oneself and others is the be-all and the end-all of the Vedantic mystic, and to that end all those activities are directed.

Lecture 12

Mysticism in the Vedānta.—The question arises how this divine bliss is to be attained. The true *Summum Bonum* for the Vedantist is not liberation, whether of the asymptotic or of the catastrophic kind, but the enjoyment of divine bliss here and now. The part which meditation plays in this realisation would here be brought to light. A full-fledged life of mysticism, it would be contended, reconciles alike the claims of intellect, emotion, and action. It would be wrong to say that mere intellect or mere emotion or mere action leads to the realisation of this mystic bliss. One or other of these may be stressed no doubt; but all must be present in a greater or lesser degree to enable one to attain to that divine bliss. Jñāna, Bhakti, and Yoga would thus be shown to be not contradictory of each other, but only corroboratory. Vedantic mysticism is thus absolutely on a par with all real mysticism. They may speak different languages, but the meaning is identical. The experience which made Christ and St. Paul, Plotinus and Augustine, Thomas A. Kempis and Eckhart, great mystics of the western world, is also the same experience which made Śankara and Jñāneśvara, Gaurāṅga and Manikkavachagar, Kabir and Tukaram, the great mystics of the east. The essence of all Vedantism is mysticism, and it would be our business, time permitting, to expound what this mysticism is in a future work entitled "The Pathway to God".

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE PATHWAY TO GOD

(A study in the philosophy of Beatification)

	Approximate Number of pages
Introduction ...	20
Chapter 1—The Mystical Criterion ...	40
Chapter 2—Religion and Religions ...	40
Chapter 3—The Problem of God ...	40
Chapter 4—The Problem of Nature ...	40
Chapter 5—The Problem of the Self ...	40
Chapter 6—The Ethical Ideal ...	35
Chapter 7—The Beginnings of the Pilgrimage ...	35
Chapter 8—The Vicissitudes of the Mystical Path ...	35
Chapter 9—Unitive Victory ...	35
Chapter 10—A Vision of the Theopolity...	40
Total	400

INTRODUCTION

Beatification ethically, psychologically, metaphysically, mystically considered.

Philosophers must learn to mysticise, and mystics to philosophise.

Many have sought the Pathway to God. Here is the Pathway.

The present dynamic view, hitherto static.

The present psychological view, hitherto intellectual.

Oriental and occidental philosophy and mysticism.

Mysticism has been hitherto regarded to have no philosophy; Philosophy of mysticism.

Origin of God-consciousness: man born in a desert-island. Universality of religious feeling: religion latent in all to a great extent; cf. poetic, artistic genius. Pythagoras.

Practical, psychological point: metaphysics based on experience. The starting point-psychological.

CHAPTER 1

The Mystical Criterion

1 The stand point—Psychological.

Descartes: Self-consciousness. Correspondence, coherence, satisfaction,
Beatification: degrees of Truth.

Relation of Intuition to Intellect. Bergson: intuition. Aristotle: Logic.

Kant: objectivity and universality.

Being universal though individual, continuity, growth.

[Continuity and growth make the Being Individual though it is Universal].

Musical faculty, mathematical faculty, intuitive faculty.

Intuition akin to genius (scientific) but substantive.

The sensuous and the ecstatic to be discussed here? The consciousness of God.
Nature of ecstatic "Consciousness".

2. Continuity, permanence, beatification-tone: marks of real experience.

3. The neo-realism aims at the emancipation of metaphysics from the clutches of epistemology: they are wholly impatient of the epistemological problem.

4. How far the Kantian universality, necessity and objectivity pertain to the criterion of Anubhava.

5. Coherence, correspondence, satisfaction vrs. Anubhava, which blinks at intuition on the one hand and beatification on the other.

6. Doctrine of intuition in knowledge.

CHAPTER 2

Religion and Religions

Meaning of religion; definitions:

Religion and morality (Identical to Kant)	Practical attainment to God. Attitude not ceremonial nor system of beliefs and practices.
Religion and art	...
Religion and Science	...
Religion and Philosophy	... (details) Philosophy, the art of living.
Psychological basis of Religion	...
Religions and Religion	... (detail)
The religious attitude	...

History of Religions; Philosophy of Religion: Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Mohammedanism, Sufism, Confucianism, Christianity. Bahaism.

Mystical Religion.

Agnosticism and rationalism in Religion.

2. The different religions have an ethnic, localized, temporal significance; true religion is universal and for eternity.
3. Mystical Experience—the unifying principle of religions.
4. The religious feeling is a composite feeling made up of awe/wonder, hope, dependence, comfort, peace, joy and rapture.
5. Religion and Philosophy : —
Bradley : "There is a fundamental inconsistency in religion."

"God personal; Absolute
superpersonal" "God an
appearance of the Absolute."

"The absolute is
related to nothing; God
to the Universe." "God
has no meaning outside
religious consciousness."

6. Religion and Science: Herbert Spencer. Science gives only anatomy of the universe. Religion gives its valuation.

"There can be little conflict between science and religion as between the logarithmic table and the phenomenon known as falling in love, or between the axioms of Euclid and Sonnets of Shakespeare. The provinces are different." Edwards. This is wrong. Provinces identical; but difference of aspects. Hypothesis identical; experiment identical—R.D.R. Science teaches how to wonder, religion tries to highten it.

7. Religion and Art :

Art is the quest for the ideal of beauty, whether in painting, architecture, music, sculpture or poetry. Art consecrates itself to the service of religion.

8. Morality and Religion, identical to Kant. The moral attitude is an attitude of conflict. The religious attitude of victory. Feeling of "Reverence" in religion.

9. Max Mullar's definition of religion as "Perception of the Infinite". Schleiermacher: "Feeling on dependence on God".

Kant: "Religion as moral consciousness", the recognition of all our duties as divine commandments.

Mathew Arnold: Religion is "Morality touched with emotion".

Hoffding: Religion is "Faith in the conservation of values."

CHAPTER 3

The Problem of God

- A.
 - 1. Uselessness of the so-called arguments for God's existence.
 - 2. Doctrine of a Finite God.
 - 3. A dreamer.
 - 4. Anthropomorphism condemned. God and Absolute.
 - 5. Personal and impersonal. Herakleitos; Super-personal.
 - 6. Infinitude. Energy, harmony, bliss (giver of)—H. G. Wells.
 - 7. Ecstatic analogy; thought of all thoughts.
 - 8. Demi-urge; wrong (Plato). Buddhi, mediator. Prakṛti.
 - 9. Impulse in God; grace at various stages; mercy, creation, realisation and justice.
 - 10. Doctrine of flux.
 - 11. Plotinus - Image of lamp.
 - 12. Relation to self and nature.
 - 13. Fills all space and time.
 - 14. Mystery of ultimate nature of God.
 - 15. Historical conception of God.
- B.
 - 1. Grace for relief from sin. For intuitional experience, for the perfection of experience.
 - 2. Reconciliation of theism and pan-theism in mysticism.
 - 3. Doctrine of a finite God, suggested by Mill and developed by W. James, H. G. Wells, Schiller. Rashdall.
See Ward -Realm of Ends, pp. 443 to 444,
and Pringle Pattison - The idea of God.
 - 4. God and the Absolute identical; personal and impersonal conceptions of ultimate reality; Theological and philosophical conceptions.
 - 5. The impulse in spirit; grace due to it; Buddhi in Sāṃkhya philosophy, Creation due to it.
 - 6. The arguments for the existence of God - all invalid. The mystical proof wanted, spiritual experience.

CHAPTER 4

The Problem of Nature

- A.
 - 1. The attitude of naturalism; creation, emanation, evolution.
 - 2. Einstein's theory of Relativity.
 - 3. Different theories of creation-Sāmkhya. Vedānta, Christian. Platonic.
 - 4. Evolution, Spencerian and Bergsonian.
 - 5. Humanise nature and not naturalise man.
 - 6. A crude, dark, unmoral stuff.
 - 7. Garment of Gods— created by and for God.
 - 8. Arachnomorphism; of the substance of God.
 - 9. Spinoza; nature and spirit.
 - 10. Doctrine of appearance; Kant, Śankara, sensuous and esstatic.
 - 11. The tree of unreality.
 - 12. Phenomenal and noumenal.
- B.
 - 1. J.A.Thompson—Animate nature.
 - 2. Appearance affects both self and nature.
 - 3. The moral as apart from the metaphysical. The doctrine of appearance.
 - 4. Appearance justified; psychologically as apart from metaphysics as in Kant or Śankara.
 - 5. Nature as a cruel, anti-ethical force.
 - 6. A true theory of evolution must humanise nature and not naturalise man.

CHAPTER 5

The Problem of the Self

- A.
 - 1. Reconciliation of monism and pluralism.
 - 2. Qualitative identity. Numerical pluralism.
 - 3. Ecstatic state appealed to, as the resolver of doubts.
 - 4. Summum Bonum. Breaking of individuality.
 - 5. Buddhistic doctrine of non-ego.
 - 6. Reincarnation, an illusion; Plato's arguments.
 - 7. Mystery.

8. Doctrine of sheaths.
 9. Self-consciousness.
 10. McTaggart.
 11. Centre of experience.
 12. Kant: Unity of apperception; logical unity.
 13. Upaniṣadic doctrine of Atman.
 14. Doctrine of flux; Bergson.
 15. The ecstatic state puts a stop to flux.
- B.
1. Transmigration to explain inequalities of creation.
 2. Reconciliation of Monism and Pluralism in an ecstatic doctrine.
 3. Summum Bonum--The breaking of the individuality. Individual immortality, inferior as contrasted with God-realisation, here below in the universe.
 4. The sensuous reality but the ecstatic unreality of selves.
 5. Reincarnation, an illusion from the absolutistic stand-point as well as from the psychological stand-point (of ecstasy).
 6. Self and God—Adjectival and substantival
 - Part and whole
 - Image and archetype
 - Appearance and reality.
 7. Numerical pluralism not inconsistent with qualitative monism.

CHAPTER 6

The Ethical Ideal

- A.
1. Self-realisation.
 2. Super-moralism.
 3. Beatificism.
 4. Loyalty.
 5. Summum Bonum.
 6. Doctrine of Nirvāṇa.
 7. Exuberant optimism Vs. pessimism.
The pessimistic caravansarai on the way to the palace of God.
 8. Ethics passes into mysticism.

9. Justice and mercy.
 10. The reality of morality in sensuous state.
 11. Evil.
 12. Mystical realisation of God.
 13. Activism.
 14. Mysticism and duty.
 15. Love of God—the supreme virtue.
- B.
1. The ethics of loyalty.
 2. Exuberant optimism of the Vedantic mystic. Contrast pessimism. Existence of evil.
 3. Transmutation of instincts and emotions.
 4. Levels :—
Pleasure (animal); happiness (men); beatification (God).
 5. Mystical experience as the supreme end of life.
 6. Conflict between the active and the theoretic attitudes. Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon. Karma and Jñāna.
 7. The philosophy of values.

CHAPTER 7

The Beginnings of the Pilgrimage

- A.
1. Agnosticism, suffering, pain, the problem of the life-after. Miracles, no-test.
 2. Conversion.
 3. Purgation.
 4. Hypothesis—The Word. Logos.
 5. Meeting of the Guru—Grace from Guru as from God.
 6. Moral qualifications; path of discipleship.
 7. Asceticism.
 8. Discipline.
 9. Devotion like a fountain—The part of Eros.
 10. Prayer, meaning of.
 11. Repentance, humility.
- B.
1. The spirit must rise like a fountain to God. Bhakti.
 2. Pain a sacrament; Job.

3. Mysticism and duty: "A life of mysticism exalts contemplation at the expense of moral action."
4. Conversion—a sudden process. Purgation- a gradual process.
5. The use of hypothesis in spiritual life.
6. Evaluation of prayer: "To whom shall I pray?" Prayer aims at an external aim: meditation on internal bliss.
7. Purgation a continual process—Dante's view.
8. The part which Eros plays in mysticism.
9. Intuition awakened through the perfected mystics, hence the necessity of the Guru.

CHAPTER 8

The Vicissitudes of the Mystic Path

- A.
 1. Illumination: Platonic doctrine of forms.
 2. Super-sensuous perception: vision, audition, etc.
 3. Pathology.
 4. Central initiation e.g. tears: sensuous language, super-sensuous experience.
 5. Loss of God -Tukaram, Penumbra.
 6. Continual sense of moral imperfection.
 7. Contrast between actual and ideal.
 8. Mystical adolescence: surrender, Christ.
 9. Step to higher things.

- B.
 1. The artistic nature of spiritual experience: the symphony and illumination.
 2. The vision of dreams, imagination, intuition.
 3. Everlasting No. Center of indifference. Tormented like a fish out of waters. Foresaken for God. No pursuit of God if God were known as impotent. God is dead. Internal wall. Chains of greatness, taken to be possession of spirit. Fate stronger than God. No power in God or God's name. God a pennyless beggar. Shamed to be called of God.
 4. "Him verily seen and fully feeling. Him spiritually hearing and Him deliberately smelling and Him sweetly swallowing" Julian of Norwich.
 "Our normal consciousness is so committed to a dependence on the senses that the fruits of intuition itself are instinctively referred to them by the mystics"—Evelyn Underhill. (Kabir's poems XXXII)

5. Adolescence, mystical—the dangers and pitfalls of.
6. Surrender—the way to final realisation:
Christ. Job, Suso. The psychology of surrender.
Atonement of subject and object.

CHAPTER 9

Unitive victory

- A.
 1. The beatification of the self.
 2. The psychological analysis of the ecstasy and trance.
 3. Timelessness.
 4. Plotinus, Porphyry.
 5. The category of the Holy.
 6. Asymptotic approximation to divinity.
 7. Principle of Grace.
 8. Spiritual power: effects of ecstasy. Vision of God.
 9. Different images.
 10. Deification and marriage.

- B.
 1. In ecstatic experience. subject and object, are one.
 2. Images for unitive life (Dante).
 3. River and the ocean. Iron and fire. Scintillation and fire.
 4. Extinction, annihilation of time in a state of ecstasy. Shortening of time in any blissful activity. Timelessness of God and mystic experience.
 5. Effects of ecstasy: enhancement of world perception. State of transcendent vitality. Transmutation of emotions.
 6. The unhealthiness of trance. Trance vs. ecstasy. Unconsciousness and self-consciousness. Psychological analysis of the state of ecstasy. Ecstasy life-giving. Contributes to organic, mental, moral, intuitive, development. One moment of ecstasy makes another moment easier of approach. Capital added unto capital.

CHAPTER 10

A Vision of Theopolity

- A.
 - 1. The productiveness of spiritual experience; self perpetuation.
 - 2. Types of mysticism; activist, emotional, intellectual.
 - 3. The Kingdom of Ends.
 - 4. Plato's Republic.
 - 5. The City of God—Augustine.
 - 6. Bacon—New Atlantis. Campanella; City of the Sun.
 - 7. The League of Nations and the League of God.
 - 8. The philosopher, the poet, the artist, the physician, the scientist. Jñāna Bhakti Karma (one predominates).

- B.
 - 1. The activist teachings of the Bhagvad-gītā.
 - 2. The felicity of spiritual experience.
Mystics—the parents of a new spiritual race.
 - 3. Europe—only Christianity.
Asia—merely Mohammedanism.
India—Christianity, Mohammedanism, Hinduism;
"The Birth-place of a Universal Religion.

"On reading Professor Ranade's articles on Greek Philosophy, Shri Aurobindo Ghosh wrote "The perfect writer and Scholar... possesses in a superlative degree the rare gift of easy and yet adequate exposition and leaves us charmed.... enlightened and satisfied. A complete history of Greek Philosophy by this perfect writer and scholar would be a priceless gain".

Realising the book Pathway to God in Hindi Literature at Rashtrapati Bhavan, Dr Rajendra Prasad said: "So the philosophy which we have inherited from the past now lives in Professor Ranade".

Releasing the book Paramartha Sopan, Dr. S Radhakrishnan Said: Dr Ranade lived philosophy and was touched by the grace of God My life is richer for having known him

If a full exposition of a problem from the pen of a master is delightful, suggestions from him for further research are challenging. In addition to his critical estimates of different philosophical systems, we have in the last chapter of this book, Professor Ranade's sketch of a contemplated work—The Pathway to God. It provides ample food for thought to whomsoever wishing to launch upon a deep study of philosophy and religion. There are in this work such flashes as: 'We find in Mimāṃsā a lame moralism and a lamer theism 'Or, 'the doctrine of degrees of reality is a mere compromise between monism and pluralism'. Professor Ranade envisages a clue for the reconciliation of the different Vedantic systems in a doctrine of mystical realisation which cancels none of these and yet absorbs all of them giving to each an appointed place and level in the thought evolution of the Vedanta. If one wants to know how mysticism gives a synoptic view of life, one should turn to this book.